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Abstract 
 
The perceived capability of corporate organizations to influence politics, 
although fueling an ongoing public debate, features in literature as a source of probable 
benefits. According to the majority of the pertinent studies, these benefits, more often 
than not, materialize with important value-adding implications. In the U.S. context, 
whereby political money contributions constitute the prevalent way of establishing 
connections, this can result in a hefty return on a firm’s political investment. 
Our research posits that if political connections formed via monetary donations 
elevate the donor to a higher status, this should reflect in circumstances whereby a firm 
needs to assert its quality to other economic agents. This is the case for firms that are 
plagued by the market newness liability. Whether as a form of insurance from tail risk 
or entitlement to economic rents, proximity to politics offers legitimacy and a 
compelling way of introducing a new venture to the marketplace. To prove this 
conjecture, we mainly draw from IPOs for representing a setting of acute uncertainty. 
Our findings confirm that both lobbying and PAC (Political Action Committee) 
expenditure pays off on listing day as donors incur less underpricing; an effect which 
can be amplified with contribution size and strategic targeting of recipients. Donor IPOs 
also experience negative offer price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility. 
Collectively, these results offer new empirical grounding to uncertainty and signaling 
theories.  
Subsequently, we frame IPO pricing as an efficiency problem for prospective 
issuers and develop an approach of general application in finance, where relationships 
of influence are suspected. Rather than imposing a regression-based framework, we 
allow relationships to manifest themselves in a data-driven manner. Our analysis reveals 
nonlinearities between IPO pricing efficiency and the two contribution avenues 
(justifying the fully nonparametric treatment). We are able to uncover relationships 
separately according to business sector, which we interpret in terms of varied 
competitive environments. 
Broadening up our scope prior to and after the IPO event, we document that 
connected firms are associated with a longer time to venture or other equity capital 
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financing, attesting to a greater financial autonomy. Additionally, they attain larger 
market shares and have a superior likelihood of survival in the public domain. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 
The central axis this thesis revolves around is that of corporate political 
connections. This notion of acute public interest, defined by any conceivable 
interdependencies between business organizations and political institutions as on the 
basis of resource and agent sharing, has sparked substantial interdisciplinary research. A 
common theme emerges in the value-relevance of a firm’s political strategy. 
Acknowledging a (limited) number of studies that allude to a latent form of perquisites 
consumption (e.g. Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2012), ties to the foremost 
loci of power have been shown to confer privileges which normally remain inaccessible. 
For example, connected firms secure bank loans on advantageous terms, systematically 
enjoy tax discounts, receive more frequently government bailouts but are considerably 
less likely to be detected for malpractices and fraudulent behavior (Faccio, 2006; Faccio 
and Parsley, 2009; Cooper et al., 2010; Yu and Yu, 2011; Correia, 2014; and Chen et 
al., 2015).  Overall, the multifaceted benefits highlight proximity to politics as a salient 
niche of relationship capital and invite further research in pursuit of additional, currently 
overlooked implications. 
Invariably, the existing literature (inclusive of the aforementioned studies) 
focuses on sizable, well-established firms which have nurtured their political network 
over a commensurately long period of time. As a result, these firms have already shaped 
a corporate identity and reputation within the market. That is, they are known for 
fulfilling their economic role and not as a consequence of their political outreach. 
Recent evidence from China’s IPO frenzy, addresses connected firms at an earlier stage 
in corporate life cycle, that of the transition from the private to public domain (Fan et 
al., 2007; Francis et al., 2009). This research, however, encounters two major 
challenges: i) the distinct character of the local capital market constitutes the 
extensibility of findings precarious and ii) connections abound because of the old 
regime legacy and, therefore, barely indicate strategic investment in politics. In a 
departure from these works, the aim of this thesis is to introduce a novel function that 
political connections may serve in the special setting of new ventures. Specifically, it 
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develops the notion that this type of influential acquaintances can assist businesses to 
combat the market newness liability by providing the necessary legitimacy. In this 
respect, political connections can effectively refer a young firm to the market and lay 
the foundations for future success. The following analysis sheds light on the mechanics 
of this relationship. In particular, this thesis comprises three empirical chapters with 
each one exploring the above proposition from a theoretically or methodologically 
complementary angle.  
Chapter 3 centers on the process of going public for politically connected firms. 
Our main argument is that if indeed this type of network confers certification, this 
dimension should be most apparent under circumstances of immense uncertainty as is 
typically the case at an IPO. The findings are robust and of high economic significance. 
IPO underpricing, the foremost cost in the listing procedure, subsides as a result of the 
decreased ex ante uncertainty characterizing the offering. Yet, as we show the effect 
varies considerably according to the perceived attractiveness of connections. In this 
respect, a need for strategic networking arises, so that a new venture maximizes the 
return on political investment.  
The notion that political connections should not be regarded as a ‘one size fits 
all’ solution is further developed in Chapter 4. However, the main distinction is now 
drawn based on the employed means rather than the targeted politicians. Specifically, 
the two main proxies for political connections in the literature, lobbying and PAC 
(political action committee) campaigns, are comparatively assessed as to the extent that 
allow an issuer to claim a superior valuation for the ownership foregone. An additional 
contribution to the broader IPO literature pertains to the framing of IPO price discovery 
as an efficiency problem to be treated in a fully nonparametric way. The benefit of the 
data-driven approach is twofold as: (i) it is attentive to the dynamic nature of 
interpersonal relationships capturing any nonlinearities in the relationships and (ii) it 
overcomes a series of shortcomings in the IPO research such as the problem of return 
comparability, self-selection and simultaneity bias.  
Finally, Chapter 5 broadens its scope to encompass the full spectrum of events 
during a new venture’s life cycle. Key corporate milestones, ranging from the 
attainment of early external financing such as angel or venture capital to the firm’s 
performance in a public domain, are sequentially visited in pursuit of separate evidence 
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of the interplay with politics. To this end, we document that staying in the good graces 
of politicians can be a stable source of competitive advantage. For example, connected 
firms enjoy considerable financial autonomy, increased market shares and a larger 
likelihood of survival over the long-run. The next paragraphs provide more detail about 
the motivation as well as the specific research areas that the aforementioned studies 
intend to contribute to. 
1.2 Political money contributions of U.S. IPOs 
 
Stimulated by the prolific literature on the value-enhancing element of proximity 
to politics, we investigate a prospective issuer’s possibility to capture a larger portion of 
the surplus value created at an IPO by proceeding to that day ‘connected’. The central 
premise is that the association with politics has the potential to eliminate a lot of 
informational disparities and alter the dynamics in pricing negotiations to the issuer’s 
advantage. This should ultimately result in lower IPO underpricing. 
The majority of pertinent theories differentiate themselves according to the 
particular pair of IPO participants identifying as culprits for the pervasive valuation 
bias. On the one hand, underpricing is taken to reflect the de facto information 
asymmetry between the issuer and market investors (see, e.g., Rock, 1986; Welch, 
1989; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Chemmanur, 1993). Alternatively, the pair of issuer 
and lead underwriter comes to the forefront with underpricing evidencing the extent of 
each party’s bargaining power (for example, Loughran and Ritter 2002, 2004; Hoberg, 
2007; Liu and Ritter, 2010). This study steps on both strands of literature to introduce 
political contributions as an effective mechanism for containing the foremost cost in the 
going public process.  
First, both contribution types entail substantial disclosure which should naturally 
cause a non-negligible portion of the informational asymmetries to subside. A more 
level informational playing field is also attainable with increased interactions among the 
primary participants in the IPO. This brings forward the networking effect of political 
expenditure as an entry ticket into a niche system of similarly politically involved 
entities in which institutional investors and the lead underwriter can have a central role 
by virtue of their size and level of sophistication. Second, we develop the notion that 
12 
 
 
donor equities carry special value for the underwriter. In this regard, political 
connections are perceived to insulate issuers from tail risk; a feature that fosters 
expectations for a long-term business relationship with the investment bank as in the 
form of future issuance, M&As and revenue for the brokerage arm. And if these benefits 
allude to a medium to long-run horizon, facilitating a clientele with perceived influence 
upon political elites can immediately bolster an underwriter’s reputation and, therefore, 
the ability to gain in market share. On balance, notwithstanding whether the 
management strategically engages in political campaigns with an eye at the IPO or not, 
lobbying and PAC contributions can combat the causes of IPO underpricing in a holistic 
manner. 
We seek evidence through the assembly of a unique dataset that involves the 
scrutiny of a large sample of U.S firms for either form of political expenditure. The time 
window is restricted to 5 years prior to an IPO. Besides donors, we trace the profiles of 
the recipient politicians. To investigate for their differential appeal to market 
participants, we hand-collect from the archives of the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) qualitative dimensions such as Congress affiliation, partisan camp, representing 
State and length and breadth of political career. Consistent with the recent literature, this 
information is operationalized by means of the Cooper et al. (2010) indexes of relative 
power, strength and ability. 
The main findings divulge an association of high economic significance. In 
particular, a 10% rise in political expenditure results in 2.5% less IPO underpricing. 
Considering the median contribution size of $ 71.5 thousand, a surprisingly cost-
effective mechanism emerges for mitigating listing-related friction. Furthermore, in 
accord with our initial conjecture, the effect varies significantly with candidates’ 
identity. Interestingly, a market bias towards Democratic politicians and candidacies for 
House of Representatives confirms itself at all levels of statistical significance. More 
expectedly, high-ranked incumbents with lengthy tenures of accomplishment pose as a 
more value-adding target compared to new challengers or average-performing Congress 
members. If carefully tailored, therefore, political contributions can complement the list 
of common pre-IPO strategies such as employing prestigious auditors (Beatty, 1989), 
joining forces with VCs with track records of successful offerings (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991), engaging reputable underwriters (Carter et al., 1998), assembling boards 
with esteemed directors (Certo, 2003) and securing a credit rating (An and Chan, 2008). 
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1.3 Political connections and IPO underpricing: An efficiency 
problem 
 
As discussed above, a prospective issuer is capable of constraining IPO 
underpricing by virtue of its political connections. Although the effect is, on average, 
beneficial, we acknowledge that hidden information may reside in likely nonlinearities. 
Delving into the mechanics of the association, this chapter investigates a question of 
general applicability: what is the most accurate way of modeling political capital and 
relationships of influence? In using lobbying and PAC campaigns as proxies for 
corporate political connections, the challenge lies in describing a setting that will be 
attentive to their different philosophy and, therefore, the different types of 
connectedness that they give rise to. To this end, we abandon the typical regression-
based framework in favor of a direct, data-driven approach. Specifically, we frame the 
IPO underpricing process as an efficiency-analysis problem and assess the issuer’s 
ability to minimize underpricing across a variety of settings.  
Efficiency can be defined as the ratio of an input to an output. A ratio analysis, 
in turn, is a very useful tool provided that suitable prior weights on inputs (and outputs) 
are available in order to render comparisons meaningful. However, these weights are 
difficult to be determined in a subjective manner and, often, there is a need for prior 
information. The inability to define reliable weights causes several obstacles for 
observing benchmarks and, thereby, setting plausible input and output targets to 
facilitate the quest for efficiency. Our study illustrates how this limitation can be 
overcome through the adoption of a nonparametric frontier approach known as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). 
DEA is a mathematical programming method which, once applied in the IPO 
setting, offers the advantage of automatically assigning different weights based on the 
values of IPO offer and first aftermarket prices. As a result, it enables us to derive an 
empirical frontier anchored in the most efficiently valued IPOs relative to the others and 
set reliable benchmarks across our sample. For first time in the literature, therefore, we 
develop a way of assessing IPOs' relative efficiency based on the ability of the issuer to 
maximize the IPO offer price given the aftermarket closing price. Having established 
this efficiency–based valuation measure, we subsequently apply a probabilistic 
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approach (Daraio and Simar 2005, 2007; Bădin et al., 2012) in order to re-measure the 
relative efficiency of the proposed IPO underpricing process under the direct effect of 
different levels of lobby and PAC money. In this respect, we are able to account directly 
for whether an increase in the amounts disbursed to politicians influences the ability of 
the issuer to reduce underpricing and, therefore, to evaluate the IPO in the optimal 
direction. 
The advantage of our proposed methodology over a parametric regression 
framework is threefold as: (1) it has been shown to accommodate with efficacy input - 
output combinations obviating the need for an a priori imposed functional form. 
Therefore, it confers the ability to explore any nonlinear relationships and reveal 
different threshold values for the examined effect of lobby and PAC money on IPO 
efficiency levels; (2) it can be communicated with clarity to decision makers conveying 
insight about the benchmarking units; and (3) it remains unaffected by endogeneity, a 
typical source of bias in the IPO-return equation, as it involves efficiency evaluation 
rather than outcome prediction.   
The results unveil important nonlinearities in the relationship of efficiency with 
the two contribution avenues and thereby justify the fully nonparametric treatment. By 
and large, PAC contributions confirm their hypothesized role as a deterrent against 
excesses in the amount of money that is left on the table by prospective issuers. With 
the effect surviving a battery of robustness exercises pertinent to sampling as well as the 
scale assumptions underpinning the model, market participants are shown to especially 
factor in the existence of direct, interpersonal relationships with policy makers. The 
conflicting evidence from lobbying contributions further corroborates this conclusion. 
In particular, when the full sample is employed the association of lobbying with IPO 
efficiency obtains an inverted “U”-shape form. However, this is to alter to a “U”-shape 
once we restrict IPOs with positive returns which lie on the empirical frontier and, 
therefore, are de facto efficient. At the same time, the identification of best and worst 
performers on a top-30 basis reveals that the majority of IPOs exhibiting efficiency have 
taken advantage of both lobbying and PAC contributions alluding to a complementary 
nature as per the ‘access-influence’ hypothesis of Milyo et al., 2000. 
Intrigued by this peculiar pattern, we bring to the forefront the heterogeneous 
political objectives that firms across the various economic sectors are likely to pursue. 
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Plausibly, disparities in the degree of regulation, reliance on government contracts and 
the salience of labor unions within a particular industry comprise some of the elements 
that contextually deem the one contribution type more value relevant over the other. The 
comparison of three economic sectors (Energy and Power, Financial and Industrial) 
strongly attests to the need for strategically tailored spending. In particular, lobbying 
contributions in Energy and Power account for a positive nonlinear effect on IPOs’ 
efficiency levels, whereas PAC money appears to erode value. This evidence is in 
accord with a heavy regulatory framework commanding for quality communication 
between those who set policy and affected entities. The reverse relationship is observed 
in the Industrial sector; we surmise that PAC campaigns, as a superior means for 
networking, cajole decision makers into government purchases as well as favorable 
appropriations of the federal budget for the industry as a whole. Interestingly, the 
Financial sector, already exerting a political role by virtue of its centrality to the 
economy, barely warrants an economically meaningful association of either lobbying or 
PAC with IPO efficiency levels. 
1.4 The influence of political connections on new ventures: From 
inception to peril 
 
For a holistic study of the implications of political involvement for new ventures, 
the final chapter abandons the IPO focus to encompass a series of other prominent 
events throughout the corporate life cycle. In order of occurrence, these events comprise 
the likelihood of angel or venture capital financing, the time to listing, the performance 
and overall standing within the public domain and, ultimately, the failure as in the form 
of a corporate transformation or delisting. In addition, the broadened time frame lends 
itself well to the study of endowments effects. Accordingly, a parallel research question 
pertains to the extent that founders’ own political networks can mark a distinct course, 
possibly a ‘red-carpet’ for start-up companies.  
In the early stages of corporate life cycle, political connections appear to give 
rise to an interesting idiosyncrasy of introversion. This is observable in the 
underrepresentation of venture capital investors within connected firms’ ownership 
structure. Combined with the evidence showing a longer time to IPO, these ventures 
exhibit in practice their aversion to short-termism and premature exit strategies. 
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Though, this selective behavior is at least partially an outcome of the financial 
autonomy that connected firms are typically entitled to. In this respect, our evidence 
attests to the superior financing alternatives that remain accessible to these 
organizations which manage to stay in the good graces of politicians (Faccio, 2006; 
Boubakri et al., 2008 and Houston et al., 2014). 
Benefits continue to accrue to politically connected firms even when financing 
ceases to be the upmost priority, as is the case subsequent to an IPO. Applying a 
number of performance measures, we associate political influence with the firm’s ability 
to attract increase revenue and, therefore, reinforce its competitive position within the 
market. At the same time, we encounter a phenomenon that features in Boubakri et al. 
(2008) and is described by the firm’s inability to convert market share to a 
commensurately large accounting profit. Fitting a Cox proportional hazard model, the 
time to event (i.e. positive earnings per share) analysis shows political involvement to 
defer profitability to a considerably more remote time. A final organizational outcome 
examined is that of survival as evidenced by the likelihood that a firms remains in our 
sample 5 years following its IPO. Given that a large minority of firms fail to adjust to 
the increased requirements of operating as public entities, we hypothesize that powerful 
acquaintances should be most valuable when an outcome poses of permanent or 
irreversible nature. Indeed, the empirical evidence strongly warrants this direction. In 
line with Shane and Stuart (2002) who reach this conclusion through directors’ social 
capital, we establish the extensibility to the political capital. 
In drawing the above inferences, we reveal important insight about the dynamics of 
a firm’s connectedness. At inception, founders’ proprietary political network is proven a 
transferable asset and suffices for the new organization to claim the associated benefits. 
As long as these individuals retain their stake at the organization, their behavior and 
legacy (inclusive of the political footprint) continues to weigh upon the corporate 
aspects. This situation is to sharply alter upon the transition to a public ownership 
status. This time acts, in a lot, as a turning point whereby the salience of founders’ 
contributions as a determinant of corporate outcomes abates. Concurrently, alternative 
means of participation which foster greater representation of the organization such as 
top management team’s contributions and, especially, centrally planned campaigns as in 
the form of lobbying and PAC account for the lion’s share of the explanatory power. 
Therefore, political outreach can be endowed, but similarly with any other asset, it is 
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subject to depreciation and requires replenishment that caters appropriately to the 
particular stage in corporate life cycle. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature review 
 
2.1 Corporate political connections: an overview 
 
The research on political connections has been originally motivated by the 
empirical observation that a fraction of firms commits resources for purposes extending 
beyond their corporate mission in order to influence issues of public interest. In this 
respect, the seminal works of Masters and Keim (1985), Zardkoohi (1985) and Grier 
and Munger (1993) have played an important role in explaining this selective behavior. 
Further, they have provided a solid theoretical framework for subsequent researchers to 
study the interplay of political connections with a number of corporate aspects such as 
financial reporting (Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010; Chaney et al, 2011), operating 
performance (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Boubakri et al., 2008; Faccio and Parsley, 
2009; Cooper et al., 2010), cost of capital (Houston et al., 2014), executive 
compensation (Aslan and Grinstein, 2012; Skaife et al., 2013), corporate social 
responsibility initiatives (Chin et al., 2013), government bailout packages (Faccio et al., 
2006), professional misconduct and fraudulent activities (Yu and Yu, 2011; Correia, 
2014). 
 
2.1.1 Determinants of corporate political involvement 
 
Masters and Keim (1985) researching the probable determinants of a firm’s 
choice to interfere in politics hypothesize a number of future benefits that these 
organizations can reasonably aspire to. Further, the authors allow for heterogeneity in 
incentives according to the dissimilar needs of each firm’s industry and special 
competitive environment. For data availability reasons, they limit the scope of their 
study to PAC contributions made by Fortune 500 companies in the election cycle 1981-
1982. The main analysis includes a probit regression that models the PAC probability 
based on a list of 10 firm and industry-specific factors. In particular, the probit 
coefficients reveal an increased contributions’ likelihood for larger establishments with 
a wide base of employees, even more so when these firms operate in a highly unionized 
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industry. Inversely, the association is negative for firms operating with a large number 
of competitors. The interpretation lies in the free-ridership problem which is 
accentuated in this situation. Interestingly, the financial sector is shown less likely to 
give rise to PACs. The authors propose instead the centrality of this sector as the 
backbone of the economy which, by and large, obviates the need for further political 
involvement.  
In a parallel research endeavor, Zardkoohi (1985) obtains qualitatively similar 
results for a number of political activity determinants that overlap with Masters and 
Keim (1985); namely, proxies for size, competitive environment and the role of labor 
unions within the firm’s industry. However, Zardkoohi, accounting for possible 
nonlinearities, documents a parabolic relationship between market share and political 
activity. Notably, the researcher observes that beyond a certain threshold of market 
penetration, firms contract their political budget. In this respect, Zardkoohi explains that 
market power can act as a substitute for political power. Especially for firms that 
resemble monopolies and are capable of extracting rents as such, the corporate interests 
can be best served by drawing the least possible attention from policy makers. Lastly, 
the author adds that most likely a firm under these circumstances is successfully 
realizing economies of scale. This, again, means that it can operate optimally under the 
status quo and possible interventions by regulators could put this organizational 
capability at jeopardy.  
In the same spirit, Grier and Munger (1993) conduct a study that is largely based 
on the two seminal works of 1985. The authors engage a more comprehensive sample (5 
election cycles and a diverse sample of companies that spans 124 different industries at 
the 3-digit level of the SIC code). Their contribution also extends to the introduction of 
new political activity determinants into the standard probit model of Masters and Keim 
(1985). As a consequence, while the authors come up with corroborating evidence in 
support of the previously identified determinants, they also document incremental 
explanatory power for the reliance on government contracts, regulated industries, 
collective-actions and other antitrust concerns. Importantly, this study acknowledges the 
possibility of a self-selection bias within the sample of contributing firms and corrects 
appropriately by means of selectivity-corrected econometric models and additional 
robustness checks. 
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Also adhering to the method of Heckman selection models, Hart (2001) adds 
one last motive that may underscore a firm’s political behavior, namely research and 
development (R&D). The viability of a firm that relies on its internal capabilities to 
develop unique processes largely conditions on the existence of solid legislation that 
protects proprietary rights. Equally often, the case might be that a firm seeks permission 
to pursue technologies or products that affect other stakeholders. Notably, the desired 
outcome, in the first situation, is the rigidity in the law-making process while leniency 
and flexibility is required in the second situation. In essence, the advancement of 
corporate interests remains the actual common theme highlighting the opportunistic and 
rent-seeking behavior of corporate donors. Additionally, the author provides a second 
line of argument. Taking R&D as a proxy for operational complexity, he posits that 
with greater degree of complication, the less value a firm’s exit threat obtains as a 
means of exercising pressure on policy makers. In turn, this bargaining deficiency 
should be remedied through alternative ways, including monetary contributions. To 
devise an opportune setting for testing the effect of R&D on political expenditure, the 
author assembles a sample of 120 high-technology firms over the period 1977-1996. 
Overall, the analysis confirms the failure of prior studies to account for what is now 
proven as an important determinant. Notably, the author submits corroborating 
qualitative evidence which obtains by interviewing company executives. 
Political ideologies and partisan sidelines also claim an important role. Shon 
(2010) revisits the turbulent 37-day recount period which followed the 2004 U.S. 
presidential elections (also known as the ‘Florida recount’) in order to conduct an 
interesting experiment. Specifically, Shon studies the association of corporate campaign 
contributions over the two-year interval preceding the elections with donor firms’ 
market performance. The sample comprises 6,708 U.S-listed companies. Consistent 
with prior work on the covariance of share prices with political involvement, the 
relationship is significant and robust. At the same time, the sign of the direction remains 
conditional on the supported race. In particular, firms that aligned with Bush evidenced 
a sharp appreciation in market value; the opposite was true for firms that supported 
Gore. To highlight the substantial economic implications of the effect, the author draws 
evidence from gas and oil stocks. Because of the traditional ties with the Republican 
Party as well as the sizeable stake of the Bush family itself, the industry gained an 
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aggregate value of $ 103 billion, thereby proving the investment character of campaign 
financing.  
Chin et al. (2013) assess the impact that political ideologies can exert upon 
organizational outcomes. In particular, they investigate for a possibly differential pattern 
of resource allocation on CSR (corporate social responsibility). They develop a 
threefold hypothesis. That is, CEOs leaning favorably towards the Democratic 
(Republican) Party are more (less) likely to commit a sizeable budget to CSR, even 
more (less) so when they enjoy increased power and are also more (less) inclined to 
defend this expenditure in the aftermath of poor financial performance. To test this 
conjecture, the researchers trace the political ideology of 249 CEOs prior to assuming 
the CEO position using their individual contributions as a proxy of partisan orientation. 
The empirical findings fully confirm the hypothesized effect. In addition, CEOs with a 
definitive political identity commonly tend to establish corporate PACs as fund-raising 
vehicles for further support to their favored candidates. Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that political values of influential individuals can be transferred and injected 
into their organizations in a discernible manner. 
 
2.1.2 The value-relevance of political connections 
 
Fisman (2001) provides important evidence in support of a symbiotic 
relationship between business and politics. Focusing on the Southeast Asian crisis of 
1997, the study investigates reasons for the unprecedented capital outflow that the 
region witnessed at that time. A huge criticism concerned the misallocation of 
investment funds based on political preferences rather than market-driven mechanisms. 
In order to test the validity of this claim, the author comes up with an efficient solution 
for shedding light on the local interdependencies. Taking the paradigm of Indonesia, 
Fisman ensures an opportune testing ground: the country enjoys remarkable political 
stability and its highly centralized structure resembles a pyramid in the sense that on top 
of every major organization links can be traced to President Suharto or a member of his 
family. Moreover, because the time frame coincided with the last days that Suharto 
remained in office, the researcher ingeniously associated negative news on the state of 
his health to the market performance of quoted companies as well as the Jakarta Stock 
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Exchange Composite Index (JCI). The postulated relation is not only confirmed but also 
the strength of the association is greatly conditioned on the ‘directness’ of the 
connections between firms and Suharto. The severity of the negative information, an 
additional test that Fisman subjected his results to, also claimed incremental explanatory 
power on the subsequent market reaction.  
Event studies like this have also taken place in a U.S. setting. An older one has 
been produced by Roberts (1990) who has documented a sharp decline in the share price 
of traded firms after the death of Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson in September of 1983. 
More recent, corroborating evidence comes from Faccio and Parsley (2009). The 
authors document a decrease in share price for firms headquartered in a politician’s 
hometown upon the announcement of her unexpected death. Conclusively, the findings 
from Fisman (2001) complement the evidence from the U.S. on the existence of 
important feedback effects between the corporate world and the realm of politics.  
Shane and Stuart (2002) explore the effect of initial endowments on the 
evolution of new ventures. Specifically, they investigate the extent to which 
entrepreneurs’ social capital positively influences the survival and further development 
of start-ups. The sample comprises 134 business ventures that have emerged over the 
period 1980-1996 with the sole purpose of commercializing MIT-developed inventions. 
Evidence is drawn through distinct organizational outcomes: failure, venture capital 
financing and IPO. The social capital is defined in the broadest terms to include direct 
interpersonal or business relationships between the founding team and VC-affiliated 
individuals or indirect whereby the relationships are derived through a third party. In 
accord with the authors’ conjectures, social capital is found conducive to this early-type 
of financing. Furthermore, firms are more likely to undertake an IPO risking a smaller 
likelihood of failure. On this basis, founders’ social capital emerges as a valuable 
endowment. Notably, due to the retrospective nature of the data, these findings can be 
subject to bias in a twofold manner: i) entrepreneurs may have a blurred recollection of 
early-life contacts and ii) entrepreneurs who are ultimately successful at securing VC-
support, because of the gratefulness factor, may have a superior recollection of their 
past acquaintances (recall bias); even more so when compared to ventures that 
experienced failure. 
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Faccio et al. (2006) focus on the government bailouts of private firms within the 
period of 1997-2002. By doing so, they shed light on the value-relevance of political 
connections in the special case that an organization is confronting economic distress 
and, ultimately, the threat of bankruptcy. Scrutinizing 35 countries, including the U.S., 
the authors find connections to significantly increase the likelihood of a bailout. 
Countries that receive financial aid from either the International Monetary Fund or the 
World Bank are even more probable to bailout politically involved firms than their non-
connected peers. Interestingly, the former firms tend to systematically exhibit worse 
financial performance than the latter ones before and after the received bailout. As a 
result, the authors conclude that connections consistently lead to resource misallocation 
and impede growth in countries with struggling economies. 
Boubakri et al. (2008) study the privatization process of 245 organizations based 
on 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period 1980-2002. Their main 
research question lies within the role of the organic ties that these firms naturally 
maintain with local governments: do they impede or facilitate the transition to the 
private domain? In addressing this enquiry, the authors investigate a subsample of 87 
firms which host an incumbent or retired politician in the board of directors. These 
directly connected firms significantly underperform the rest privatizations in a number 
of performance measures (e.g. market share growth, return on sales, earnings growth). 
Notwithstanding the adverse effect, the researchers state that a firm’s chance to retain 
connected boards in the private domain is largely endogenous. In particular, a closer 
analysis of these organizations profiles reveals more leverage, a regulated industry, and 
geographic proximity to the key loci of power (for example, as when headquarters are 
located in the capital city). Other institutional factors such as political stability and legal 
system efficiency are also associated with incremental explanatory power. Lastly, the 
chance of spotting politicians within the board positively relates to the residual equity 
stake in the company retained by the local government but is inversely associated with 
foreign ownership. 
Cooper et al. (2010) elucidate the correlation between firm performance and 
proximity to politics. To this end, they employ a large and comprehensive sample of 
U.S. public firms supporting candidacies for the U.S. Congress within the period 1979-
2004. To approximate the breadth and depth of firms’ political involvement, the 
researchers devise ingenious indexes that capture multiple dimensions of the recipient 
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politicians’ profiles such as incumbency status, career progression in Congress, majority 
party alignment and affiliated constituencies. They also factor in the length of the 
relationship between firms and candidates as evidenced by an uninterrupted pattern of 
PAC contributions. By and large, the higher a donor firm scores in the proposed indexes 
the higher cumulative abnormal returns is expected to realize. Future earnings are also 
positively associated with contributions. The profile of recipients that maximize this 
effect comprises candidacies identifying with the Democratic Party and running for the 
House of Representatives. An incrementally positive effect is also observed once a 
politician’s constituency coincides with the firm’s state of headquarters. 
Chaney et al. (2011) commit evidence that ties to politics relate inversely to a 
firm’s accounting quality. In an international study of 19 countries (inclusive of the 
U.S.) drawn from both mature and developing capital markets the researchers test 
whether increased public scrutiny, because of the political shadow, forces connected 
firms to produce above par financial reporting documents or whether the accounting 
standards shrink in value relevance and, as a consequence, the firm’s disinterest reflects 
on the produced output. Notably, firms with ex-ante problematic accounting quality 
resorting to politics also for the purpose of obtaining immunity to business malpractices, 
including poor financial reporting, have been excluded from the assessed sample. 
Overall, the empirical findings robustly support the poor accounting quality conjecture. 
Adding to their value-relevance interpretation, the authors highlight that in order to 
safeguard the longevity of their connections, firms have an apparent incentive to 
strategically conceal or report in an ambiguous manner the benefits derived as a result 
of the political network. 
Houston et al. (2014) attest to the preferential access to debt financing for the 
politically connected firms of S&P 500. Their benefit in this respect is twofold as not 
only do they incur lower interest expenses but also the accompanying covenants are 
significantly less restrictive. The authors explore two different lines of reasoning that 
can plausibly drive this phenomenon. The first interpretation, the Borrower Channel, 
posits that links to politics augment a firm’s credit-worthiness and, ultimately, this is 
what creditors reward. Alternatively, the Bank Channel, highlights the bankers’ need to 
cajole politicians in an attempt to build their own network by granting a special 
treatment to their protégés. To disentangle between the two possibilities the authors 
draw evidence from a subsample of loans given by financial organizations which have 
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already established strong connections with politicians and, consequently, have been in 
less need of the debtor’s proprietary network (a series of other secondary tests is also 
employed for this purpose). With the results remaining qualitatively unchanged, the 
Borrower Channel emerges as the most probable argument. 
 
2.1.3 Abuses and ethical concerns 
 
Confirming the public sentiment of suspicion, corporate political connections 
are commonly found to foster purposes that not only defy business ethics but also are 
legally liable. Recent evidence is mounting. 
For example, Yu and Yu (2010) investigating a sample of U.S. firms that have 
exhibited fraudulent activity within the period 1998-2004 are able to draw an 
unambiguous link to lobbying money. Specifically, lobbying the U.S. Congress results 
in a lower hazard rate for being held accountable for an illegal behavior and even if the 
firm is detected that will typically be 4 months later than the detection time of a non-
lobbying firm. Further, when firms are matched by industry and accounting 
fundamentals, the disparity in the detection time approximates a full year. The authors 
provide evidence that, within this time interval, corporate insiders proceed to aggressive 
sales of their shares so that they insulate their personal wealth from the imminent perils. 
The fact that more than half of incumbent Congressmen typically embark on lobbyist 
careers upon the termination of their political service explains much of the observed 
immunity. 
In the same spirit, Correia (2014) studies the cross-section in the association 
between lobbying and PAC contributions to the probability as well as the monetary 
severity of enforcement actions imposed on U.S. firms by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Documenting a strong negative association, the researcher unveils 
three distinct avenues that provide protection from SEC’s disciplinary mechanisms: 
employing lobbying firms that are connected to the SEC, granting campaign financing 
to politicians that are important for the operation of the SEC and lobbying the SEC 
itself. In addition, firms appear fully aware of these resources and are not reluctant to 
spend heavily on them as a form of insurance against the regulatory agency. Non-
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coincidentally, firms exhibiting subpar accounting quality or systematically engaging in 
misreporting come up among the most probable donors. 
Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) consider the increased scrutiny on a 
company affairs brought about due to its political connections. In what the authors 
designate as the ‘political cost hypothesis’, they develop the proposition that firms are 
strongly incentivized to mitigate the actual magnitude of economic rents extracted by 
staying in the good graces of politicians. This is to prevent any negative publicity 
against both the corporation and its associated political network. Consequently, this 
strategy should result in accruals choices that deflate current earnings while deferring a 
significant portion to future reporting periods. Using the U.S. federal elections of 2004 
as a natural experiment, the authors show firms to overwhelmingly account for profit-
decreasing accruals in the quarters most closely preceding the election time. In addition, 
they draw special evidence from the subsample of firms maintaining a greater interest in 
the outsourcing of one or more lines of production, as the loss of industrial jobs to 
countries with cheaper labor costs topped the political agenda at that specific electoral 
race.  With the findings to emerge even stronger in this paradigm, the authors offer 
reasonably robust evidence in support of the political cost hypothesis. 
The effect of political connections on executive compensation is subject to an 
ongoing debate in the literature. In particular, while there is consensus on the fact that 
connections, in general, lead to inflated pay packages, the evidence suggesting 
commensurate value creation for shareholders is at best mixed. In this respect, Skaife et 
al. (2013) reduce lobbying contributions to agency costs which erode shareholders’ 
wealth. Specifically, they find CEOs of lobbying firms to significantly exceed in 
compensation CEOs of non-lobbying but otherwise comparable firms. Interestingly, 
they report a sharp jump in overall remuneration at the time a firm with no prior 
lobbying activity files its first lobbying report. Although lobbying firms can be 
associated with expanding market shares, the economic impact on the firm’s bottom line 
appears negligible. Further to the agency cost view, when corporate governance 
structures become stronger the executive compensation level approximates more the 
industry average. 
 Aslan and Grinstein (2012) also attest to the higher remuneration received by 
politically connected CEOs. Opting for a more direct method of identifying 
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‘connectedness’, the researchers trace all hard money campaign donations made by 
CEOs over the period 1996-2006 in a sample of companies of heterogeneous sizes (i.e. 
Mid-Cap 400, Small-Cap 600 and S&P 500 firms). In this sample, donor CEOs are able 
to earn on an annual basis about 9% more, while exhibiting a 17% decrease in their pay-
performance sensitivity. Applying the measures of candidates’ relative power and 
ability devised by Cooper et al. (2010), the researchers find that the effect is more 
pronounced once the connection is strategically targeted at the most ‘suitable’ types of 
politicians. However, in contrast to Skaife et al. (2013), the findings also reveal at least 
a partial pass-through into a firm’s operating performance which increases by 0.3%. In 
this case, contributions are congruent with shareholders’ interests. 
2.2 Key studies on IPOs: an overview 
 
The perennial puzzle of IPO underpricing (i.e. the positively skewed distribution 
of IPO returns, also characterized by a fat tail) has entered the corporate finance 
literature in a rather incidental manner. In particular, Stoll and Curley (1970) embarking 
to investigate a likely differential access to equity capital for corporate issuers based on 
asset intensity (termed as ‘equity gap’ in the study), trace the returns realized over the 
first day of trade. Employing a large sample of U.S. firms from the late 50’s and early 
60’s, the researches fail to find empirical support in favor of the covariance of the cost 
on equity capital with a firm’s size. One finding, however, which emerges as a common 
theme in the study and survives a battery of robustness tests, reveals another type of 
gap. That is, the positive difference between the first-aftermarket close and IPO offer 
price.  
Follow-up research by Ibbotson (1975) over an overlapping time period 
estimates an average first-day return of 11.4 percent. Ibbotson finds no evidence of 
abnormal aftermarket performance beyond day one. Specifically, the author allows for a 
sufficiently large time interval to elapse in order for the initial sentiment to subside and 
investigates returns from the 2nd to the 6th month of trading. After accounting for 
transaction costs, IPO shares appear to co-vary with the market, thereby signifying the 
transient nature of the underpricing effect. As a result, the author admits to have proven 
but not resolved an important pricing conundrum. 
28 
 
 
In a first enquiry on the causation for the observed anomaly, Logue (1973) 
brings to the forefront the underwriters’ market structure. As the latter ones refrain from 
engaging in price wars with one another in order to attract new offerings, a model of 
monopsony arises. Consequently, the pricing outcome reflects the relative bargaining 
power of the issuer with lead underwriter. Logue proposes a series of factors which 
could benefit the former one in negotiations such as a large size and the ability to 
sustain business from organic profitability. The underlying assumption is that the cost of 
capital becomes lower for organizations which disseminate financial autonomy. Yet, a 
typical IPO issuer is plagued by severe cash scarcity and, thus, some degree of 
underpricing appears inevitable. 
Since these seminal works, the causes of IPO underpricing have been subject to 
voluminous research. Share allocation, agency conflicts and behavioral arguments 
contribute to an ongoing debate which may not empirically single out a dominant 
culprit. As per the comprehensive survey study of Ritter and Welch (2002), we 
differentiate among the pertinent theories based on whether they assume a status of 
symmetric information among the key IPO participants or not. 
 
2.2.1 Theories on IPO underpricing 
 
Sharp information asymmetries can exist among the buyers of IPO securities. 
Accordingly, Rock (1985) views two groups of IPO investors: an informed and an 
uninformed one. Expectedly, the former group places bids for quality offerings and 
protects itself from committing capital to troublesome or questionable companies. 
Given the severe rationing of IPO shares, this causes uninformed investors to attain 
allocations only when informed investors withdraw their interest. Consequently, in 
order for an incentive to arise for uninformed investors to participate in the process, 
offerings should be marketed with a built-in discount. In this case, the bias in pricing 
offsets the bias in share allocation.  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) stress on investment bankers’ need to value IPO shares 
in a way that closely approximates an ‘equilibrium price’. In turn, an equilibrium price 
is a price which factors in an issuer’s ex ante uncertainty. In this respect, IPO investors 
behave similar to the holders of a call option demanding a premium that is 
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commensurate with risk and the equilibrium price, in essence, becomes an exercise 
price.  Although the authors concede that proxies for ex ante uncertainty are plagued by 
substantial noise, they propose the following two: i) gross proceeds (the inverse of) and 
ii) number of the intended uses of proceeds as listed in an IPO prospectus (S-1 
document). Deviations from the equilibrium are invariably harmful for an underwriter’s 
business. If the latter one underprices excessively, the clientele in the form of new 
issuers will be discouraged. Alternatively, if the underpricing is too frugal, the 
sentiment of discontent will pass on to the buy-side. Under both circumstances, the end 
result converges on the impairment of the underwriter’s reputational capital; a finding 
for which the authors provide strong empirical support. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) compare an IPO to a conventional auction sale. In 
general, they deem the analogy successful noting, however, two key differences: (i) 
investors’ bids represent mere indications of interest than binding commitments and (ii) 
the pricing and allocation criteria remain concealed from the auction participants. With 
these considerations in mind, the authors develop a theoretical model of information-
revelation to explain IPO underpricing. Accordingly, they view no plausible reason for 
roadshow invitees to disclose their proprietary information, unless this entails some sort 
of compensation. Indeed, underwriters opportunely allow for a discount in the IPO offer 
price in order to provide an incentive for truthful information revelation, even though 
this is ultimately done at the client firm’s expense. Furthermore, regular investors, i.e. 
buyers of both ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ offerings should also possess priority over more 
selective or seasonal type of investors. 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) from a cross-country framework shed light on 
the resulting inefficiencies when regulatory authorities intervene in underwriters’ 
marketing effort. In the U.S. capital markets, one such obstacle comprises the NASD 
Fairpractice Rule imposing a uniform valuation over the period of offer, resembling to a 
call’s option exercise price. In other countries, such as the United Kingdom and 
Singapore, the ‘evenhanded’ distribution of oversubscribed offerings is mandatory. 
Both dimensions hamper underwriters’ efforts to alleviate the winner’s curse. The 
outcome results in increased IPO underpricing, even more for Singaporean issuers who 
remain subject to both regulations. The conclusion drawn from this study is a broader 
one: the underwriters’ discrimination in IPO pricing and allocation is conducive to the 
efficient market functioning and, as such, it should be preserved rather than suppressed. 
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Hanley (1993) assembles a sample of U.S firms going public over the period 
1983-1987 with the purpose of empirically investigating the information revelation 
theory of Benveniste and Spindt (1989). A first examination on the basis of descriptive 
statistics appears encouraging to this direction. In particular, firms with IPO offer prices 
in excess of the upper limit of their filing price range account for a mean first-day return 
of 20.7%. In the most celebrated case, the Microsoft IPO, the final price was revised to 
$21 from an initially predicted range of $16-19. On the day of listing, the closing 
aftermarket price raised further to $27.75, yielding a return of 32%. Indeed, the 
empirical analysis confirms upward price revisions as an important determinant of IPO 
underpricing. In contrast, the association of negative revisions with first-day return fails 
to attain statistical significance. This evidence attests to a partial adjustment 
phenomenon in response to good news disclosure. Then, the magnitude of the abnormal 
return comprises informed investors’ compensation for sharing their private insight. A 
second, complementary means of compensation involves preferential share allocations. 
Lastly, the author investigates the implications on long-term performance showing price 
revisions to have negligible explanatory power over two-year returns. The fact that the 
effect remains exclusive to the first-day return equation corroborates the notion of price 
manipulation as a means of deferred compensation. 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) delve into the bookbuilding process of 39 
offerings (of which 23 IPOs and 16 SEOs) over the years 1995-1997. These offerings 
comprise 20 countries and a wide spectrum of industries. Bidders represent 60 different 
nations from Australia, Europe, North and South America. The lead bookrunner for all 
of these cases remains a major European investment bank which has facilitated the 
study by providing the authors access to typically unseen technicalities. In this regard, 
the detailed bid information is conducive to revealing any preferential allocations to 
bidders disclosing their proprietary information. For instance, the authors trace whether 
a bid reaches the maximum limit in price. If this is the case, the price cap indicates the 
fluctuations in demand within the boundaries of a set price range. Alternatively, absent 
an upper limit, the only relevant information for the underwriter in the price discovery 
process remains the quantity of demanded shares. Accordingly, the findings reveal that 
investors opting for price caps are more valuable in information production and, 
therefore, are rewarded by means of preferential allocations. The same rationale and 
privileged treatment applies to those bidders subsequently revising their bids. In 
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addition, regular investors are preferred; therefore, the conjecture of Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) is empirically validated. Finally, domestic investors are shown to enjoy 
an advantage over international ones 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Welch (1989) and Chemmanur (1993) also attach 
to IPO underpricing an important information production role. Acknowledging the 
disparities in the level of information between company insiders and IPO investors, 
these studies revolve around the issuer’s objective function. Accordingly, a common 
theme emerges in quality issuers’ need to promulgate their above average standing. 
Because information production is costly, however, a powerful mechanism to convey 
this message would be a sizeable discount in IPO offer price. This concession is meant 
to comprise a ‘signal’ for uninformed investors (hence, pertinent theories are 
collectively referred to as signaling theories) as other IPOs plausibly are incapable of 
bearing this expense. As for the benefits of this strategy, they presumably arise in due 
time by means of: seasoned equity offerings (Welch, 1989), an optimistic market 
reaction to dividend announcements (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989) and the attraction of 
analyst coverage (Chemmanur, 1993). In this respect, underpricing, as an issuer’s 
endogenous decision, obtains an investment character. At the same time, the underwriter 
plays a peripheral role as simply being a rationing administrator. 
An empirical application of these models features implicitly in Loughran and 
Ritter (2004). In a time-series analysis of U.S. IPO returns over the period 1980 to 2003, 
the authors, at first, observe sharp variations in underpricing according to specific sub-
periods. For example, the average returns within the periods 1980-1989, 1990-1998, 
1999-2000 (the dotcom bubble) and 2001-2003 have been 7%, 15%, 65% and 12%, 
respectively. Even when correcting for the effect of an overheated market, as in late 
90’s, the authors attest to an upward trend which they attribute predominantly to issuers. 
Resorting to an issuer’s objective function similar to the signaling studies, Loughran 
and Ritter envisage changes in the relative weighting of objectives, with issuers 
increasingly emphasizing non-financial factors over the maximization of IPO proceeds. 
In line with Chemmanur (1993), analyst coverage is empirically shown to dominate the 
listing decision. Notably, issuers actively seek underwrites which have a reputation of 
drawing attention to their offerings, even if this is the outcome of excessive 
underpricing. Non-coincidentally, the financial press routinely regards a hefty first-day 
return as well as oversubscription to be indicative of successful IPOs. Finally, Loughran 
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and Ritter add to the picture the self-serving behavior of key executives who are often 
willing to trade a reduced offer price for their preferential access to the allocation lists 
of future (underpriced) offerings by the same underwriter.  
Behavioral interpretations of IPO underpricing also feature in literature. 
Arguably, the most celebrated of these studies is Loughran and Ritter (2002) which 
introduces the application of prospect theory to the IPO paradigm. Focal to this 
framework is the convexity (concavity) in losses (gains) for issuers’ value function, 
with the midpoint of filing price range serving as the reference point. Reinforcing this 
insight into IPO pricing, the authors illustrate the negative impact of the overvaluation 
as descending from a previously assigned high barely leaves management in the same 
state of complacency as that high had never existed. Thus, the concluding pricing 
meeting is expected to give rise to renegotiations where an issuer of proven bargaining 
efficacy fiercely pressures for recouping some of the lost value. 
Lowry and Shu (2002) trace the legal risk that IPO companies encounter. In a 
sample of issuers over the period 1988-1995 about 6% of them are found to be subjects 
of litigation pertinent to IPO matters and, predominantly, IPO pricing. The associated 
cost is substantial. On average, it accounts for 11% of proceeds raised. Notably, in some 
cases the settlement process costs as much as half of the IPO proceeds. Apart from the 
financial burden, the cost may extend to reputational damages for the issuer as well as 
the rest of the agents that have been involved in the process (e.g. accounting, 
underwriting and legal intermediaries). Therefore, an incentive emerges for issuers to 
deliberately offer underpriced shares as a form of insurance. Parenthetically, the effect 
should be even more obvious for those firms that for other reasons (unrelated to 
financing decisions) constitute frequent targets of litigation. Investigating for this 
enquiry raises important simultaneity bias concerns as firms may lowball offer price 
with an eye to subsequent legal implications and the latter ones may appear milder 
because of the observed underpricing. This problem is ultimately overcome by means of 
instrumental variables estimation and an extensive sensitivity analysis. Within this 
framework, the authors provide robust evidence for their postulated effect of IPO 
underpricing as a means of both litigation insurance and litigation deterrence. 
Lowry and Schwert (2004) address the question of whether the new equities’ 
pricing discovery is an efficient process. They investigate this query from two 
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complementary angles: i) the filing price range that an investment banker initially 
assigns and ii) the final IPO offer price. In the first test, the midpoint of filing price 
range is regressed on a series of firm and offering-specific characteristics, i.e. the 
information that has been publicly available at that time. Overall, these covariates can 
explain the heterogeneity in price updates much in the same manner as they relate to 
IPO returns. The observed effect also appears of the same magnitude with that in the 
first-day returns equation (i.e. 3%). Thus, the authors conclude that while for no 
apparent reason underwriters fail to incorporate into pricing all public information, the 
anomaly is economically insignificant so that a speculator may barely set up a profitable 
trading strategy. Subsequently, these pricing updates and the returns on market 
portfolios over the book-building period as proxies for private and public information, 
respectively, are used to explain the variation in IPO-day returns. The fact that both 
variables produce statistically significant coefficients confirms underwriters’ selective 
processing of both information types. Yet, again the effect in economic terms remains 
negligible. Taken together, this evidence leads the authors to the conclusion that the 
pricing process is ‘almost efficient’. 
 
2.2.2 Issuers’ strategies to mitigate the problem of asymmetric 
information  
 
In order to combat ex ante uncertainty and disseminate signals of quality, issuers 
can exhibit particular resourcefulness. Accordingly, the literature shows them to deploy 
a plethora of pre-IPO strategies such as: (1) employing top-ranked auditors (Beatty, 
1989), (2) aligning forces with venture capital firms (VCs) of a proven record of taking 
companies public successfully (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Hsu, 2004), (3) hiring 
high-caliber underwriters (Carter et al., 1998), (4) recruiting prestigious executives for 
the top-echelon positions (Certo, 2003), and (5) obtaining a credit rating shortly before 
tapping the equity capital markets (An and Chan, 2008).  
More closely, Beatty (1989) brings to the forefront the role of auditors as one of 
the key independent agents involved in an IPO. The conjecture is intuitively simple in 
the sense that the established accounting firms are reluctant to impair their reputational 
capital by facilitating offerings which ultimately result in excessive underpricing. 
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Regardless of the clients’ objectives from an imminent IPO, an impeccable reputation 
comprises the foremost asset of market leading auditors and, therefore, a correlation 
between accountants’ brand equity and issuer’s quality should be apparent. Indeed, the 
author’s proxies for a CPA firm’s reputation, fees and a big-8 affiliation, yield a strong 
association when regressed on the amounts of money that is left on the table at listing. 
Importantly, the sign of the direction is negative corroborating the postulated effect. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) stress on the cooperation with VCs as a different, 
yet powerful, alliance. An alliance that as authors comment comprises as much of a 
substitute for prestigious auditors and underwriters as is a complement to them. 
Contrasting a sample of 320 VC-backed firms with the same number of non-VC backed 
issuers appearing as the closest neighbors in terms of industry classification and 
offering size, the VC- backed firms incur significantly lower underpricing as well as 
underwriting costs. The observed effect is attributable to the certification function that 
successful VC firms can serve in the process of going-public. Of course, this does not 
preclude an underwriter’s concession to share a larger portion of the surplus value 
created at IPO with the issuer (and, indirectly, the VC firm) because of the recurring 
stream of revenue generated by a long-term relationship with the VC. In line with this 
argument, the researchers show increased VC loyalty to top-ranked investment banking 
firms. An additional finding pertains to the long-term investment horizon of reputable 
VCs as evidenced by the retention of sizeable equity stakes deeply within the post-IPO 
period. 
Hsu (2004) shows issuers to value and actively pursue the certification and 
legitimacy stemming from VC affiliations. This reflects on a mean of 10%-14% 
discount which reputable VCs enjoy when purchasing start-up equity. The substitution 
of prestige for price denotes that non-financial objectives systematically supersede 
pricing considerations in entrepreneurs’ decisions to share ownership in new ventures. 
The empirical evidence is drawn from a special sample of start-ups. The popular 
‘Entrepreneurship Laboratory (E-lab)’ module offered by MIT’s Sloan School of 
Management assigns a number of graduates to the management team of actual start-up 
firms provided that the latter ones have made it to a Series A funding round. For the 
purposes of the study, this sample is opportune because it is the outcome of reasons 
unrelated to financing choices such as entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the value-added of 
MIT students. Consequently, inferences are least affected by self-selection which is a 
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pervasive bias in this type of experiments. Additionally, the author reports that a new 
venture is about three times more likely to accept the offer of a reputable VC than that 
of a cheaper but less established financing firm. 
Conceptually similar to Megginson and Weiss (1991), Carter et al. (1998) assess 
the effect of underwriter reputation on IPO returns. However, their manuscript 
complements first-day returns evidence with the study of long-run (three-year) IPO 
performance. Overall, the authors corroborate two widely-documented phenomena in 
the IPO literature: the IPO underpricing and the long-term underperformance of the new 
equities. Nevertheless, once a distinction is drawn based on underwriter’s reputation, 
both of the relations feature considerably milder than average. As a result, prestigious 
underwriters more than compensate issuers for the higher underwriting commissions 
which they typically charge. Parenthetically, in testing the above conjectures, the 
authors mark a further contribution. Specifically, they develop a proprietary measure of 
an underwriter’s reputation which they find superior to that introduced by Megginson 
and Weiss (1991). Inspired by the format of Hollywood billboards, this measure relies 
on the order in which the investment banking firms appear on tombstone 
announcements and is proven particularly influential within the underwriters’ market. 
Certo 2003 appeals extensively to sociological theory in order to propose the 
assortment of prestigious executives as a means of signaling quality in a top-down 
manner. The author contends that investors’ decision- making is, among other things, 
guided by anchoring. In this respect, directors who can be plausibly associated with 
prestige, a fusion of personal skills, professional experience and social network, offer 
legitimacy to their organizations. In the IPO setting, this feature is key to overcoming 
the market newness liability. The author concedes an inherent inability of all signaling 
theories to warrant causation net of confounding factors. However, directors’ prestige 
fulfils the basic requirement of an efficient signaling mechanism as it entails significant 
cost in the form of: i) remuneration expenses for the firm and ii) reputational cost for the 
executives. Moreover, burning money in this, and other types of signals, is of little use 
if the target audience is incapable of properly receiving and decoding the message. 
Addressing this further concern, directors’ prestige appears to be a feature easily 
discernible with a broad appeal to the investor community. 
36 
 
 
Using this theoretical framework, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) empirically 
investigate how managerial quality and reputation weighs upon a variety of IPO 
performance aspects. Three measures of these attributes are introduced: i) top 
management team’s (TMT) education and prior professional experience, ii) TMT’s 
tenure within the company and turnover and iii) CEO dominance framed as the sum of 
CEO’s fixed components of compensation over the respective components of  TMT’s 
compensation. Issuers scoring highly on these dimensions are shown to realize a 
multitude of benefits at IPO: limited underpricing, increased interest from institutional 
investors, lower underwriting expenses and greater appeal to top-ranked underwriters. 
Over the long-term, returns for this IPO niche remain satisfactory escaping the 
underperformance problem encountered by average issuers. The benefits extend from 
market valuations to the firm’s operating performance. The authors evidence a positive 
correlation between the above measures of quality with the management’s ability to 
engage in and successfully implement positive NPV projects. Because prestigious 
managers are aware of their own market value, the authors note that only the larger 
establishments could afford to satisfy their financial and non-financial objective 
functions. 
An and Chan (2008) pay special attention to a small sample of issuers that have 
been prudent enough to ensure a credit rating before going public. Specifically, over the 
period 1986-2004, 161 U.S. IPO firms, out of a total population of 5,141, were able to 
provide to investors an objective and readily identifiable sign of quality. Even if this 
feature assesses creditworthiness, and notwithstanding the fundamental conflicts of 
interests between debt and equity holders, a credit rating can claim an important role in 
mitigating ex ante uncertainty as it grants uninformed investors a benchmark to relate 
to. As a consequence, the rated issues capitalize this benefit in terms of a considerably 
smaller first-day return. In addition, the authors emphasize that what ultimately matters 
is the existence of a credit rating per se, rather than the level of it; firms of a higher 
rating realize no statistically different returns than lower-rated issuers. Accounting for 
the fact that a set of common firm characteristics may jointly determine initial returns 
and a firm’s decision to pursue a rating, in the first place, a variety of econometric 
methods are employed in order to treat the endogeneity problem. Overall, the effect 
survives all of the robustness tests, while the endogenous nature of the variable in 
interest is confirmed.  
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2.3 Data envelopment analysis (DEA) in finance 
 
Grounded on the ideas of Farrell (1957), data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a 
linear programming formulation that describes a correspondence between multiple 
inputs and outputs. Unlike a production function which is defined by an equation, the 
DEA’s envelope is data-driven. That is, DEA (and not the researcher) determines which 
input-output combinations are efficient and thereby shape the efficient frontier. The 
suboptimal combinations in the sample derive their efficiency score with reference to 
the observed deviation from what is allowed to emerge as a ‘real’ production function. 
This type of benchmarking is conducive to revealing how a decision making unit should 
modify the particular input-output blend in order to gravitate towards efficiency. 
Although the technique features in the seminal work of Charnes et al. (1978) 
pertinent to the performance evaluation of educational programs and in subsequent 
studies on operations management (Banker et al., (1984), Serman (1984) and Mahajan 
(1991)), the finance literature has been sluggish to adopt the DEA construct. Some 
traces can be found in Varian (1990) which makes a compelling argument for the 
adoption of a nonparametric approach when it comes to measuring the optimal 
performance of customers, investors and other economic agents. Assigning a lesser 
priority to statistical significance, Varian upholds that the economic significance of a 
deviation from the optimal behavior entails more relevance. Employing a set of 
variables (quantities demanded, price and output), he develops metrics relying on 
residuals which capture the difference of outputs over inputs from unity. Seiford and 
Thrall (1990) rely on these measures in order to draw a direct link with efficiency scores 
derived from DEA.  
Relying on an adequately crafted theoretical framework, therefore, Murthi et al. 
(1997) apply DEA into the portfolio performance assessment and circumvent essential 
shortcomings of the widely-used Jensen’s alpha and Sharpe index. For example, the 
assumption of zero transaction costs underpinning both measures is relaxed with a 
mutual fund’s expense ratio and applicable loads to be among the model’s inputs (along 
with the manager’s trading turnover and the standard deviation of returns). At the same 
time, returns retain their position as the output variable similar to the Sharpe index. 
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Within a corporate finance context, the research resorting to DEA analysis is 
recent, evidencing the increasing approval of the non-parametric approach in issues of 
resource allocation and capital budgeting decisions. In one of these studies, Duzakin 
and Duzakin (2007) assess firm performance across the economic sectors in Turkey by 
means of a DEA model with 3 input (assets, gross value and number of employees) and 
2 output variables (earnings before tax and export revenue). Engaging 480 of the largest 
organizations in the country, the researchers find only 9 of them to operate with 
efficiency and 65 when firms are rank-ordered within each different industry. 
 Corporate event studies also begin to appreciate the DEA benefits. For example, 
Halkos and Tzeremes (2013) develop a bootstrapped DEA procedure in order to assess 
efficiency gains of hypothetical mergers or acquisitions (M&As). The inputs comprise 
labor, total deposits and physical capital whereas loans and securities are the outputs. 
Applying this framework over the period 2007-2011 the study finds the fiscal crisis to 
cause any gains in operating efficiency from hypothesized M&As to evaporate. An 
additional conclusion is that a merger does not necessarily result in technical efficiency 
gains even if each of the banks is technically-efficient on a stand-alone basis.  
 In the IPO paradigm, DEA estimation remains in its infancy which comes as a 
surprise given the perennial quest in this literature to overcome endogeneity concerns 
within the first-day returns’ equation. The sole extant study comes from Gregoriou and 
Kooli (2006); however, with a theoretical framing that focuses on investors’ ability to 
maximize their return on IPO shares, the authors overlook the big picture which rests 
upon the excessive amount of capital foregone at listing. Their decision making units 
are indicative to this matter, with the offer price, number of shares and IPO proceeds 
comprising the inputs whereas the first aftermarket price and quarterly return making up 
the outputs.  
Intangibles as inputs into DEA models predominantly revolve around research 
and development (R&D). In this respect, Sueyoshi and Gotto (2009) center on the 
interplay of R&D intensity with the financial performance of two manufacturing 
industries in Japan which constitute traditional drivers of growth for the national 
economy. Confirming their conjecture about a differential effect conditional on 
industry-specific features, the authors register a positive association in a sample of 
machinery manufactures whereas R&D appears as a liability to the performance of 
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electric equipment firms. The list of intangibles may appear more comprehensive. For 
example, Demerjian et al. (2012), in assessing managerial ability on the efficient use of 
firm’s resources, complement R&D with balance sheet items such as ‘goodwill’ and 
‘other intangible assets’. On the other hand, intangibles that escape statutory reporting 
such as a firm’s networking and overall relationship capital are barely used as inputs 
into the production process, even though a DEA model would be particularly 
compatible with their dynamic nature and less predictable association with firm 
performance. 
2.4 Gaps in literature and the contribution of the present study 
 
As it becomes apparent from the previous sections, the value-relevance of 
corporate political connections and the IPO event feature extensively in the corporate 
finance literature. Their between interplay may be: i) implied (e.g. Fisman, 2001; Ritter 
and Welch, 2002; Cooper et al. 2010 Chin et al., 2013), ii) assessed in the context of 
emerging markets as in Fan et al. (2007) and Francis et al. (2009) or iii) draws evidence 
from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast with these studies, the present thesis 
intends to address the following gaps in the extant literature: 
The immediate or very short-term effect of proximity to politics complements 
findings obtained from medium to longer-term horizons (Cooper et al. 2010; Yu and 
Yu, 2011; Chin et al., 2013; Coreia, 2014). Common-sensually, establishing links to 
politicians or other government officials comprises a source of probable benefits which 
manifest themselves ad hoc when political favoritism is needed. From a novel 
prospective, we explore the possibility that political connections as a means of 
introducing a firm into the marketplace and overcoming the liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965).  
In this sense, we also contribute to the IPO literature which examines issuers’ 
strategies for combating the ex ante uncertainty and instilling confidence in prospective 
investors. A non-exhaustive list includes: resorting to top auditing firms (Beatty, 1989), 
(2) sharing ownership with VCs that have a reputation for successfully taking 
companies public (Megginson and Weiss, 1991), (3) being underwritten by reputable 
investment banks (Carter et al., 1998), (4) filling the top-echelon positions with revered 
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executives (Certo, 2003), and (5) obtaining a credit rating (An and Chan, 2008). We 
expand this list by proposing alliances with politicians as a novel yet potentially 
powerful strategy. 
With regard to the extant studies on IPOs our contribution is twofold. The 
existing literature studies politically connected IPOs in emerging markets with the big 
majority of the studies focusing on China (also as in Fan et al. (2007) and Francis et al. 
(2009)). Our empirical evidence is drawn from a mature western capital market (i.e. 
U.S.). Therefore, our inferences are free from elements which are idiosyncratic to 
developing countries or the Chinese state-driven capitalism.  
Relatedly, the studies of Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), Perroti and Guney (1993) 
and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) report conflicting findings on the underpricing of 
SOE (state-owned enterprises). However, a significant portion of the issuer-specific 
uncertainty subsides when the newly floated securities relate to a national government. 
As a consequence, the evidence may hardly be extensible to corporate issuers. 
Interestingly, the survey study of Ritter and Welch (2002) expresses the 
speculation that allocation of IPO shares may, on occasion, serve as a means of exerting 
political influence. The authors, however, provide no empirical support. If valid, this 
practice can conceivably generate a multitude of implications for the efficient 
functioning of capital markets as well as the political system. Yet, it is at least surprising 
that none of the later researchers has picked upon this seed.  
  A final contribution that the present study claims is the applied methodology. 
The persistent phenomenon of IPO underpricing raises concerns’ on issuers’ efficiency 
in determining an offer price. Therefore, framing the process of going public as a 
production-analysis problem, our aim is at pinpointing the efficiently priced IPOs. Once 
properly identified, these issuers can act as benchmarks and their emulation is expected 
to allow issuers capturing a larger portion of the surplus value created at an IPO. 
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Chapter 3 - Political money contributions of U.S. IPOs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the last week of October 2013, with barely 15 days remaining to the planned 
IPO, Twitter Inc was intensifying its effort to finalize a price range for its offering. 
Interestingly, the firm chose this busy week to file its first-ever lobbying report. The 
issues lobbied for comprised a long agenda, mainly pertinent to consumer matters, 
foreign relations, technology and copyright. This lobbying expenditure came 
complementary to Twitter’s newly formed political action committee (PAC) in a timely 
and coordinated effort to reach Washington just before the company’s equity reached 
the New York Stock Exchange. Twitter hardly pioneered the practice of political money 
contributions (PMC) in light of an imminent IPO. The rival social network, Facebook, 
initiated its own PMC effort within the year prior to going public, and Google, back in 
2004, launched lobbying campaigns in a similar time frame.  
While the list of prospective issuers with a PMC record goes on, the corporate 
finance literature has yet to draw the link to IPO performance. Considering the prolific 
research on the possibilities for information flow in favor of the least informed party at 
the IPO event (e.g. Beatty, 1989; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 1998; 
Certo, 2003; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005 and Francis et al., 2010), it is surprising that 
PMC activity has not been explored as a means of firms to communicate access to the 
highest echelon of government. The present study explores the impact of such cash 
flows on a company’s listing endeavor by raising questions of broader public interest. Is 
the level of a firm’s PMC spending a suitable proxy for ‘political connectedness’? If so, 
do market participants factor in corporate political donations under circumstances of 
acute uncertainty such as in the IPO paradigm? Further, how do the two prevalent PMC 
types, lobbying and PAC, compare in terms of overall effect on IPO underpricing and 
do they substitute or complement each other? Finally, which group of recipients should 
PMC firms be targeting in terms of political party (i.e. Democrats or Republicans), 
Congress chamber (i.e. Representatives or Senators) and individual characteristics? 
After all, is there such thing as an ‘ideal’ PMC strategy?  
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In an important departure from recent studies that focus on the benefits accruing 
to established public firms nurturing connections with political figures (e.g. Cooper et 
al., 2010; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010; Yu and Yu, 2011 and Chaney et al., 
2011), we investigate new issuers’ likelihood of seizing a larger portion of the surplus 
created in the going-public process by means of PMC expenditure. Contributions to 
lobbying and PAC campaigns, within a reasonably short period before floatation, can 
create value for at least two non-mutually exclusive reasons. First, a connected firm 
enjoys proximity to other connected entities that play a role in the IPO, in particular 
institutional investors. Positioning itself as an additional node in the network, 
management can gain insight into market sentiment and issues of demand; vice versa, 
firm-specific cues towards the principal buyers are direct and frequent. This first-order 
channel of communication is likely to eliminate a significant portion of informational 
asymmetries in the going-public process. For more peripheral to the network parties, 
such as first-day investors, a traceable record of PMC could constitute important 
disclosure of preemptive action taken against imminent risks. At a minimum, access to 
the highest decision-making bodies promulgates a firm’s ability to maneuver with less 
friction in the institutional environment, thereby mitigating ex ante uncertainty. Second, 
politically involved issuers possess sufficient bargaining power to contain an 
underwriter’s propensity for distributing discounted IPO shares to preferred customers. 
An edge in the pricing negotiations may stem from: (1) the connected firm’s financial 
autonomy, rent-extraction capability and overall reputation (Hart, 2001; Faccio, 2006; 
Boubakri et al., 2008 and Houston et al., 2014); (2) It can equally be a product of 
management sophistication, a necessary quality in order to orchestrate and go after 
political connections in the first place. Taken together, the setting appears opportune for 
PMC issuers to incur less of the foremost cost entailing the listing endeavor, i.e. IPO 
underpricing1. 
To test this conjecture, we assemble a large and comprehensive sample of U.S. 
IPO deals spanning the period from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. We manually 
investigate each issuing firm in the archives of the U.S. Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) and Center for Responsive Politics for evidence of PMC activity within the five-
year period preceding the listing date2. We thus obtain our special sample of interest, 
                                                          
1 ‘Underpricing’ is the prevailing IPO jargon for the realized return over the first trading day. 
2 We expect the effect of PMC on IPO performance to be more pronounced with increased time proximity 
to the IPO day. Approximately 81% of PMC firms have exhibited their spending within the 12-month 
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PMC firms. Comparing PMC IPOs’ mean first-day return of 19% with the remaining 
IPOs’ mean underpricing3 of 29%, we come up with strong preliminary evidence for 
our hypothesized effect of political donations on IPO returns. Notably, assessing the 
fundamentals of PMC firms, we find these issuers to be associated with superior quality 
as proxied by market share, profitability, leverage and years of operational experience. 
It becomes, therefore, plausible that PMC firms, rather than seeking a ‘life jacket’ in 
politics, are involved in order to manage, in due course, the legal and institutional 
uncertainties that lie ahead. Our empirical findings show that this strategy becomes 
discernible by market participants and pays off on the first day of trade. Employing the 
full IPO sample, we regress underpricing on a firm’s choice to engage in PMC, along 
with common covariates from the literature, and confirm the inverse relation; lobbying 
money, PAC contributions and any combination of the two PMC routes significantly 
result in leaving less money on the table.  
Econometrically, we exercise caution in the above analysis to draw inferences 
least distorted by endogeneity. Given the highly discretionary nature of PMC, it is likely 
that firm-specific features driving the PMC decision weigh also upon IPO pricing. To 
account for feedback effects, we instrument for PMC involvement with a battery of 
established, in the relevant literature, PMC determinants while also introducing novel 
ones, especially tailored to the IPO setting. We estimate selection and outcome 
equations in a two-stage procedure applying the Heckman and the instrumental 
variables (IV) methods. The former approach addresses the bias stemming from firms’ 
self-selection into the PMC practice. The IV method, instrumenting by means of fitted 
values, adds robustness to our selection of PMC determinants. Pursuing enhanced 
efficiency for the resulting coefficients, we also estimate the equations system 
simultaneously via maximum likelihood. Invariably, the three estimation techniques 
lend strong support to the validity of our inferences. 
With our main conjecture confirmed, we turn our attention from the PMC 
involvement per se to PMC level. We draw evidence from the PMC IPO sample to 
ensure that results are not simply driven by size. In assessing the incremental 
importance of a dollar disbursed for lobbying or PAC contributions, we record that the 
more substantial the PMC magnitude appears, the more constraining the effect on initial 
                                                                                                                                                                          
period preceding the IPO. In our robustness checks, we test the validity of our results in this special 
subsample as well as alternative time windows. 
3 Hereafter, we use the terms ‘first-day return’ and ‘underpricing’ interchangeably, similar to literature. 
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return emerges. The relation is of high economic significance; ceteris paribus, an 
additional 10% PMC expenditure reduces IPO underpricing by 2.5%. In light of this 
evidence, far from acting as a nominal value proxy for connectedness, PMC obtains a 
definite investment character.  
Further, we take advantage of the traceable nature of PAC contributions (as 
opposed to lobbying opaqueness) and study the differential effect on IPO return by 
recipient candidate profile. First, we draw a distinction between the two Congress 
chambers and test for an incremental Senate effect. Interestingly, findings dispel the 
popular perception that attaches special prestige to U.S. Senators; sponsoring campaigns 
for the House of Representatives entails more value. Second, we split across party lines 
and, once more, contrary to the common view accompanying the Republican Party as 
the ‘pro-business party,’ we show that a Democratic bias in contributions brings about 
the least underpricing. Third, we portray candidates not only as structural units of their 
main affiliations, but also as portfolios of distinctive characteristics of their own. To this 
end, we resort to the Cooper et al. (2010) taxonomy and construct the respective indexes 
for candidate ‘strength,’ ‘power’ and ‘ability.’ By and large, the cross section of these 
dimensions upon IPO returns reveals a more compelling effect for home state 
candidates and lengthy tenures of accomplishment. Given the scarcity of liquid assets in 
the pre-IPO regime, this insight facilitates the efficient appropriation of PAC funds 
based on strategic targeting of recipient candidates. Another key implication pertains to 
the nature of the relationship per se. That is, establishing robust links with (any type of) 
candidates necessitates a firm’s commitment to a recurring and uninterrupted pattern of 
contributions. Of course, with a median firm age of 8 years at IPO, time is also in short 
supply. Overall, we conclude that notwithstanding the significant adversities, and to a 
large extent because of them, a PMC record successfully promulgates an issuer’s 
determination to grow in political reach in parallel to the rest of its asset base.  
We expand our horizon beyond the listing day to draw support from the 
bookbuilding period. Following both the magnitude and direction of filing price 
revisions, we explore how a PMC record weighs on price discovery. Evidently, it 
systematically leads to downward revisions of IPO offer price. This relation, in 
conjunction with the modest underpricing, attests to the highballing of PMC offerings, a 
phenomenon that only partially reverts in light of informed investors’ feedback. In this 
case, the underwriter foregoes a nontrivial fraction of the surplus created in the going-
public process in favor of the issuer; a behavior that is in line with the bargaining power 
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of donor firms but less compatible with the networking effect of PMC. We seek 
additional evidence from cases whereby the lead underwriter is also politically 
connected. We recognize two distinct avenues through which this becomes possible: (1) 
The underwriter is active in political contributions similar to IPO firms and (2) the 
underwriter derives connectedness indirectly through its PMC clientele. While the 
results invariably corroborate our main conjecture in this study, the effect is amplified 
for underwriters with a scarcity of the second (indirect) type of connections. Therefore, 
PMC issuers are shown to be sought-after in themselves rather than as liaisons between 
the investment banker and the loci of power. 
For a holistic study of the PMC effect, we also trace the aftermarket volatility of 
IPO equities. Following a matched sample approach, we assign to each PMC IPO a 
non-PMC closest neighbor and record the standard deviation of returns on the two 
portfolios within specific time intervals that extend up to a year after the issue. 
Invariably, the results prove that PMC shares trade significantly more smoothly than 
their non-PMC counterparts. In addition, we show that the wider the interval, the more 
sizeable the difference in mean volatility grows to be. Apparently, the PMC-driven 
sentiment extends well beyond the IPO event.  
We subject findings to a battery of robustness exercises. First, we assess the time 
sensitivity of our results by introducing alternative cutoffs with regard to PMC distance 
from the IPO day. Second, in order to disentangle the effect of each contribution type, 
we rerun our main regressions for lobbying and PAC in isolation. With this testing to 
yield a qualitatively similar relation, our choice for grouping under a common PMC 
umbrella is largely warranted. Notably, the least underpriced IPOs have employed some 
blend of lobbying and PAC contributions. This proves that a PMC effort, in order to 
fulfill its mission, whether as a means to reduce information asymmetries or a 
bargaining weapon, needs to be both sizeable and focused; lobbying contributions cater 
for the size factor by being uncapped, PAC contributions provide the more personalized 
dimension by entering directly into candidates’ campaign coffers. Third, we 
acknowledge the existence of a special group of PMC IPOs (‘political by birth’) that 
commence contributions shortly after foundation. We test separately for these early 
birds allowing for a possible covariance of the PMC effect with the corporate life cycle. 
With inadequate evidence to support this conjecture, though, a long apolitical past is 
shown to pose no threat to the PMC-stemming benefits.  
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This study makes important contributions to IPO and corporate finance literature 
while addressing concerns of mounting public interest such as the symbiotic relation 
between the corporate world and politics. First, we show how a firm’s political 
donations, commonly associated with remote and indirect benefits, translate into an 
immediate and measurable gain on the IPO day. With a median expenditure of $ 71.5 
thousand, such contributions exert a profound effect on altering the relative dynamics in 
an IPO as both underwriter and market investors factor in a firm’s Washington strategy; 
the former assigns a premium valuation and the latter systematically maintain first-day 
return at a modest level. Second, we contrast lobbying and PAC spending, as the two 
main PMC types, and disentangle their effect on IPO performance. Highlighting special 
strengths and weaknesses for each strategy, we make a case about their complementary 
nature towards an effective mechanism for combating ex ante uncertainty. Third, 
differentiating among PAC money recipients by Congress chamber, party affiliation and 
individual characteristics, we devise an optimal target group for the most constraining 
effect upon underpricing. The implications for prospective listers are unambiguous: a 
dollar spent on PMC activity saves many more on the actual listing day. Sure enough, 
uncertainty-driven underpricing can be fought with alternative tools; for instance, 
marketing campaigns or charities. In that case, however, the advantage of a well-
implemented PMC strategy would be twofold as: (1) it typically entails a dramatically 
lower investment; and (2) the likely benefits are expected to extend over well beyond 
the IPO event. 
Our study relates to the works of Beatty (1989), Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
Carter et al. (1998), Certo (2003), Faccio (2006), An and Chan (2008), Francis et al. 
(2009), Cooper et al. (2010), Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010), Yu and Yu (2011) 
and Correia (2014). A focal point in the IPO literature has been issuers’ effort to 
overcome moral hazard and adverse selection concerns by signaling quality. In this 
regard, firms reportedly employ a plethora of means. A nonexhaustive list shows issuers 
targeting prestige spillovers by: (1) hiring reputable auditors (Beatty, 1989), (2) inviting 
VCs with a proven record of successful IPOs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991), (3) 
employing top-notch underwriters (Carter et al., 1998), (4) infusing management teams 
with prestigious executives (Certo, 2003), and (5) seeking a credit rating (An and Chan, 
2008). Expanding this literature, we produce the first study to relate political donations 
to IPO performance and introduce PMC as a novel strategy for a prospective lister to 
claim value with assertiveness. Another strand of literature stemming from the interplay 
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of politics with business (Faccio, 2006; Cooper et al., 2010; Ramanna and 
Roychowdhury, 2010 Yu and Yu, 2011) draws evidence from firms with several years 
of experience as public corporations that have developed their connections over a 
sufficiently large time span. From an alternate perspective, the present study fixates 
upon the IPO event for highlighting a firm’s need to fast-track connections in the pre-
IPO period, so that it cashes in benefits as early as the first day of trade. 
The rest of the chapter has the following structure. Section 3.2 reviews selected 
studies of IPO and political connections literature. Section 3.3 develops our hypotheses. 
We describe our sample and contrast the two PMC types in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 
outlines our methodology. The empirical analysis is in Section 3.6. We test the 
robustness of our results in Section 3.7. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
 3.2 Related literature 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
Price discovery for new equity offerings is an inherently uncertain process. The 
relevant literature invariably captures this uncertainty by means of listing day 
aftermarket performance. Since the seminal works of Stoll and Curley (1970), Logue 
(1973) and Ibbotson (1975) have revealed a robust pattern of abnormal positive returns, 
a plethora of theories attempt to explain the conundrum of IPO first-day return, which is 
appropriately referred to as underpricing. The asymmetries in information among the 
various parties involved in an IPO deal serve as a focal point for most explanations 
offered. For example, Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) maintain that in light of 
a de facto informational disadvantage, risk-averse investors are naturally inclined to 
pressure for a discount price. In parallel, effective price discovery requires unbiased 
feedback from engaged investors and, if possible, their proprietary insight. But since 
private information comes at a cost, the underwriter is likely to adjust the offer price 
downwards in order to provide compensation at the issuer’s expense (see Benveniste 
and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990 and Spatt and Srivastava, 1991). 
Accordingly, the need to underprice lies at the intersection of demand-side and 
bookbuilding factors. 
 Another strand of literature, also stemming from the asymmetric information 
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framework, assigns value to underpricing and illustrates circumstances under which an 
issuer would concede to a large first-day return. Far from the market friction view, 
Welch (1992), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Demers and Lewellen (2003) regard a 
reasonably low offer price as an effective marketing tool for appealing to an extended 
base of uninformed investors. The implicit assumption is that the firm will be able to 
capitalize in due course on the enhanced attention drawn from a euphoric IPO, 
recouping more wealth than what was given up at listing. Chemmanur (1993) adds 
increased analyst coverage to the benefits of a high initial return while a number of 
studies pertinent to the legal implications of IPOs highlight the lawsuit deterrence effect 
of a strong first-day close (Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Drake and Vetsuypens, 1993 and 
Lowry and Shu, 2002). 
 Lastly, Loughran and Ritter (2002), in a notable turn from asymmetric 
information to prospect theory, portray underpricing as a rather harmless vice, 
suggesting that initial investors, already being in a prosperous state through the 
amassment of IPO proceeds, rarely reckon the marginal utility foregone on the first day 
of trade. Yet, it is Jay Ritter who estimates on his website the cost of global IPO 
underpricing to be $135.12 billion. And this only captures the period 1998–2012. 
Consequently, the astronomical magnitude of the amount fosters skepticism against any 
behavioral explanations assigning a lesser importance to the efficient pricing process. 
 
3.2.2 Political connections as a value adding strategy 
 
The value adding component of corporate political connections is explored in 
literature via two main routes; these either involve scrutiny of company insiders’ 
proprietary network or, alternatively, apply a ‘follow-the-money’ approach going after 
cash flows directed from corporate coffers to politics. 
 Within an international or cross-country context, poor data availability and, on 
occasion, deliberately opaque interrelations between the business world and local 
governments typically leave no option but to directly investigate the individual profiles 
of corporate officials. In these cases, companies derive their connections through 
directors and executives who either actively engage in politics or remain closely related 
to others who do. Faccio (2006) applies this identification method in a comparative 
study of 47 countries and finds that connected firms are able to sustain larger market 
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shares without this feature to reflect proportionately on the accounting bottom line (see 
also Boubakri et al., 2008). The study observes further that connected firms maintain 
significantly more levered capital structures as they enjoy preferential access to debt 
financing (e.g. lenient debt covenants), although there is no evidence of incurring a 
smaller interest expense than their peers. Chaney et al. (2011) assess the reporting 
quality of more than 4,500 firms in 19 countries and reach the conclusion that politically 
connected firms are not penalized for consistently underperforming in this field. 
Apparently, in light of political reach, accounting data shrinks in value relevance.  
Tracing political connections in the U.S. at the director’s level, similarly to the 
above studies, would likely produce less enlightening results. In the Faccio (2006) 
database, out of a total of 6,007 U.S. firms examined, only 13 of them qualify to be 
classified as politically connected. U.S.-centered literature circumvents this limitation 
by recognizing corporate expenditure for political purposes (overwhelmingly, lobbying 
and PAC) as a valid proxy for political connections. Notably, within this 
methodological framework, the particular PMC type appears of minor importance. For 
example, even though Chen et al. (2010) and Cooper et al. (2010) concentrate on 
lobbying and PAC contributions, respectively, they draw a common conclusion: donor 
firms robustly enjoy superior financial and accounting returns. Besides performance, 
political money has been documented to facilitate more questionable ends. Indicatively, 
Correia (2014) finds that PMC lower the probability of an SEC enforcement action and, 
even if the firm is subjected to one, the financial penalty is expected to be very 
moderate. Yu and Yu (2011) take this argument one step further and stress the 
immunity to fraud that lobbying can provide. Interestingly, “firms that lobby on average 
have a significantly lower hazard rate of being detected for fraud, evade fraud detection 
117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be detected by regulators.” 
 
3.2.3 Political connections and the listing project 
 
Recent studies on China show that political connections can play a decisive role 
towards a successful IPO. Fan et al. (2007), drawing evidence from the (partial) 
privatizations of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), attest to the contained 
underpricing that these firms incur when headed by incumbent or past government 
officials. Corroborating this research, Francis et al. (2009) discuss the threefold benefit 
that a strong association with the government entails by supporting premium valuations, 
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imposing discipline on first-day returns and reducing costs throughout the entire 
issuance process. Yet, the distinct character of the Chinese capital markets casts doubt 
on the applicability of this insight into a cross-country framework. More importantly, 
these connections, largely an inheritance from the past economic model, entail no cost 
and, therefore, may not be considered as an issuer’s political strategy. Resorting to the 
international privatization literature, the studies of Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) and 
Perroti and Guney (1993) meet on the excessive underpricing of SOEs compared to 
non-SOE IPOs, a finding that is challenged in Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). But 
again, any inferences to be drawn from SOEs to the typical corporate issuer remain, at 
best, dubious as the ex ante uncertainty is fundamentally different when the state is a 
counterparty. In a U.S. setting, Ritter and Welch (2002), within a line that has 
surprisingly escaped attention, raise the speculation that underwriters employ the 
allocation of (discounted) IPO shares as a tool for influencing politicians. Logically, the 
alignment of incentives should fundamentally be revised when the issuer, rather than 
standing between the investment banker and the sought-after connections, assists in 
bridging the distance. We develop this proposition in the next section.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
 
Political connections formed via PMC, whether the firm operates in a private or 
public domain, remain in essence a long-lived intangible asset and may hardly be 
framed as preparation for an imminent offering. Even so, a precedent of donations can 
profoundly alter the relative dynamics in an IPO. To uncover the incremental value 
accruing to a firm soliciting equity capital ‘connected,’ we rely upon two non-mutually 
exclusive lines of argument.  
First, if, as per Logue (1977), IPO pricing mirrors an issuer’s bargaining power 
vis-à-vis lead underwriter, a valuable deal for the former party is likely to emerge once 
it convincingly transmits less dependence upon the latter agent’s resources. A PMC 
setting is in line with this spirit as: (1) the de facto esteem of connected firms simplifies 
the marketing effort and generally appears to be more compatible with the types of 
offerings that enhance an underwriter’s reputational capital, rather than those relying on 
it for certification (as in Carter and Manaster, 1990); (2) the preferential access to 
alternative means of financing (Faccio, 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008 and Houston et al., 
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2014) allows for the possibility of either waiting until a satisfactory negotiated outcome 
arises or cancelling the deal altogether; and (3) the rent-extracting capacity attributable 
to connections (Hart, 2001; Faccio, 2006 and Cooper et al., 2010) reinforces 
expectations of a recurring business relationship with the underwriter, as in the case of 
follow-on offerings, M&A activity and trading revenue for the brokerage arm. A more 
subtle point can be deduced not as a result of the PMC act per se, but on the basis of 
management’s determination to pursue one additional resource: PMC-stemming 
benefits. Arguably, an issuer identifying with the minority of firms that challenge the 
boundaries of the prevailing institutional environment and go after policymakers is also 
less likely to concede to a lowballing of the IPO price. 
Second, PMC reduce information asymmetries for principal participants 
involved in the listing process. A more level playing field is attainable: (1) within a 
niche network of similarly politically connected people or entities. Institutional 
investors, without precluding other economic agents (underwriter, retail investors, 
financial and legal intermediaries etc.), can be central to such an association by virtue of 
an advanced sophistication level. In this respect, political connections shape for the IPO 
firm an additional channel through which it can exchange inside information for 
projections of demand and overall market sentiment; (2) due to the disclosure element 
entailing both the filing of lobbying reports and the identification of PAC recipients. 
Logically, reassessing an issuer’s risk exposure in conjunction with all remedial action 
taken in the form of PMC alleviates an important portion of ex ante uncertainty. Let one 
of our opening examples, Facebook, illustrate further this notion. With intellectual 
property infringement posing as a primary threat, operational viability remains 
conditional on the protection of proprietary rights. Indeed, the firm’s IPO prospectus (S-
1 document), among other risk factors, declares: “If we are unable to protect our 
intellectual property, the value of our brand and other intangible assets may be 
diminished, and our business may be adversely affected.” Yet, an investigation of the 
company’s PMC activity is likely to mitigate related concerns divulging a substantial 
and ongoing lobbying effort on issues of copyright, patent and domain name protection, 
a campaign that was also complemented by PAC contributions towards the leadership 
of the relevant Congressional committees4. Notwithstanding the multifaceted role that a 
                                                          
4 The election cycle 2010–2011 saw substantial PMC activity for Facebook Inc. In detail, lobbying 
expenditure reached $ 1,701,390 and total PAC contributions $ 270,000. Among PAC recipients we note 
Bob Goodlatte ($ 2,000) and Mel Watt ($ 2,000) as the chairman and ranking member, respectively, of 
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PMC record can obtain in the elimination of asymmetries, Ritter and Welch (2002) 
recognize that “all theories of underpricing based on asymmetric information share the 
prediction that underpricing is positively related to the degree of asymmetric 
information.” 
In sum, the potential channels lend support to PMC as a means of imposing 
discipline on first-day returns and lead to our main hypothesis: 
 
H.1. Ceteris paribus, underpricing is inversely related to political money contributions of IPO 
firms. 
 
If lobbying and PAC contributions are complementary PMC types, the firm has 
to devise an efficient portfolio of PAC recipients5. In light of the cash-constrained 
environment of a typical IPO firm, the targeting of candidates warrants careful study.  
We first differentiate based on Congress chamber affiliation. The Senate is 
commonly surrounded with greater prestige than the House of Representatives. Two 
plausible reasons are the Senate’s filibuster prerogative (the right to delay or postpone a 
proposal by extending debate indefinitely) and the authority ‘to advise and consent’ to 
major presidential appointments (U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 2). Nevertheless, the majority 
of studies simply point to the size differential between the two Houses; undoubtedly, 
contrasting the 100 seats of the Senate with the 435 (voting) seats of the House of 
Representatives creates a strong impression of a Senatorial predominance (e.g. as in 
Grier and Munger, 1993). Given the above, we expect additional prestige to accrue to 
firms contributing preferentially to Senate candidates and the merits of being associated 
with the more privileged Congress chamber should reflect on IPO return.  
 
H.2.a. Underpricing decreases more with PAC contributions to Senate rather than House 
candidates. 
 
Disentangling the effect of PAC contributions across political party lines is a 
complex task. The relevant studies highlight firms’ strategy to target incumbents, 
irrespectively of party affiliation, and converge to the conclusion that firms spend to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet committee of the House of Representatives. In the 
Senate, PAC recipients include John Kerry ($ 2,500) and Jim DeMint ($ 2,500) as the chairman and 
ranking member, respectively, of the Communications, Technology and the Internet committee. 
5 Lobbying, because of its impersonal nature, does not allow for any further differentiation other than the 
monetary intensity of the contribution. 
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ensure access rather than to influence the outcome of elections or for other ideological 
reasons (Stigler, 1971; Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and Milyo et al., 2000). Lowery 
and Brasher (2004: 133) describe this phenomenon in an accurate manner: “most of the 
economic sectors do not put all of their eggs in one partisan basket. They give to both 
parties; or, more specifically they give to incumbents, which means that they give to 
both parties,”  
Because of corporate donors’ indifference, literature has turned its attention to 
the partisan preferences of market investors. In this respect, some early insight from 
Niederhoffer et al. (1970) and Riley and Luksetich (1980) associates a bullish market 
with the aftermath of Republican victories. At the firm level the evidence is rather 
mixed. Goldman et al. (2009), tracing corporate political contributions from the 2000 
election cycle, refute altogether an association of the outcome of the elections with post-
election market returns. In contrast, Shon (2010), also using data from the turbulent 
period of the 2000 Florida recount, documents a significant relation between campaign 
donations and stock prices. With a broader time window, Cooper et al. (2010) conclude 
that PAC contributions have a strong positive relation with both market and accounting 
measures of performance, documenting an incremental contribution effect for 
Democrats.  
Notwithstanding the discord in literature, a portion of the issuer-specific 
uncertainty is likely to subside from the association with the ‘pro-business’ party and 
Republicans may hardly dispel this stereotypic identity. 
H.2.b. Underpricing decreases more with PAC contributions to Republican rather than 
Democratic candidates. 
 
Down to the level of individual characteristics, each candidate comprises a 
unique portfolio of attributes. Among them, we attach special weight to: (1) geographic 
scope, (2) an uninterrupted relationship with the firm, and (3) a track record of 
leadership while in Congress. 
Faccio and Parsley (2009), in a provocative manner of pinpointing the 
interdependent relations between businesses and local authorities, document a decrease 
in share price for firms headquartered in a politician’s hometown upon the 
announcement of her unexpected death. Within a U.S. context, Roberts (1990) had 
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already witnessed a similar effect for Washington-based companies following the loss 
of Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson in September of 1983. In assessing the value of 
connections, therefore, we need to acknowledge the symbiotic relationship among the 
local pillars of power, especially for those firms maintaining an extended operational 
base in the headquarters’ state. Additionally, literature favors constant streams of PAC 
money, as opposed to one-off or sporadic spending (Strattman, 1995, 1998 and Krozner 
and Strattman, 1998). Intuitive as this proposition may appear, nurturing long-term 
political connections is a challenging project; prospective issuers, with a median age6 of 
8 years, face severe time and liquidity constraints. But again, we expect such adversities 
to assert the firm’s determination regarding political involvement. Finally, for a 
maximum impact per PAC dollar spent, we propose the selection of recipients on the 
basis of their relevant agenda-setting power and collegial esteem within the Congress 
chambers. We proxy for these qualities by means of committee assignments and 
committee rankings. 
 
H.2.c. Underpricing decreases with recurring contributions towards home state candidates and 
lengthy tenures of accomplishment. 
 
3.4 Data and sample 
 
3.4.1 Sample selection criteria – IPO  
 
To assemble our sample we retrieve information from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) covering the entire population of IPOs that have been floated on U.S. 
exchanges for the period 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. Consistent with previous 
literature (e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 2002), we eliminate those IPOs priced at less than 
$5 per share, limited partnerships, reverse LBOs, ADRs and foreign issuers whose 
shares may be already trading in local markets. In addition, while allowing for financial 
firms, we exercise caution not to include closed-end funds, REITs, royalty trusts and 
special purpose investment vehicles. To this end, we do not consider firms with SIC 
codes between 6723 and 6999 or companies that, even though they bypass Thomson 
                                                          
6 We use data from Jay Ritter’s website in order to estimate this statistic for a time horizon exactly 
overlapping with the one used in this study, i.e. 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. The total sample 
includes 2,403 IPOs.  
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Reuters filters for closed-end funds, still operate as such. Finally, we exclude corporate 
spin-offs; these firms have typically been parts of large, mature businesses and thus 
entail considerably less uncertainty than the average issuer. The remaining sample is 
merged with the databases of Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) from which we obtain IPO firms’ accounting fundamentals and aftermarket 
performance data, respectively. After these interventions, we end up with a final sample 
of 1,578 unique IPO deals. 
 
3.4.2 The two alternate routes to PMC: Lobbying & PAC  
 
Lobbying and PAC contributions comprise the two main avenues available for 
U.S. corporations to reach out to the Congress chambers. The decision to engage in 
either practice is made by a firm’s top-echelon executives. We investigate political 
money spent by firms within a time frame of up to five years before the IPO date. 
Ultimately, this methodology generates our special sample of interest of 273 IPOs with 
PMC. 
Lobbying is the prevalent means, in terms of both frequency and size, by which 
U.S. companies interfere in the making of politics (de Figueredo and Richter, 2014). 
Dollar contributions made to this end (publicly disclosed under the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act of 1995) aim to advance a firm’s perspective of the institutional framework within 
which it operates. Consequently, rather than being directed at specific politicians, 
lobbying pertains to the essence of the legislative process. Of course, the fact that no 
money enters candidates’ campaign coffers hampers the traceability of cash flows to the 
individual recipient level. For example, the relevant document acknowledging a 
contribution succinctly mentions that a firm lobbied the “U.S. House of 
Representatives” or the “U.S. Senate.” Notwithstanding the indirect character, lobbying 
constitutes a robust proxy for connections as lobbyists typically are political insiders 
with extended networks of contacts. In addition, the uncapped element of contributions 
enables the extent of connectedness to be quantified with accuracy. We obtain lobbying 
data from the files of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). CRP derives 
information directly from the semi-annual lobbying disclosure reports filed with the 
secretary of the Senate’s Office of Public Records (SORP) and initiates coverage from 
the year of 1998, inclusively. Matching the IPO deals with the CRP database, we are 
able to identify 244 IPO firms that have reportedly engaged in lobbying.  
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 PACs (political action committees), commonly established by firms and other 
special groups, have the explicit purpose of supporting or fighting against a candidate’s 
election. The corporate treasury is eligible to provide for a PAC’s operating expenses 
but may not grant any additional support. Instead, the funds need to originate from 
third-party sources for which a firm routinely resorts to its key constituents (employees, 
shareholders etc.). As a consequence of their traceability feature, PAC contributions 
constitute the most widely used proxy for corporate America’s political connections 
(Milyo et al., 2000). We rely for our PAC data on the Federal Election Commission’s 
(FEC) electronic archive. Appendix B depicts the display of a typical search. To extract 
more of the informational wealth residing in these cash flows, we manually investigate 
each IPO firm within the ‘Candidate Master’ and ‘Contributions to Candidates from 
Committees’ files so that we record the detailed profiles of the recipients (party 
affiliation, House membership, representing state and more). This search yields 89 IPO 
firms that have contributed to PACs. 
 
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics & sample identification 
 
Table 3.1 provides a preliminary description of our full sample (N=1,578) vis-à-
vis the subsamples of firms with (N=273) and without (N=1,305) PMC. The period 
from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013 spans 8 election cycles, which we use as time 
frames for the IPO deals. Grouping in this manner, we illustrate that the number of 
PMC IPOs need not fluctuate in proportion with overall IPO activity. For example, 
2004–2005 was the election cycle with the most PMC firms (60); yet the total IPOs 
(271) accounted for almost half of those in the 1998–1999 cycle (465). Interestingly, 
even though the latter period coincided with the late 90s’ bubble and, hence, gave rise to 
the majority of IPOs (29.47% of our full sample), the number of PMC firms (30) 
exactly equals that of the most recent election cycle of 2012 – 30 June, 2013. There is, 
therefore, nontrivial evidence that the frequency of prospective issuers resorting to PMC 
is on the rise. 
Next, we array IPOs into the divisions of the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code. Most PMC firms fall within the manufacturing division (34.8%) followed 
by the service division (26.74%) and finance, insurance and real estate division 
(15.02%). The findings appear plausible in light of the heavy regulatory frameworks 
accompanying a lot of industries within these divisions (see Appendix A for a detailed 
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identification of regulated industries). In contrast, divisions experiencing minimal 
regulations exert more frugality on PMC activity (e.g. the wholesale and retail trade 
division accounts for a mere 5.49% of total PMC firms). Intuitively, firms most directly 
affected by legislation possess a stronger incentive for frequent disbursements. 
Consistent with this notion, 29.30% of PMC firms come from regulated industries while 
the respective percentage for the non-PMC sample sharply drops to 19.70%. In addition, 
we observe that PMC firms are less likely to be associated with Internet or technology 
industries, venture capital financing and the NASDAQ exchange. Based on market 
capitalization, PMC firms are worth close to 5 times more ($ 2,441.55 million on 
average) than their non-PMC counterparts ($ 498.33 million on average) and this is not 
a result of overvaluation as shown by a lower Tobin’s Q7 (mean value of 2.33) 
compared to the non-PMC sample (mean value of 2.98). 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample as well for the 
PMC and non-PMC subsamples. We define all variables in Appendix A. Substantial 
preliminary evidence in support of our main hypothesis for less underpricing accruing 
to donor firms can be found in Panel A. First, PMC IPOs record an average first-day 
return of a modest 19%. This accounts for a good ten percentage points decline 
compared to the 29% return of non-PMC IPOs. Second, a pattern of downward offer 
price revisions appears, at first sight, compatible with the need to ‘leave money on the 
table’ so as to compensate informed investors for disclosing proprietary information (as 
per Hanley, 1993 and Loughran and Ritter, 2002). However, as we show in later 
sections, it primarily attests to the initial overvaluation of donor IPOs and the resulting 
need for correction, a phenomenon idiosyncratic to the PMC setting. Notably, it is 
within the PMC sample, exclusively, where the mean value of revisions (-2%) assumes 
a negative sign. In passing, the mean differences in returns and revisions come out 
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
Panel B analyzes all IPO characteristics to be used as control variables in the 
subsequent regressions. On a comparative basis, PMC firms are considerably larger than 
their non-PMC counterparts as demonstrated by the average gross proceeds raised: $ 
354 million for the former and $ 92 million for the latter IPOs. They also deliver 
superior profitability (captured by an earnings per share dummy) and rely less on 
leverage. In addition to stronger fundamentals, PMC firms possess more years of 
                                                          
7 We calculate Tobin’s Q as market capitalization over the replacement cost of total assets.  
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operational experience with a mean age approximating 25 years; that is about 10 years 
older than the average of the non-contributing sample. Consistent with the overall 
quality image, PMC IPOs are less likely to resort to venture capital financing and are 
mainly taken public by top-ranked underwriters. In contrast, stocks from the Internet or 
the broader technology sector, which usually have IPOs at infant stages (so as to fuel 
further growth), are relatively underrepresented in the PMC sample. Notably, this may 
also serve as a hint regarding their relative absence from NASDAQ, technology issuers’ 
favorite listing platform. Interestingly, the dotcom period of 1999–2000, for all of its 
record-high IPO activity, gave rise to fewer PMC IPOs, in proportion terms, than the 
credit crunch crisis of 2007–2008. Finally, there is no significant difference in the 
percentage of retained ownership between the PMC and non-PMC group. On the whole, 
many of these characteristics have been shown to exert influence on IPO pricing. Any 
effect caused on first-day return by the new covariate in the valuation equation (i.e. 
PMC) must result net of the confounding factors. To facilitate this analysis, we define a 
cross-sectional setting in the next section. 
For communicating the essence of contributions in a visual way, we refer the 
reader to Panel A of Table 3.3, i.e. top-fifteen IPOs ranked by PMC intensity. Overall, 
the first-day returns of these PMC heavyweights are dwarfed by annual average IPO 
returns in all but three cases (Talecris Biotherapeutics, SAIC and Mastercard). In a 
striking example, the second largest contributor, PentaStar Communications, documents 
a return of 7.5% amidst the overheated market of 1999 with the record-high mean IPO 
underpricing of 70.3%. From a complementary angle, Panel B presents the top-fifteen 
recipients of PAC money. A Republican candidate, Rick Santorum, leads the list with 
total PAC proceeds of $ 109.4 thousand. The general trend appears to be in favor of the 
Republican party and the House of Representatives. Unsurprisingly, all candidates share 
long tenures that span almost the entire horizon of our study. 
Over the eight election cycles under research, the 273 identified PMC firms have 
channeled $ 74.29 million and $ 6.75 million towards lobbying and PAC contributions, 
respectively. The apparent lobbying bias also pertains to the particular PMC 
combination employed. Specifically, 184 IPOs (i.e. 11% of the total; 68% of the PMC 
sample) have practiced lobbying but not PAC contributions whereas 28 firms (i.e. 2% of 
the total; 10% of PMC) possess PAC-only experience. The remaining 61 IPOs (i.e. 4% 
of the total; 22% of PMC) have stayed active in both PMC types. The relative 
proportions are schematically shown in Figure 3.1. 
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The descriptive statistics of contributions are reported in Table 3.4. The mean 
(median) political money, a construct for aggregating lobbying and PAC amounts, 
equals $ 297 thousand ($ 71.5 thousand). Partitioning by contribution type, IPOs 
disburse about 1 dollar in PAC for every 4 lobbying dollars. The respective means are $ 
75.9 thousand for PAC contributions and $ 303 thousand for lobbying. Tracing PACs 
down to the recipient level, IPO firms provide campaign financing to a mean (median) 
of 41 (10) candidates. Notably, consistent with previous work showing firms spend 
primarily for access, with little or no interest in the outcome of elections or ideology, 
the lion’s share of the funds is targeted at incumbents (Grossman and Helpman, 1994 
and Milyo et al., 2000). Panel A of Figure 3.2 graphically represents the time evolution 
of PMC types, by dollar magnitude and number of donor companies. Similarly, Panel B 
depicts the appropriation of funds by Congress chamber and political party affiliation 
. 
 
3.5 Methodology 
 
3.5.1 PMC choice & PMC level 
 
To fully capture the effect of PMC on underpricing we distinguish between a 
firm’s choice to engage in PMC and cash flow recorded towards this purpose. In doing 
so, we cater for our reluctance to assign an a priori linear relation between PMC size 
and dollars left on the table. Indeed, a meticulous study on the nature of lobbying and 
PAC contributions reveals reasons or circumstances under which the intensity of 
contribution weighs less than the PMC act per se.  
  According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), a lobbying contact is 
any oral or written communication (inclusive of electronic interactions) to an executive 
branch official or a legislative branch official that is made on behalf of a client with 
regard to the formulation, modification or adoption of federal laws, executive orders or 
government contracts, etc. Conceivably, once lobbying is framed as a communication 
endeavor, monetary intensity also becomes contingent to the intrinsic characteristics of 
the message it is meant to convey. For instance, evidence (as in Leech et al., 2005; 
Bonardi and Keim 2005 and Baumgartner et al., 2011) shows that messages of a salient 
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or relevant nature consume more lobbying resources. And this is by no means 
conditional on outcome. 
PAC contributions, in spite of an unambiguous mission (i.e. fundraising vehicle 
for a candidate’s campaign), pose two main challenges. First, the FEC-imposed $ 10 
thousand ceiling8 on corporate contributions allows for minimal support for any 
particular candidate. To put this amount in perspective, 2012 data from Vital Statistics 
on Congress estimate the cost of winning a seat in the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives at $ 10.3 million and $ 1.6 million, respectively. More scope for 
differentiation can arise from the assembly of a portfolio of candidates; yet, this brings 
about a second challenge. Specifically, committee memberships, rankings, incumbency 
(as well as length of) and majority party alignment are all features that distribute 
unequally the agenda-setting power among elected officials (as in Cooper et al., 2010) 
so that the number of sponsored candidates hardly adds up to a firm’s overall sphere of 
influence. 
Given the above, the next section engages the full sample in order to assess the 
effect of PMC involvement on first-day return. Subsequently, we focus on the cash flow 
level and, drawing evidence from the PMC sample, we gauge the incremental effect on 
underpricing per PMC dollar spent.  
 
3.5.2 Estimation methods 
 
To relate PMC involvement to IPO pricing, we specify a treatment effects model 
as follows: 
 
                                             (1) 
 
where Xi encompasses a vector of firm- and IPO-specific characteristics, PMC enters 
the model as a dichotomous variable, and εi stands for the residual term. Further, letting 
Z be a set of measurable determinants of PMC, we can define accordingly the selection 
equation as:  
              
                                                                                                 (2) 
 
 
                                                          
8 However, corporate PACs are not precluded from covering federal candidates’ expenses. Such expenses 
should presumably be unrelated to electoral campaign purposes and are designated as ‘independent 
expenditure.’ 
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A greater degree of complication resides within the estimation approach as we 
can barely lend support to the stochastic independence of the variable in interest. Firms 
that place the legislative framework among their key operational risks are inclined to 
self-select themselves into the PMC practice. In addition, unobservable determinants of 
PMC such as a firm’s extant political network and overall exposure to the institutional 
environment are also susceptible to influence pricing. We therefore expect these 
elements to enter equations 1 and 2, through ε and η, respectively, giving rise to 
feedback effects. Heckman (1979) proves how this selection bias cripples the reliability 
of OLS estimates and, ultimately, comes down to an omitted variables problem. In a 
setting that diverges from Heckman (1979) only in that the outcome equation 
regressand (underpricing) assumes a value for every observation (IPO) in the sample, 
we can similarly apply the proposed two-stage procedure to account for the bias. Within 
a corporate finance context, among others, Cohen (2003) resorts to the aforementioned 
method to treat the endogenous nature of the binary regressor of financial reporting 
quality, and so do An and Chan (2008) for a firm’s decision to obtain a credit rating 
before an IPO. 
Econometrically, we can make a case for the need for selectivity correction by 
rewriting equations (1) and (2) in an augmented model as shown below: 
 
[ [           
                                                                                   
= 𝛽′𝛸 + 𝛾 + 𝜌 𝜎𝜀  
𝜑 (𝜔΄𝛧)
𝛷 (𝜔΄𝛧)
                                                                                            (3)           
 
Respectively, the model for the non-PMC IPO becomes: 
 
[                                      (4) 
 
Subtracting equation (4) from (3), we derive the incremental expectation due to PMC:  
 
[ [  
 
=                                                                                          (5) 
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where Φ and ϕ refer to the cumulative and density distribution function, in this order, of 
the standard normal distribution. 
Modeled as such, the incremental expectation coincides with the OLS estimate 
of (γ), which distorts the actual effect on underpricing to a direction determined by the 
sign of the terms in equation (5). This bias can be dispelled by the inclusion of the 
inverse Mills ratio (λ), which is hypothesized to be the omitted variable in equation (1). 
The selectivity correction, conditional on PMC, obtains then the form: 
 
 if PMC=1 or  if PMC=0 
 
An alternative estimation approach that we employ is full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML). Making a stronger assumption about the bivariate normality of the 
residual terms in equations 1 and 2, we estimate the system simultaneously. Because it 
processes all available information at once, FIML is a more efficient estimation 
technique than the two-stage procedure described above (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). In 
addition, the FIML estimates allow us to test the null hypothesis of residual terms 
independence by means of the Wald test.  
Finally, we relax the assumption of the normal distribution of the residuals and 
thus challenge the validity of our results outside the Heckman framework. This is 
attainable with an instrumental variables (IV) approach (see Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 
5), which instruments for PMC, in Equation 1, via ω. The use of fitted probabilities as 
an instrument implies that the probit model can assume a suboptimal specification with 
minor effect on the IV estimates. This robustness property of the IV approach allows for 
flexibility in the selection of explanatory variables, a vital feature considering the 
substantial discord in literature about the exact PMC determinants. Incidentally, the IV 
setting is opportune for the Hausman test, which we conduct as an additional 
endogeneity control. 
 
3.6 Empirical results 
 
3.6.1 Determinants of PMC activity 
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In this subsection, we investigate a battery of plausible incentives for political 
donations and report the results in Table 3.6. The estimation techniques previously 
discussed converge to a probit regression in order to model a firm’s likelihood to resort 
to PMC. Although interesting in its own right, this regression, once augmented by IPO 
literature covariates, comprises the first stage of both the Heckman and the instrumental 
variables methods. As such, it is critical to satisfy the exclusion restriction via a 
regressor influencing the PMC decision but not IPO underpricing. To this end, we 
employ the variable Bills introduced referring to those ideas for legislation which have 
received adequate support to become a bill. Indeed, while it is unlikely that this factor 
affects first-day returns, firms’ incentives for PMC should increase with a longer agenda 
of issues brought before Congress. From the side of incumbent officials, a heavier 
workload reasonably consumes more resources either as inputs into the legislative 
process (i.e. lobbying) or in the effort to reconcile the policy making consequences with 
the chances for reelection (i.e. PAC), so that the demand for contributions appears also 
larger. For a systematic study, we classify PMC determinants into four general 
categories: i) firm profile & visibility, ii) internal politics, iii) political exposure, and iv) 
operational complexity. This specification yields a pseudo-R2 of 23.3%.        
  
3.6.1.1 Firm profile & visibility 
 
As evidenced in the descriptive statistics, PMC activity flourishes with a bigger 
corporate footprint. Masters and Keim (1985) illustrate how asset intensity reinforces a 
firm’s ability to exert scrutiny over its institutional environment and policy-related 
issues. From a rent-seeking framework, Hart (2001) views any benefits earned by PMC 
as accruing to firms in proportion to their size. As for the cost, larger establishments can 
opportunely spread it over a wider asset base. In a similar vein, a hefty level of cash 
flow proxies for resource availability. Masters and Keim (1985) make a case about the 
propensity of cash-affluent firms to contribute more, maintaining, nonetheless, an 
interesting reservation: successful firms may strategically abstain from political action 
in order to avoid unwanted public attention; this is particularly true for those firms that 
resemble monopolies and are capable of extracting rents as such. Firm age is a 
controversial variable in the sense that older firms are more likely to have invested in 
ties to politics and to nurture them via PMC on an ongoing basis. On the flip side, Hart 
(2001) upholds that their younger rivals may engage in aggressive contributions 
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pursuing a quick fix to a perceived deficiency in political reach. However, this 
syndrome of making up for lost time is likely to blur their vision with regard to the 
value relevance of PMC investment. Finally, we include media coverage. Given the 
disclosure scarcity of the pre-IPO environment, media attention can magnify a firm’s 
dependence on institutional environment and sketch out possible risks, above and 
beyond a typical ‘Risk Factors’ section on the S-1 form. Within this context, PMC 
dollars can act as a sweetener to public concerns and infuse forward-looking predictions 
with renewed optimism.  
The probit results confirm that large and cash-affluent firms are more likely to 
engage in PMC. Further, media coverage obtains a positive and highly significant 
coefficient (at the 1% level), corroborating our last conjecture. In contrast, firm age 
comes out as a poor PMC determinant in the IPO setting. 
 
3.6.1.2 Internal politics 
 
Theorists have indicated a plethora of organizational aspects that are directly 
influenced by management’s political standpoint. For example, Chin et al. (2013) 
evidence that U.S. firms with liberal (conservative) CEOs, in the aftermath of subpar 
financial performance, sustain (limit) corporate social responsibility initiatives. 
Extending this research to political donations, they find that the more liberal the top-
echelon executives appear, the more PMC spending aligns with Democratic purposes. 
More often than not, however, ideological or partisan preferences of management and 
other stakeholders, also driven by individual ambition, exist in a state of conflict and 
compete fiercely over the available PMC budget (for example, Hart, 2001). Thus, to the 
extent that contributions represent a form of perquisite consumption, organizational 
politics plays a decisive role in shaping a firm’s PMC behavior. We allow this 
dimension to enter the probit model through the inclusion of the pre-IPO management 
ownership and the percentage of unionized employees in the firm’s industry. 
Additionally, given the multifaceted influence that a venture capital (VC) firm exerts on 
a prospective lister (e.g. from the appointment of directors to IPO time selection), we 
account accordingly for its presence by means of a dummy variable. Predicting, 
however, the direction of this relationship entails considerable uncertainty as the cues 
stemming from the grandstanding theory are mixed (Gompers, 1996). It may be the case 
that younger VCs, anxious about gaining prestige, attach value to PMC as a time-and-
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cost-efficient tool for promoting an image of connectedness. On the other hand, because 
they tend to myopically fixate on the IPO day, VCs are incentivized to exert frugality as 
the PMC benefits can appear remote and incompatible with a short-term investment 
horizon. 
The estimate of the probit coefficient shows that the PMC probability increases 
with management’s equity stake at all conventional levels of significance. It also 
increases with the participation of venture capital (at the 10% level of significance). 
Given VCs’ anchoring on listing time, we pay particular attention to this finding. 
Evidently, VCs recognize at least some short-term benefits in PMC, thereby aligning 
with our main conjecture in this study. In contrast, the percentage of unionized 
employees in the firm’s industry obtains an insignificant coefficient. 
 
3.6.1.3 Political exposure 
 
A firm’s special competitive and geographic environment naturally claims 
significant explanatory power over the PMC decision. At the industry level, Zardkoohi 
(1985) acknowledges two possibilities: bourgeoning PMC participation may inspire 
firms to align efforts for benefits accruing to the industry as a whole or, alternatively, 
give rise to free riders as a public good. To infer the interpretation that IPO firms lend 
support to, we use Industry PMC (i.e. number of corporate donors in the same 4-digit 
SIC code) and the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) for market concentration. To 
account for geography, we include the number of Electoral College votes corresponding 
to the state of the firm’s headquarters. Intuitively, a larger number of local candidacies 
not only increases the demand for campaign funds but also perpetuates and polarizes the 
political debate.  
Interestingly, while these variables are among the well-established PMC 
determinants (e.g. Cooper et al., 2010 and Skaife et al., 2013), in the IPO paradigm, we 
can only make a robust case (at the 1% level of significance) about our instrument (i.e. 
Bills introduced) and Industry PMC. Moreover, the positive association of the latter 
variable with PMC involvement favors the coalition over the free-ridership scenario. In 
passing, the coefficients on HHI and the Electoral College fail all conventional levels of 
significance. 
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3.6.1.4 Operational complexity 
 
Hart (2001) highlights salient implications for the role of R&D as a proxy for 
asset specificity; he posits that the more specific a firm’s operations appear, the less 
power an exit threat obtains as a means of exercising pressure on policymakers. Under 
this framework, there should also be a positive relation between R&D and PMC 
involvement. We investigate this possibility by identifying via a dummy variable 
(R&D) those IPOs disclosing an R&D expenditure. PMC incentives due to complication 
can also arise from a rigid regulatory framework. We similarly use a dummy variable 
(Regulated industry) for regulated IPOs. As such, we designate issuers with SIC codes 
of 4900–4939 (electric and gas), 1300 (oil and gas extraction), 4000–4700 
(transportation), 4800 (telecommunications), 4950–4959 (sanitary services) and 6000–
6712 (financial companies). Especially for those sectors in the economy experiencing 
government as both a regulator and buyer, the resource dependence theory predicts 
increased chances of contributions towards the key decision loci. We capture this dual 
role of government by means of a dummy variable (Government purchases) set to 1 for 
the five sectors topping the Economic Census list of U.S. public spending (i.e. defense, 
health, energy, transportation and education). As a last dimension to operational 
complexity, we take the number of a firm’s business and geographic segments. 
Diversification at any of these levels induces contributions as at least some segments are 
likely to reap the benefits; this expectation causes a risk-averse management to view 
PMC as a somewhat safer bet (also as per Zardkoohi, 1985). 
The results strongly suggest an increased PMC likelihood in the presence of 
escalating operational complexity. Specifically, R&D expenditure, regulated industry, 
government purchases and business segments all obtain positive coefficients, significant 
at the 5% level or better. The geographic segments make up an interesting deviation 
with a coefficient that is both negative and insignificant. We surmise that with greater 
geographic reach a firm becomes capable of leveraging its exposure to different 
legislative frameworks and campaign financing needs so that the PMC decision obtains 
a highly contextual character. 
 
3.6.2 The effect of PMC on IPO underpricing 
 
Table 3.7 reports our empirical results explaining the effect of PMC on 
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underpricing for the full sample of firms (N=1,578). To demonstrate the robustness of 
findings, we tabulate the resulting coefficients from all three estimation methods: the 
Heckman two-stage procedure (Column 2), the MLE two-equation treatment model 
(Column 3) and the instrumental variables method (Columns 4 and 5). We reserve 
Column 1 for the OLS estimates to facilitate benchmarking. 
 The dependent variable remains in all specifications the first-day return 
estimated as the difference between the first aftermarket price and the IPO offer price 
divided by the IPO offer price. From the seminal studies on IPO returns (Stoll and 
Curley (1970), Logue (1973), Ibbotson (1975)), the systematic dwarfing of the IPO 
offer price by the first closing market price has become apparent. Further it remains 
surprisingly robust across time according to evidence from more recent studies (Ritter 
(1991), Jain and Kini (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995)). Statistically, the distribution 
of IPO returns can be described as leptokurtic and right-tail skewed. Accordingly, we 
apply the following logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable:  
 
First-day return = Ln((IPO Closing Price -Offer Price) / Offer Price +1) 
 
as a treatment to the skewness problem. The transformation augments the explanatory 
power of the model, without altering in any way the inferences. This approach features 
commonly in the IPO literature (e.g. Leone at al. 2007, Chahine and Filatotchev 2011).  
Among the regressors, we include key variables that have been shown to 
account for much of the variability in returns. Specifically, we use: 
Firm age set equal to the number of years elapsing from a firm’s foundation to 
IPO. Previous literature commonly employs age as a surrogate for risk (Ritter, 1984, 
1991; Schultz, 1993 and Carter et al., 1998). The assumption is that firms with 
operations dating back longer have proven their resilience against market swings and 
thus constitute safer investments. Acknowledging the lesser degree of uncertainty 
surrounding long-lived organizations, we expect them to incur smaller underpricing. 
Venture capital. Hsu (2004) illustrates how “VCs’ extra-financial value may be 
more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital.” Reputable venture 
capital financiers with a proven record of successful IPOs can lend credibility to their 
investment portfolio firms. Moreover, Megginson and Weiss (1991) note that they are 
typically involved in order to stay as opposed to cashing out at the IPO time. This vision 
makes venture capitalists extra cautious against any excesses on the amount of money to 
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be left on the table. Alternatively, Loughran and Ritter (2004), shifting perspective from 
the certification to the grandstanding hypothesis, refute the long-term horizon of VCs. 
Instead, they describe a sense of urgency so that the latter release funds towards the next 
IPO targets. Of course, a premature IPO is an opportune setting for heavy underpricing. 
We leave the actual direction of the relationship up to empirical investigation. 
 IPO proceeds. We use this item as a proxy for size. Increased visibility 
inevitably causes larger companies to leave a proportionately bigger footprint within the 
investor community. Therefore, the latter can relate with more clarity to the firm so that 
issuer-specific uncertainty diminishes.  
Earnings per share (EPS) is taken as a dichotomous variable in order to capture 
issuers with a positive bottom line in the year trailing the IPO. Firms attaining a sizeable 
accounting return should be associated with less uncertainty, and thus lower first-day 
returns. At the same time, profitability, in the pre-IPO period, comes second to 
presenting a convincing vision for sustainable profitability in the post-IPO period. In 
one extreme illustration, Trueman et al. (2000) find that in the realm of Internet stocks, 
nonfinancial measures of performance, such as the number of unique visitors and page 
views, dominate net income in value relevance. Consequently, we maintain mixed 
expectations about the sign of the EPS coefficient. 
  Leverage. We estimate this ratio as pre-IPO total liabilities over pre-IPO total 
assets. A reasonably high level of leverage is expected to impose discipline on 
management consistent with the mechanisms described in Jensen (1986). Ceteris 
paribus, we expect firms relying heavily on debt financing to leave less money on the 
table. 
Credit crunch and dotcom period capture the 2007–2008 turbulence in financial 
markets caused by the subprime mortgage crisis and the overheated period of 1999–
2000 (thoroughly described in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003), respectively. They both 
enter the model as indicator variables.  
Industry controls enter our model by means of indicator variables for technology 
and Internet firms to account for the excessive underpricing that these IPOs typically 
entail (e.g. Aggarwal, 2002). In addition, we control for the exchange by means of a 
NASDAQ dummy for being the preferred marketplace for the majority of IPOs. 
 Underwriter rank pertains to the perceived quality of the agent underwriting the 
issue. Carter and Manaster (1990) evidence significant underpricing by firms engaging 
prestigious underwriters and interpret it as a means to signal quality (conceivably only 
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strong issuers are capable of assuming this cost). Arguably, an established underwriter 
would not risk impairing his reputational capital by facilitating an offering of dubious 
quality. 
Share overhang, defined as the ratio of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders 
to the total equity given up in IPO (refer also to Bradley and Jordan, 2002), reflects the 
natural dilution caused by the issuance. This cost is incurred proportionately by all 
shareholders retaining equity post-offering. As a result, with a large number of new 
shares (low overhang ratio) the losses escalate, making incentives to underprice less 
compelling. 
Market return is estimated as the average return realized on the value-weighted 
CRSP index over the 20 trading days preceding the offering. It is a measure of the 
overall market sentiment prevailing at the time of the IPO, and as per previous research 
(Logue, 1973; Hanley, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Derrien and Womack, 2003; 
Lowry and Schwert, 2004 and Derrien, 2005), it is expected to positively associate with 
IPO return. 
Revisions refer to the change of the IPO offer price from the midpoint of the 
initial filing price range and are a product of all public and private information that 
becomes available to the underwriter by the time of listing. As a complementary pricing 
metric, we are equally interested in its cross section with PMC and use it as an outcome 
variable in subsequent investigation. At the same time, one could draw from Hanley 
(1993) and the partial price adjustment theory to advocate its inclusion on the right-hand 
side of the first-day return equation. To address possible omitted variables concerns, we 
employ this additional covariate as a robustness exercise in Column 5.  
Overall, the three estimation methods in Columns 2, 3 and 4 yield highly 
significant (at the 1% level) coefficients on the PMC variable and confirm the predicted 
negative sign. Further, the resulting coefficient magnitudes are notably consistent with 
each other. They also sharply contrast the OLS benchmark, in Column 1, which even 
though attests to the negative relation (at the 5% level), it comes out less than a fourth 
of the other estimates. Augmenting the baseline specification to account for revisions, in 
Column 5, confirms the incremental explanatory power of this covariate, yet the effect 
of PMC remains intact9. In sum, though we may not completely rule out alternative 
                                                          
9 The 1% threshold of statistical significance for the PMC coefficient is marginally missed. We reiterate 
the Heckman and MLE estimations, including the revisions variable, and attain the 1% level of 
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interpretations of the negative association between PMC involvement and IPO 
underpricing, the results accord with our twofold conjecture that PMC level off the 
informational playing field and confer increased bargaining power. 
The findings pertaining to the control variables are interesting in their own right. 
We obtain a positive and highly significant coefficient on proceeds raised while 
presumably size should lead to less, rather than more, underpricing; this may hint at the 
need to attract more uninformed investors via a discount. The coefficient on age 
(significant and negative) corroborates previous research showing long-lived companies 
to be associated with more chances of survivorship, and thus less uncertainty. 
Consistent with Bradley and Jordan (2002), we attain a significantly positive coefficient 
on share overhang; dilution costs are greater in issues with lower overhang suggesting a 
lower underpricing and vice versa. In contrast, underpricing significantly increases with 
Internet and technology stocks as per Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). This explanation 
may naturally extend to the coefficient (likewise positive and significant) on NASDAQ 
for being the preferred listing platform for technology issuers. Expectedly, the 
coefficient on the dotcom period is positive and highly significant, evidencing the 
excessive funds that were left on the table in the bullish period of 1999–2000. The fact 
that the overall market sentiment reflects on initial returns is also captured by the 
coefficient on market return (positive and significant at all levels). The positive and 
significant values on venture capital and underwriter rank contradict the findings from 
Carter and Manaster (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991), though they are strongly 
aligned with evidence from Beatty and Welch (1996), Loughran and Ritter (2004) and 
Lowry and Murphy (2007). Notably, we register no significant relation for a firm’s 
leverage and earnings per share, confirming our conjecture about the mixed signals that 
both disseminate to market investors. Finally, the credit crunch crisis of 2007–2008, in 
spite of a heavy shadow on the volume of IPO activity, appears to leave IPO 
underpricing unaffected. 
To establish the endogenous nature of PMC, we look for separate evidence in 
each estimation method employed. First, the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio 
exhibits high statistical significance (p=1%), lending support to our initial suspicion 
about firms’ self-selection into the PMC practice. Second, the Wald test, involving the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
significance for both methods. For simplicity, we report in Column 5 the most conservative estimate, 
only. 
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maximum likelihood estimators, attests to the correlation of the residual terms in the 
selection and outcome equations at the 1% level. Third, the Hausman test, from an 
instrumental variables framework, strongly indicates the presence of feedback effects 
(p=5%). Evidently, latent determinants of the PMC decision are also impounded into 
first-day returns. Taken together, these findings are in line with the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity. 
In Table 3.8, we focus on the PMC sample (N=273) in order to assess the effect 
of PMC (dollar) level, rather than simple PMC involvement, on underpricing. Including 
the same covariates as previously, we now use as variables of interest: (1) political 
money (Specification 1) to capture any combination of lobbying and PAC contributions; 
(2) lobby money (Specification 2) to concentrate on all lobbying IPOs; and (3) PAC 
money (Specification 3) to account for all PAC IPOs. Invariably, the resulting 
coefficients on these variables attain significance, at all conventional levels, while 
maintaining their negative sign. Consequently PMC, far from representing a nominal 
value proxy of ‘connectedness’ or a good faith gesture (in the case of PAC), proves its 
definite investment character with an incremental effect on underpricing for each dollar 
disbursed. Further, the coefficient magnitudes are non-negligible. All else being equal, a 
modest 10% increase in PMC spending accounts for a 2.5% reduction in underpricing. 
The practical implications from this relationship are important. Given the median 
contribution size of $ 71.5 thousand, issuers can rely on PMC as a cost-effective option 
for combating ex ante uncertainty and positioning themselves in pole position in the 
negotiations with the underwriter. Thus, our results come up not only statistically but 
also highly economically significant.  
 
3.6.3 The efficient PAC plan & strategic targeting for less money left on 
the table  
 
With PAC contributions being an indispensable element of a well-organized 
PMC effort, we now explore the type of candidate that market investors want issuers to 
connect to. Hypothesis 2 frames candidates’ overall appeal in terms of contextual as 
well as idiosyncratic characteristics. We test for the effect of both categories on first-day 
return in Table 3.9. In Specifications 1 through 4, we view candidates solely as 
structural units of their basic affiliations and aggregate contributions towards the House 
of Representatives (Specification 1), U.S. Senate (Specification 2), Democratic party 
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(Specification 3) and Republican party (Specification 4). This generic treatment of 
recipients provides interesting insight into the relative dynamics that candidates obtain, 
exclusively, by virtue of their chosen Congressional or partisan sideline. Specifically, 
while all regressions result in negative and significant coefficients, the House of 
Representatives dominates the Senate in terms of both coefficient magnitude and level 
of statistical significance. Similarly, Democratic candidates have a marginal advantage 
over Republicans. These findings cast doubt upon the value relevance of two widely 
held beliefs. First, the extra prestige accruing to the Senate appears less conducive to a 
firm’s effort to preempt the political agenda. A plausible reason lies within the 
constitutional command for all revenue and appropriation bills to be originated in the 
House of Representatives. Consequently, support for the House (as opposed to the 
Senate) accounts for a more prompt interference in the chain of the legislative process. 
Second, we provide new evidence from the IPO setting that refutes the existence of a 
Republican bias among market participants. In this regard, we extend the work of 
Cooper et al. (2010) who document higher abnormal returns with the cross section of 
contributions to Democratic rather than Republican candidates, as we show that the 
latter also fall short in the mitigation of ex ante uncertainty.  
At the micro level, we test candidate features that are expected to influence IPO 
underpricing as per Hypothesis 2.c. In order to exploit further the traceable nature of 
PAC contributions, we abandon the ‘follow-the-money’ approach that has been used so 
far in the study and replace the variables of interest with comprehensive measures of 
candidate characteristics. Following the recent literature (e.g. Correia, 2014 and Aslan 
and Grinstein, 2012), which increasingly resorts to the constructs of Cooper et al. 
(2010), we introduce the following indexes: 
 
1) The first index, PISTRENGTH , is expressed as follows: 
 
where Candidatejt,t−5 is a binary variable assuming the value of 1 if the firm has raised 
PAC money in support of candidate j over the period t−5 to t; Ijt is a binary variable set 
to 1 if candidate j has been an incumbent at time t, and 0 otherwise; NCVjt is the 
number of votes that candidate j’s party holds in office at time t; NOVjt is the number of 
votes that candidate j’s opposing party holds in office at time t; and rellengthjt,t-5 is the 
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number of months that the relationship between firm i and candidate j spans assuming 
uninterrupted PAC contributions until time t.  
 
2) The second index, PIPOWER , is defined as follows: 
 
where Committee rankmt is the reciprocal of candidate j’s rank on committee m; Median 
committee rankmt is the median number of members on a given committee m of which 
candidate j is a member; and the rest of the variables are defined as above. 
 
 
3) The third index, PIABILITY, is expressed as follows: 
 
 
where HomeCandidatejt,t−5 is a binary variable set to 1 for contributions supporting 
candidacies from the state of a firm’s headquarters, and 0 otherwise. All other variables 
are defined as above. 
 We present the results of this last set of regressions in Specifications (5), (6) and 
(7). The coefficient signs are invariably negative with PISTRENGTH and PIPOWER attaining 
statistical significance at the 1% level, whereas PIABILITY is significant at the 10% level. 
Accordingly, the candidate characteristics that we have assumed to instill confidence in 
the prospects of a new public firm are valid: (1) veteran Congress members with a 
proven record of career progression and (2) local politicians, to a lesser extent, are 
conducive to maintaining first-day returns within range. Intuitive as this relation 
appears, we note that a firm’s political capital is subject to all challenges residing in 
intangible assets valuation (e.g. lack of measurement scale or absence of control over 
future benefits). In this respect, connections have to overcome intrinsic uncertainty also 
pertinent to their relative strength, power and ability, as defined above, before they 
claim any positive spillovers to issuer-related uncertainty. To this end, candidates 
scoring highly in the three indexes merit priority in PAC funds appropriation for posing 
as more value-increasing targets compared to other colleagues in Congress or new 
challengers. 
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3.6.4 A closer look at the causes of the limited underpricing of PMC 
IPOs 
Acknowledging the multifaceted influence that a PMC strategy can exert on an 
IPO, we seek seperate evidence in support of its appeal to market investors and lead 
underwriter. 
3.6.4.1 Volatility behavior of PMC and matched non-PMC IPOs beyond the listing day 
Could an extant PMC record impose discipline on subsequent returns realized on 
PMC shares in the same manner that it does on first-day returns? If so, PMC IPOs can 
be plausibly less underpriced because of fewer concerns among investors relating to 
liquidity or the level at which a politically connected stock will trade. To explore this 
enquiry, we follow a matched-sample approach, assigning to each PMC IPO a non-
PMC counterpart of the same listing year and 2-digit SIC code. These criteria bring 
about the elimination of 72 IPOs or, approximately, 25% of the PMC sample. From the 
resulting matches, we further filter for proceeds raised and choose the IPOs exhibiting 
the greatest proximity in this feature. Ultimately, this method leaves us with a sample of 
201 PMC IPOs to be assessed vis-à-vis a sample of 201 nearest neighbors.  
The variable of interest, volatility, is taken as the standard deviation of daily 
returns realized within a short time frame subsequent to floatation (similar to Ritter, 
1984). We set this interval to 60 days and report the statistics in Table 3.10. To account 
for a probable roller coaster course of share prices within the first few trades, we allow 
for 7 trading days to elapse and start recording returns at day 8. For robustness 
purposes, we reiterate this analysis using the intervals of 120 and 365 days. In all cases, 
the PMC securities entail significantly lower (at the 1% level) volatility than their 
matched counterparts. Indicatively, over the 60-day horizon, the mean volatility of the 
PMC IPOs (3.1%) is 18% lower than that of non-PMC IPOs. The difference is 
accentuated by the number of days elapsing: PMC IPOs are 21% and 31% less volatile 
when measured over the 120 and 365 days, respectively. Notably, while the standard 
deviation of volatility remains constant across time for the PMC IPOs (at 1.3% to 
1.4%), it increases in excess of 50% across the periods for the non-PMC IPOs, so that 
the matched sample yields a standard deviation as high as 6.9% over 365 days. Overall, 
the aftermarket evidence suggests considerably less discord on the value of PMC shares. 
3.6.4.2 Bookbuilding for PMC equities & underwriters’ own political ties 
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To complement our buy-side findings, we now bring to the forefront the role of 
the underwriter and see whether we can meet again at an underpricing containment 
conclusion. To this end, we rely on two sets of tests. 
First, we draw evidence from the price discovery process. A smooth ride of 
PMC equities on the first day of trade, and beyond, invites debate as to whether it 
reflects the outcome of an equally smooth bookbuilding period or a hard-fought balance 
among powerful participants. To the extent that political connections can facilitate 
information flow, they are expected to obviate, to a significant degree, the need for 
residual information production and subsequent interventions in pricing (as per 
Benveniste and Spindt, 1989 and Hanley, 1993). Alternatively, in line with the 
bargaining power argument, political connections are a notion potent enough to 
constitute the underwriter more conceding to management’s value claims. There is, 
thus, increased likelihood of the investment banker producing an initial price range 
inflated by an implicit PMC premium and soliciting investor bids from a high stating 
point. 
Relevant studies consistently operationalize bookbuilding turbulence in terms of 
the offer price deviation from the midpoint of the initial filing price range (Benveniste 
and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Spatt and Srivastava, 1991; Hanley, 
1993; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001 and 2003). Because of its comprehensive nature, we 
expect this metric to lend itself equally well in describing bookbuilding under a PMC 
regime. We explore this cross-section in Table 3.11. All covariates of the earlier 
specifications retain their place in the new regressions as pricing for bookbuilding 
participants and aftermarket investors is driven by the same firm- and IPO-specific 
characteristics (refer for a proof to Lowry and Schwert, 2004). We thus leave the right-
hand side of the equation unchanged, adjusting only for market return, which now 
captures the holding period return from filing to IPO day. 
Due to the endogeneity concerns previously discussed10, Columns 1 and 2 
present the instrumental variables estimates of the model with the dependent variables 
to be absolute filing price revisions (Absolute revisions) and filing price revisions 
(Revisions), respectively. Investigating the magnitude of revisions vis-à-vis their sign 
reveals a distinct pricing pattern for connected firms. In particular, the insignificant 
                                                          
10 In a methodologically similar manner to the first-day return equation of Table 7, we conduct the 
Hausman test and reject the null of no endogeneity. Although these statistics are not reported in Table 11, 
in the interest of clarity, they are available from the authors upon request. 
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coefficient on PMC in Column 1 indicates that connected firms are generally not any 
easier to value than other IPOs. As shown in Column 2, however, the average revision 
in the PMC regime comprises a sizeable (13%) downward adjustment; a finding which 
fulfills all conventional levels of statistical significance. Therefore, the monotonically 
negative effect lends support to issuers’ bargaining power for attaining an initial 
valuation that is ultimately proven overoptimistic.  At the same time, this also suggests 
an informational disadvantage from the perspective of the underwriter which casts 
doubt on the networking effect of PMC. 
Second, we consider the possibility that the underwriter is also connected. If 
underwriters with no traceable links to politics perceive clients’ connections as 
substitutes, they are incentivized to exert more effort towards retaining connected 
issuers. Consequently, this subsample could introduce bias and overstate the overall 
PMC effect. To investigate for a differential pricing behavior, we collect further data on 
the lead underwriter’s political expenditure in an approach identical to that for PMC 
issuers. Therefore, our baseline model is augmented by the interaction of PMC with an 
unconnected dummy variable (Column 3). In an alternative definition, whereby 
connectedness arises indirectly through a PMC clientele, the unconnected dummy is set 
to 1 for underwriters facilitating no more than 1 PMC IPO in any given year (Column 
4).  
Two conclusions can be drawn from the resulting estimates. First, with the PMC 
coefficient maintaining the negative sign (at the 5% level of significance) across both 
specifications, an IPO firm can expect to benefit from a political strategy regardless of 
the chosen underwriter; issuer’s and  investment banker’s PMC do not cancel each other 
out. Second, with the interaction term exhibiting statistical significance (at the 5% level) 
for indirectly connected underwriters only, we show that attracting PMC IPOs 
comprises an end in itself as opposed to a means for establishing ties to politicians. This 
finding is in accord with evidence from Houston et al. (2014) showing lower spreads on 
connected firms’ loans as a result of their perceived creditworthiness rather than a 
banker’s attempt to cajole the borrower’s network. 
Overall, a PMC record can alter the relative dynamics in an IPO. In particular, it 
constitutes the investment banker more conceding at a time when the issuer comes at it 
strongest. This setting comprises an alternative, yet complementary, explanation for the 
moderate underpricing of PMC IPOs.   
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3.7 Additional robustness tests 
 
3.7.1 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Our main concern about the validity of results is twofold, pertaining to the time and 
type of PMC. In this section, we adopt a sensitivity analysis framework allowing for 
both of these dimensions to vary. To facilitate comparison, Panel A of Table 3.12 recaps 
the instrumental variable estimates γ₁ and γ₂ for the effect of PMC on initial return and 
filing price revisions, respectively. 
With regard to time, we have been content so far to record cash flows extending 
up to 5 years prior to floatation day. This line was drawn due to database limitations 
and, more importantly, out of the authors’ belief that older PMC, even though 
historically interesting, are devoid of potent signaling value. An illustration would entail 
the longest-tenured (6 years) representatives, i.e. Senators. Given the staggered-terms 
structure, one third of the Senate seats are up for election every couple of years. 
Therefore, a donation dating longer than five years may apply to the Senate’s oldest 
third only. But even this minority of Senators would be, by that point, amidst a new 
electoral campaign requiring fresh funding. This sequence of events underscores a 
firm’s need to fine-tune PMC with the listing project so that a dated PMC record does 
not turn into a sunk cost. As for firms with no prior donation experience, such a time 
interval is adequately large for a PMC momentum to evolve and promulgate 
connectedness even as a work in progress. 
This argument could also backfire, rendering our 5-year horizon questionable in 
favor of a shorter period. To explore this possibility, we stratify PMC IPOs into three 
subsamples based on floatation day proximity: (i) 119 firms exerting PMC within a 
period of 6 months or less; (ii) 120 IPOs with PMC older than 6 months and up to a 
year; and (iii) the remaining 34 IPOs with PMC dating older than one and up to five 
years. For each of these groups, we reiterate our main regressions for the effect of PMC 
on both initial return and filing price revisions. In the interest of brevity, Panel B 
focuses on the resulting coefficients, γ₁ and γ₂, which convey the gist of our analysis. 
Evidently, time considerably undermines γ₁ and γ₂ in magnitude and statistical 
significance across the two specifications. As a consequence, PMC of the 6 most recent 
months invariably attain the most compelling effects. The strongest evidence in support 
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of the recency argument comes from the return equation; once the 6 months’ cutoff has 
been violated, PMC dating no longer than a calendar year prior to the IPO results in an 
almost identical effect to PMC that is up to five years old. In parallel, the statistical 
significance of the coefficients descends the conventional levels, fulfilling, however, the 
10% threshold even for the earliest cash flows. The sensitivity to time extends to the 
revisions equation and coefficient γ₂. The differentiation comes from a high coefficient 
magnitude for the full 12-month period preceding the IPO, which shrinks nearly by half 
beyond our second cutoff, while also abolishing the high statistical significance. 
Next, we test for the particular cash flow type. So far, we have drawn from the 
asymmetric information and bookbuilding theories to argue that it is PMC involvement 
(and level of) that arouses market participants’ confidence, assigning a somewhat 
incidental role to the preferred avenue (i.e. lobbying, PAC and their between 
combinations). Yet, we have to rule out the possibility that positive externalities of 
either PMC type flow into, and artificially inflate, the effect of the alternate type. To this 
end, we split the sample further in order to explicitly account for: i) 61 firms that have 
employed both PMC methods; ii) 184 firms that have lobbied for but not contributed to 
PAC; and iii) 28 firms that have contributed to PAC but not lobbying. Panel C 
disentangles the differential effect of each possible spending manner. As expected, the 
effect on both initial return and price revisions is highly robust to PMC type with γ₁ and 
γ₂ significant at the 5% level or higher. Notably, significance is maximized when ‘Both 
lobby-PAC’ is used, for no other sample attains the 1% level in both equations. 
Therefore, this analysis sheds light on the complementary nature of lobbying and PAC 
contributions. We conjecture that the personal nature of PAC contributions enables and 
reinforces more effective lobbying, in the sense that it creates more ‘eager ears’ for the 
issues that the company lobbies for. On the other hand, malleable policymakers are of 
little use in lieu of the strategic communication element entailing a well-implemented 
lobbying effort. In an optimal setting, investors aspire to anchors in politics with both 
relevant and current information flowing among them. Accordingly, we identify the 
anchors in PAC contributions and the information flow in lobbying. 
 
 
3.7.2 Political by birth & other tests 
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In a subsequent robustness exercise, we revisit the time dimension of PMC from 
a new perspective. Specifically, one may argue that time is not only important with 
regard to listing but also a firm’s foundation. Indeed, our sample includes firms, such as 
Rex Energy and Molycorp, that commence contributions almost concurrently with their 
legal formation as corporate entities. This sense of urgency testifies to the existence of a 
group of political by birth firms that grow their political connections in parallel with the 
broader asset base and, therefore, appear to have politics deeply ingrained in their 
corporate culture. Thus, to the extent that the effect of PMC on IPO underpricing is 
conditioned upon the stage of the donor’s life cycle, we would expect the relationship to 
be stronger for political by birth firms and questionable for more mature organizations.  
To investigate this proposition, we rerun our main regressions, interacting PMC 
with an indicator variable for political by birth companies. Allowing for flexibility in 
the definition of the new factor, we reiterate the analysis by designating political by 
birth those firms of ages not exceeding: (1) the first quartile value of the full sample 
(PMC sample) of 4 years (5 years); (2) the median value of the full sample (PMC 
sample) of 8 years (11 years); and (3) an arbitrarily chosen threshold of 2 years. In all 
regressions the resulting coefficient on the interaction variable remains insignificant. In 
simple terms, this shows that an apolitical past, in reference to contributions, will not 
penalize or weigh adversely upon prospective issuers contemplating to practice PMC at 
an advanced stage in their corporate life cycle. 
We challenge further our findings to address other probable sources of bias. This 
involves the following variations : (1) replacing the dependent variable of raw initial 
returns with market-adjusted returns based on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-
weighted index; (2) measuring underpricing to the end of the 11th trading day and 1st 
trading month (Chambers and Dimson, 2009); (3) excluding all IPOs in industries with 
SIC codes 6 (for example, as in Lowry and Shu, 2002); (4) winsorizing returns and 
contributions at the 1st and 99th as well as 5th and 95th percentiles; (5) scaling PMC 
amounts by IPO proceeds; (6) including dummy variables for IPOs occurring within 
years of Congressional and presidential elections; (7) adjusting contribution amounts 
and IPO proceeds for inflation; and (8) specifying the Heckman model in lieu of 
exclusion restrictions so that it becomes identified solely by the nonlinearity of the 
inverse Mills ratio. In all tests, the results remain qualitatively similar and, in the 
interest of brevity, are suppressed. Thus, there is robust evidence in support of the main 
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conclusion of the study: PMC systematically drive downwards first-day returns (and 
IPO offer price revisions). 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
In the first study to relate a firm’s political donations to IPO underpricing, we 
argue that these cash flows can create value in the going-public process spearheading 
expectations of access to the upmost decision-making bodies. Indisputably, the ultimate 
mission of PMC is to foster a firm’s perspective on issues pertinent to corporate strategy 
rather than the IPO event per se. Even so, a traceable and publicly available PMC record 
is capable of alleviating an important portion of issuer-specific uncertainty while 
conferring substantial power in pricing negotiations with the lead underwriter. Our 
empirical evidence lies at the intersection of demand and supply side reasons as: (1) 
market investors are shown to confide in a connected firm’s ability to maneuver with 
less friction in the institutional environment and (2) the underwriter systematically 
commences the price-discovery process from a high starting point as evidenced by a 
pattern of downward offer price revisions. Overall, the opportune setting for 
maintaining first-day returns within range entails substantial implications for 
prospective issuers; all else being equal, an additional 10% PMC expenditure reduces 
IPO underpricing by 2.5%. With a median contribution of $ 71.5 thousand for the donor 
firms in our sample, PMC pose not only as a potent but also as a surprisingly cost-
effective strategy. 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the study shows that a 
PMC file constitutes a suitable proxy for a firm’s ‘political connectedness’ on the 
premise that it is both substantial and traceable to specific politicians. To this end, we 
argue about the twofold nature of an effective PMC strategy as it necessitates lobbying 
expenditure for size and PAC contributions for identification. In devising the optimal 
spending pattern, we find that the effect on IPO return is maximized by targeting 
candidates identifying with the Democratic party and the House of Representatives. At 
the level of individual characteristics, lengthy tenures of accomplishment and home 
state candidacies come up as value-adding features. Importantly, the fundamentals of 
PMC firms show issuers of superior quality as demonstrated by market share, 
profitability, leverage and years of operational experience. Evidently, PMC firms, rather 
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than seeking a life jacket in politics, are involved in order to manage promptly the legal 
and institutional environment risks lying ahead. Newly founded issuers or those 
associated with a long apolitical past are equally entitled to PMC-stemming benefits 
with veterans in donations, attesting to the appeal of political connections even as a 
work in progress. With negligible barriers to entry, the ultimate challenge for issuers 
rests in synchronizing political expenditure with the listing endeavor. In this regard, our 
sensitivity analysis reveals the urgency for fulfilling a 6-month threshold trailing the 
IPO so as to constrain first-day return to the maximum extent.  
We pave the way for follow-up investigation by offering a glimpse of the PMC-
driven sentiment past the IPO event. Tracing the trades of PMC shares deeply into the 
aftermarket period, we document significantly lower volatility than a matched portfolio 
of non-PMC IPOs. A limitation of this research pertains to lobbying contributions that, 
subsequent to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, are available in databases from 
1998 onwards. In conjunction with the overall number of PMC IPOs, a study on the 
long-term performance and survivorship is likely to encounter sample size as a 
challenge. However, as more of our identified PMC IPOs age, we anticipate, in the near 
future, research adding evidence from this alternate horizon. 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
This table presents statistics for a sample of 1,578 U.S. IPOs announced from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 
2013 along with the sub-samples of IPOs with and without PMC activity. The IPOs are described by (1) 
the election cycle in which they occur, (2) the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) division they 
belong, (3) company specific information, and (4) market value measures. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. IPO deals are retrieved from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Database with all 
aftermarket data obtained from CRSP. PMC data comes from the OpenSecrets website for lobbying 
contributions and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) archive for PAC contributions. The book value 
of assets for Tobin's q is from Compustat. 
 
Full sample 
(N= 1,578) 
IPOs with PMC 
             (N = 273) 
IPOs without PMC 
              (N=1,305) 
Election cycle No. %     No. % No. % 
98-99 465 29.47 30 10.99 435 33.33 
00-01 160 10.14 24 8.79 136 10.42 
02-03 94 5.96 15 5.49 79 6.05 
04-05 271 17.17 60 21.98 211 16.17 
06-07 247 15.65 52 19.05 195 14.94 
08-09 56 3.55 20 7.33 36 2.76 
10-11 151 9.57 42 15.38 109 8.35 
12-13 134 8.49 30 10.99 104 7.97 
       
SIC division No. % No. %       No.        % 
       
Agriculture, Forestry and fishing 4 0.25 1 0.37 3 0.23 
Mining and construction industries 49 3.11 13 4.76 36 2.76 
Manufacturing 535 33.90 95 34.80 440 33.72 
Transp., commun., and utilities 122 7.73 35 12.82 87 6.67 
Wholesale and retail trade 122 7.73 15 5.49 107 8.20 
Finance, insurance and real estate 185 11.72 41 15.02 144 11.03 
Service industries 559 35.42 73 26.74 486 37.24 
Public administration 2 0.13 0 0.00 2 0.15 
       
Company specifics  %  %  % 
       
Regulated industry IPOs  21.4  29.3  19.7 
Internet IPOs  12.6  9.5  13.9 
Technology IPOs  37.9  27.8  40.1 
VC Backed IPOs  47.2  35.5  49.7 
NASDAQ IPOs  69.4  49.8  73.5 
       
Market value Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 s.d.  s.d  s.d.  
       
Market cap. (in mil $) 834.51 322.91 2,441.55 708.08 498.33 285.55 
 3,980.58  9,250.37  812.20  
       
Tobin's q 2.87 2.33 2.33 1.63 2.98 2.48 
 3.06  2.65  3.13  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of IPO firms 
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,578 U.S. IPOs announced from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013 along with the sub-samples of IPOs with and 
without PMC activity. All IPOs come from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The statistics provided include the mean, median, minimum, maximum and 
standard deviation for the dependent variables and all control variables used in the subsequent regressions. The presentation of each variable concludes with a test for 
difference in the sub-sample means. Panel A describes our main measures of IPO pricing, i.e. underpricing and revisions. Note that revisions, due to data availability 
limitations, engage a sample of 1,171 IPOs. Panel B describes the IPO firm characteristics which we control for in our analysis. Share price data is from CRSP; 
accounting data is from Compustat. All variables are defined in Appendix A  
 
Full Sample (N= 1,578) IPOs with PMC (N = 273) IPOs without PMC (N=1,305) 
 
P-value 
of  T -Diff 
 
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
 
 
s.d. 
   
s.d. 
   
s.d. 
     Panel A – IPO pricing 
              
               First-day return 0.27 0.12 -0.71 6.84 0.19 0.09 -0.70             4.83 0.29 0.12 -0.37          6.84 
 
0.01 
 
0.58 
   
0.43 
   
0.60 
    
  
Revisions -0.01      0.00    -0.54       1.10 -0.02      0.00    -0.50             0.50 0.00      0.00    -0.54           1.10 
 
           0.02 
 
0.15 
   
0.15 
   
0.15 
     Panel B– IPO characteristics            
             
  
               Gross proceeds                                              137.66 66.04 0.86 11,805 354.11 121.36 9.35 11,805 92.39 60.81 0.86 14,266 
 
0.00 
 
465.40 
   
1,065 
   
114.44 
    
  
Earnings per share                                         0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.50 
   
0.50 
   
0.50 
    
  
Leverage 1.50 0.94 0.00 81.50 1.17 0.91 0.00 6.78 1.56 0.95 0.00 81.50 
 
0.05 
 
3.11 
   
0.96 
   
3.39 
    
  
Firm age                                                       16.37 8.00 0.00 165.00 24.89 11.00 0.00 165.00 14.58 8.00 0.00 45.00 
 
0.00 
 
23.15 
   
32.05 
   
20.39 
    
  
Venture capital                                              0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.50 
   
0.48 
   
0.50 
    
  
Underwriter ranking                                     0.62 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.58 1.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.49 
   
0.38 
   
0.49 
    
  
Internet IPOs                                                   0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.10 
 
0.33 
   
0.29 
   
0.34 
    
  
Technology IPOs                                            0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.49 
   
0.45 
   
0.49 
    
  
NASDAQ 0.69 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.46 
   
0.50 
   
0.44 
    
  
Dotcom period                                             0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.48 
   
0.36 
   
0.49 
    
  
Credit crunch                                    0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.31 
   
0.40 
   
0.29 
    
  
Share overhang                                             3.53 2.88 0.00 80.75 3.70 2.97 0.00 50.34 3.49 2.87 0.00 80.75 
 
0.35 
 
3.41 
   
3.67 
   
3.35 
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Table 3.3: Top-fifteen donors and recipients of IPO contributions 
This table identifies, on a top-fifteen basis, cases of intense PMC activity. The sample consists of 1,578 
U.S. IPOs announced from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013 which we retrieve from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database and manually search for evidence of lobbying or PAC contributions in the 
OpenSecrets website and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) archive, respectively. Panel A presents 
the IPO firms topping our list for largest contributions along with the first-day returns recorded. Panel B 
presents the most popular recipient candidates based on aggregate PAC funds raised and identifies them 
by race, political party, and U.S. state affiliations.  All variables are defined in Appendix A 
 
Panel A: Top-fifteen IPO donors of lobbying and PAC contributions 
 
IPO date Company 
Age 
at 
IPO 
1st-day 
return 
(annual 
avg.) 
1st-day 
return 
(company) 
Lobbying 
(U.S. $) 
PAC 
(U.S. $) 
       
11/17/2010 General Motors  102 9.30% 3.61% 9,570,000 284,500 
10/26/1999 PentaStar Commun.  1 70.30% 7.50% 5,580,000 49,000 
12/12/2001 Prudential Financial  100 14.30% 6.55% 4,110,000 187,200 
02/04/1998 Vysis Inc (BP Amoco) 7 21.40% 0.52% 3,520,000 172,000 
09/30/2009 Talecris Biotherapeutics  4 10.60% 11.32% 2,950,000 0 
10/22/2001 
Principal Financial 
Group  100 
14.30% 
13.51% 2,560,000 0 
11/09/1999 UPS 92 70.30% 36.25% 2,480,000 15,000 
04/04/2000 MetLife  132 7.20% 3.51% 1,840,000 595,525 
11/14/2006 Emergent BioSolutions  8 11.60% -6.40% 2,000,000 300,000 
03/16/2005 PanAmSat Holding  1 10.10% -3.61% 2,020,000 0 
10/12/2006 SAIC  37 11.60% 21.20% 1,950,000 40,000 
11/14/2007 EnergySolutions  19 14.30% 0.04% 1,020,000 780,000 
12/13/2001 
United Defense 
Industries  60 
14.30% 
1.42% 1,560,000 181,100 
05/17/2012 Facebook  8 17.80% 0.61% 1,350,000 270,000 
05/24/2006 MasterCard  40 11.60% 17.95% 1,420,000 186,973 
 
Panel B: Top-fifteen recipient candidates of PAC contributions by funds raised 
 
Election 
cycles 
Candidate Race Party State PAC funds raised 
( U.S. $) 
      
1998-2007 Santorum, Rick Senate Republican Pennsylvania 109,450 
1998-2007 Moran, Jim House Democratic Virginia 102,850 
1998-2013 Hoyer, Steny House Democratic Maryland 101,500 
1998-2009 Murtha, John House Democratic Pennsylvania 92,500 
1998-2013 McConnell, Mitch Senate Republican Kentucky 91,300 
1998-2007 Davis, Tom House Republican Virginia 89,999 
1998-2009 Wilson, Heather House Republican New Mexico 85,000 
1998-2009 Hastert, Dennis House Republican Illinois 83,597 
1998-2011 Lewis, Jerry House Republican California 83,100 
1998-2013 Dingell, John House Democratic Michigan 82,570 
2000-2013 Hatch, Orrin Senate Republican Utah 81,500 
1998-2009 Rangel, Charles House Democratic New York 80,848 
1998-2011 Barton, Joe House Republican Texas 75,000 
1998-2007 Johnson, Nancy House Republican Connecticut 74,500 
1998-2013 Blunt, Roy Senate Republican Missouri 73,150 
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Figure 3.1: Breakdown of IPO PMC expenditure by type.This chart portrays IPOs with 
political money contributions (PMC) as a fraction of a total sample of 1,578 U.S. IPOs announced from 1 
January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013; and contribution combinations as fractions of the PMC sample. Both 
Lobby-PAC refers to IPOs practicing both lobbying and PAC contributions; Just Lobby and Just PAC 
refer to IPOs practicing exclusive lobbying and PAC contributions, respectively. IPOs come from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) Database. The lobbying data is from the OpenSecrets website; the PAC 
data is from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) archive. 
 
PMC total: $ 81,038,007; Lobbying: $ 74,286,745; PAC: $ 6,751,262 
 
 
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of contributions 
This table reports statistics of the annual political money contributions made by a sample of of 1,578 U.S. 
IPOs announced from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. The contributions correspond to the recent-most 
year to IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years. The data for lobbying contributions is from the 
OpenSecrets website; the data for PAC contributions is from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
archive. Political money measures the aggregate annual contributions regardless of contribution type; 
Lobby money and PAC money measure the annual contributions for lobbying and PAC, respectively; No. 
of candidates corresponds to the number of candidates that received PAC money; Incumbents and 
Challengers measure the annual contributions targeted at incumbent and challenger candidates 
respectively; House, Senate, Democrats and Republicans refer to contributions targeted at House, Senate, 
Democrats and Republicans, respectively; Committee chairs and Ranking members refer to contributions 
targeted at candidates who have been committee chairs and ranking members in Congressional 
committees, respectively; Home state candidates refers to contributions targeted at candidates 
representing the state of firm’s headquarters. 
 
non-PMC
1,305 (83%)
Both Lobby-PAC
61 (4% )
Just Lobby
184 (11%)
Just PAC  28 (2%)
PMC
273 ( 17%)
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Political money 273 296,843 71,500 863,193 1,500 9,854,500 
Lobby money 245 303,211 80,000 869,379 5,000 9,570,000 
PAC money 89 75,857 18,075 135,969 1,000 780,000 
P
A
C
 s
p
ec
if
ic
s 
No. of candidates 41 10 77 0 530 
Incumbents 69,762 16,000 128,980 500 775,000 
Challengers 6,095 1,000 12,808 0 78,207 
House  38,988 7,000 87,462 0 625,000 
Senate  36,869 10,000 67,992 0 780,000 
Democrats 33,121 10,000 49,841 0 299,730 
Republicans 42,489 4,000 101,464 0 600,000 
Committee chairs 17,278 3,500 36,581 0 282,500 
Ranking members 13,967 4,000 23,014 0 138,500 
 Home state candidates 9,425 2,000 17,074 0 92,701 
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Figure 3.2: PMC sources and targets, election cycles 1998-2013. The data comes from 
the OpenSecrets website for lobbying contributions and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) archive 
for PAC contributions. The sample includes 273 IPOs that have practiced any contribution type over the 
election cycles 1998-2013. Panel A tracks the average lobbying and PAC expenditure as well as average 
number of lobbying and PAC donor IPOs, per election cycle. Panel B tracks the recipient candidates of 
PAC contributions and reports the average contributions that reach (1) the races for the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives, and (2) the Republican and Democratic parties, per election cycle. 
 
 
Panel A: Contribution amounts and number of IPO donors by type  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Contribution amounts by Congress chamber & political party  
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Table 3.5: Correlation matrix 
This table reports pairwise correlations of variables used in the study. The sample includes 1,578 U.S. IPOs announced from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. Panel A 
presents correlations of control variables; Panel B presents correlations of the PMC variables. All variables are fully defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
              
 Panel A: IPO variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1. Proceeds             
2. Earnings per share 0.08***            
3. Leverage -0.04*** -0.18***           
4. Firm age 0.19*** 0.24*** -0.08***          
5. Venture capital -0.09*** -0.39*** 0.08*** -0.29***         
6. Dotcom period -0.06*** -0.18*** -0.03 -0.14*** 0.08***        
7. Credit crunch 0.02*** 0.06** -0.01 0.03** -0.01 -0.27***       
8. Internet firm 0.01** -0.19*** 0.04 -0.16*** 0.20*** 0.22*** -0.06**      
9. Technology firm -0.05*** -0.22*** -0.01 -0.20*** 0.32*** 0.21*** -0.02 0.16***     
10. Underwriter 0.14*** 0.04** -0.05* 0.10*** 0.06** -0.18*** 0.13*** -0.02 0.04    
11. Share overhang 0.03 -0.07* -0.04 -0.08*** 0.13*** 0.14*** -0.05** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.11*   
12. NASDAQ -0.16*** -0.22* 0.06** -0.23*** 0.32*** 0.14*** -0.02 0.14*** 0.19*** -0.19*** -0.01  
13. Market return -0.02 -0.02** 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
              
 Panel B: PMC variables (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)    
14. Political money             
15. Lobby money 0.90***            
16. PAC money 0.45*** 0.36***           
17. House money 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.91***          
18. Senate money 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.86*** 0.59***         
19. Democrat money 0.52*** 0.46*** 0.82*** 0.95*** 0.89***        
20. Republican money 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.95*** 0.62*** 0.73*** 0.63***       
21. PIABILITY 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.38*** 0.23*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.26***      
22. PISTRENGTH 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.60*** 0.50*** 0.59*** 0.63*** 0.50*** 0.59***     
23. PIPOWER 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.58*** 0.47*** 0.57*** 0.61*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.83***    
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Table 3.6: Determinants of PMC involvement for IPO firms 
This table reports the results of a probit regression for the probability of PMC involvement on a list of 
identified PMC determinants. The sample consists of U.S. IPOs (N=1,578) announced over the period 1 
January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. The first column reports the resulting coefficients and the second the z-
Statistics. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
                   Coefficient                        z-Statistic 
   Firm profile & visibility 
    Assets 0.249*** 6.96 
  Cash flow 0.057* 1.86 
  Firm age -0.026 -0.62 
  Media coverage 0.310*** 3.47 
Internal politics 
     Pre-IPO mgt ownership 0.590*** 3.71 
   Unionized employees -0.133 -0.27 
   Venture capital 0.186* 1.71 
Political exposure 
     Industry PMC 0.001*** 2.8 
   HHI -0.451 -0.74 
   Electoral College -0.001 -0.13 
   Bills introduced 0.009*** 7.33 
Operational complexity 
     R&D 0.720*** 6.95 
   Regulated industry 0.341*** 3.23 
   Government purchases 0.314** 2.52 
   Business segments 0.099** 2.4 
   Geographic segments -0.011 -0.5 
   N 
 
1,578 
Pseudo-R² 
 
0.233 
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Table 3.7: Effect of PMC involvement on IPO underpricing 
This table reports results of regressions of IPO underpricing (dependent variable) on a PMC dummy 
variable and other control variables for a sample of U.S. IPOs (N=1,578) over the period 1 January, 1998 
to 30 June, 2013. The PMC variable assumes the value of 1 for any level of PMC activity, otherwise it is 
0. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Four estimation procedures are used: Ordinary least-squares 
(column 1), Heckman two-stage (column 2), Maximum likelihood estimation (column 3) and generated 
IV approach (columns 4 and 5). The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The 
lower part of the table provides the Wald and Hausman statistics based on the MLE and IV estimations, 
respectively, and the instrument t-statistics from the first-stage (full 1st stage results are on Appendix D). 
An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two at the 5% level; and three at the 1% level. 
 OLS Heckman MLE IV IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
PMC -0.033** -0.135*** -0.161*** -0.141*** -0.143** 
 (-2.08) (-3.09) (-4.65) (-2.58) (-2.49) 
Firm age -0.014** -0.013* -0.012* -0.012** -0.011 
 (-2.55) (-1.80) (-1.74) (-2.20) (-1.64) 
Venture capital 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 
 (3.60) (3.58) (3.52) (3.37) (3.17) 
Proceeds 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 
 (5.31) (5.87) (6.36) (5.54) (5.00) 
Earnings per share 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.026 
 (1.24) (0.97) (0.93) (1.07) (1.64) 
Leverage 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.13) (-0.03) (-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.77) 
Dotcom period 0.166*** 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.198*** 
 (10.79) (10.06) (9.99) (9.59) (9.31) 
Credit crunch                                  -0.013 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 
 (-0.69) (-0.22) (-0.12) (-0.22) (0.24) 
Internet firm 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.070** 
 (3.37) (4.85) (4.87) (3.48) (2.22) 
Tech firm 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.062*** 
 (4.83) (5.07) (5.00) (4.53) (3.34) 
NASDAQ 0.073*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (5.40) (4.21) (4.12) (4.81) (4.05) 
Underwriter rank 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 
 (3.76) (4.12) (4.15) (3.89) (3.04) 
Share overhang 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.016** 
 (3.01) (6.82) (6.87) (3.00) (2.42) 
Market return 0.225*** 0.237*** 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.246*** 
 (5.78) (7.14) (7.22) (6.04) (5.03) 
Revisions     0.315*** 
     (3.81) 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.068***    
  (2.59)    
N 1,578 1,578 1,578 1,578 1,171 
Adjusted-R2 (OLS) 0.27     
T-stat instr., 1st stage  6.75*** 6.30*** 7.56*** 7.02*** 
Wald test   17.55***   
Hausman test    4.75**  
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Table 3.8: Effect of PMC level on IPO underpricing 
This table reports results of the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of IPO underpricing (dependent 
variable) on PMC level and other control variables. PMC level is defined as the aggregate U.S. dollar 
contributions resulting from: any combination of lobbying and PAC (Column 1), lobbying (Column 2), 
and PAC (Column 3). Our sample consists of U.S. IPOs announced over the period 1 January, 1998 to 30 
June, 2013 with an extant record of PMC activity. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The 
dependent variable and dollar contributions variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. We use the 
symbols *, ** and *** for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 (1)          (1) (2) (3) 
    
Political money -0.025***   
 (-3.60)   
Lobby money  -0.026***  
  (-3.25)  
PAC money   -0.040*** 
   (-4.83) 
Proceeds 0.017 0.015 0.014 
 (0.99) (0.84) (1.32) 
Earnings per share 0.062** 0.064** 0.054*** 
 (2.29) (2.22) (2.71) 
Leverage -0.039*** -0.038** -0.047 
 (-2.61) (-2.46) (-1.00) 
Firm age -0.001 0.002 0.010 
 (-0.08) (0.25) (1.30) 
Venture capital 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.053 
 (2.70) (2.73) (1.33) 
Dotcom period 0.197*** 0.227*** 0.034 
 (3.49) (3.67) (1.04) 
Credit crunch                                  -0.055* -0.058* -0.069** 
 (-1.87) (-1.85) (-2.42) 
Internet firm 0.078 0.072 0.004 
 (1.21) (1.12) (0.07) 
Tech firm 0.038 0.029 0.039 
 (1.26) (0.93) (0.85) 
NASDAQ 0.102*** 0.090** 0.037 
 (2.93) (2.34) (1.08) 
Underwriter rank 0.091** 0.102** -0.024 
 (1.99) (2.16) (-0.55) 
Share overhang 0.007 0.005 0.003 
 (1.44) (1.22) (1.52) 
Market return 0.174** 0.213*** 0.058 
 (2.55) (2.81) (0.92) 
N 273 245 89 
Adjusted-R2 0.351 0.363 0.462 
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Table 3.9: Underpricing and PAC recipient characteristics 
The table reports results of the cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of IPO underpricing (dependent variable) on key PAC recipient characteristics for a sample of 
U.S. IPOs with a record of PMC activity announced over the period 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. The variables of interest in Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the 
aggregate dollar contributions towards the House of Representatives, Senate, Democratic party and Republican party, respectively. Columns 5, 6 and 7 use the Cooper 
et al. (2010) measures for candidate strength, power and ability, respectively. In all regressions, the control variables of Tables 7 and 8 retain their position and are 
suppressed for simplicity. The dependent variable and aggregate dollar contributions variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix A. We use the symbols *, ** and *** to denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
  Congress chamber  Partisan identity  Candidate profile 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
           
House money  -0.0077***         
  (-3.17)         
Senate money   -0.006**        
   (-2.35)        
Democratic money     -0.0067***      
     (-2.74)      
Republican money      -0.0063**     
      (-2.42)     
PISTRENGTH        -0.0168***   
        (-2.72)   
PIPOWER         -0.0355***  
         (-4.17)  
PIABILITY          -0.0199* 
          (-1.70) 
           
N  273 273  273 273  273 273 273 
Adjusted-R2  0.347 0.341  0.344 0.341  0.345 0.353 0.336 
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Table 3.10: Volatility profile of PMC and matched non-PMC IPOs 
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum statistics for a sample of 201 
PMC IPOs and a matched sample of 201 non-PMC IPOs. A t-test is employed to compare the differences 
in sample means. The matching is based on the criteria of i) a common 2-digit SIC code ii) proximity in 
IPO proceeds and iii) a common listing year. The variable analyzed is the 60, 120 and 365 day volatility, 
defined as the standard deviation of daily returns over the aforementioned intervals. All returns are 
estimated from the 8th trading day following the IPO and onwards with data from the CRSP database. We 
use the symbol *** to denote statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Sample Mean 
Difference in 
mean t-statistics 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
60-day 
volatility 
PMC 
IPOs 
0.031 -3.39*** 0.013 0.009 0.078 
 
Matched 
IPOs 
0.038  0.027 0.013 0.092 
120-day 
volatility 
PMC 
IPOs 
0.033 -3.09*** 0.013 0.010 0.085 
 
Matched 
IPOs 
0.042  0.045 0.014 0.088 
365-day 
volatility 
PMC 
IPOs 
0.035 -3.05*** 0.014 0.011 0.087 
 
Matched 
IPOs 
0.051  0.069 0.016 0.112 
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Table 3.11: Underwriters’ behavior under a PMC regime 
Columns 1 and 2 regress absolute offer price revisions and offer price revisions, respectively, on a PMC 
dummy and other covariates for a sample of U.S. IPOs (N=1,171) over the period 1 January, 1998 to 30 
June, 2013. Columns 3 and 4 use IPO first-day returns as the dependent variable for a sample of U.S. 
IPOs (N=1,578) over the same time period. The unconnected dummy in Column 3 is set to 1 for 
underwriters which abstain from political contributions in the year that they underwrite a PMC IPO; in 
Column 4 the unconnected dummy is set to 1 for underwriters that underwrite no more than 1 PMC IPO 
in any given year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The estimation procedure used is the 
generated instrumental variables method. T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. An asterisk 
indicates significance at the 10% level; two indicate significance at the 5% level; three indicate 
significance at the 1% level.  
 
   Absolute 
 revisions 
Revisions 
First-day return 
 
Direct 
connections 
Indirect 
connections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
PMC  0.013 -0.131*** -0.132** -0.107** 
 (0.06) (-4.30) (-2.39) (-2.48) 
PMC*unconnected    -0.071 -0.133** 
   (-1.31) (-2.04) 
Firm age -0.001 -0.004 -0.013** -0.011** 
 (-0.40) (-0.97) (-2.23) (-1.98) 
Venture capital 0.009 0.029*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 
 (1.28) (2.85) (3.27) (3.30) 
Proceeds -0.003 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (-0.72) (8.42) (5.54) (5.70) 
Earnings per share -0.014** 0.025*** 0.013 0.011 
 (-2.08) (2.70) (0.98) (0.85) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.03) (-0.55) (-0.11) (-0.11) 
Dotcom period 0.002 0.051*** 0.154*** 0.156*** 
 (0.32) (4.83) (9.63) (9.67) 
Credit crunch                                  -0.014* 0.020* -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.76) (1.65) (-0.13) (-0.10) 
Internet firm 0.002 0.044*** 0.101*** 0.097*** 
 (0.24) (3.22) (3.51) (3.36) 
Tech firm 0.018*** 0.038*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
 (2.73) (3.98) (4.48) (4.36) 
NASDAQ 0.004 0.002 0.067*** 0.068*** 
 (0.67) (0.21) (4.84) (4.89) 
Underwriter rank 0.015** 0.008 0.063*** 0.058*** 
 (1.97) (0.77) (3.83) (3.48) 
Share overhang 0.001 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.45) (2.65) (2.96) (2.96) 
Market return 0.023 0.131*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 
 (1.43) (5.77) (6.12) (6.08) 
N 1,171 1,171 1578 1578 
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Table 3.12: Sensitivity analysis 
This table provides a sensitivity analysis for the effect of PMC time and type on initial return and filing 
price revisions. We use the generated instrumental variables method and report in Panels A, B, and C the 
resulting coefficients, γ₁ and γ₂, for the return and revisions equations, respectively, along with the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Panel A gives the resulting coefficients from the full PMC 
sample (i.e. any PMC combination with a cut-off at 5 years prior to IPO). Panel B limits the time window 
to produce subsamples of firms engaging in PMC i) within 6 months  ii) older than 6 months and up to a 
year, and iii) older than 1 year and up to 5. Panel C distinguishes by PMC type to produce the subsamples 
of firms engaging in PMC via i) a combination of lobby and PAC contributions ‘Both lobby – PAC’ ii) 
exclusive lobby contributions ‘Just lobby’, and iii) exclusive PAC contributions ‘Just PAC’. In all 
regressions, the control variables of Tables 7and 8 retain their position and are suppressed for simplicity. 
The dependent variables in both equations are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
Coefficient (γ₁, γ₂) 
standard error 
 Underpricing equation Revisions equation 
 UND= β₁ X+γ₁PMC + ε₁  REV= β₂X+γ₂PMC+ ε₂ 
Panel A: PMC full sample   
   
Any PMC type within 5 years -0.141*** -0.131*** 
 0.055 0.030 
   
Panel B: PMC subsamples  
by time 
  
   
6-months or less -0.361*** -0.339*** 
 0.136 0.094 
Older than 6-mo & up to a year -0.302** -0.293*** 
 0.139 0.080 
Older than 1 and up to 5 years -0.300* - 0.177* 
 0.180 0.097 
   
Panel C: PMC subsamples  
by type 
  
   
Both lobby - PAC -0.365*** - 0.376*** 
 0.119 0.092 
Just lobby -0.200** - 0.124** 
 0.102 0.055 
Just PAC -0.578** - 0.722*** 
 0.289 0.236 
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Chapter 4 - Political connections and IPO underpricing: 
An efficiency problem 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In 2014, ten years after its IPO (Initial Public Offering), Google surpassed 
Goldman Sachs in both lobbying and PAC (Political Action Committee) 
contributions11. Given the bank’s traditional ties with government, this news drew 
considerable attention from the press. However, Google had initiated its Washington 
strategy just a few months before it went public in August 2004. Similarly, other 
corporate issuers exert great efforts to develop their political networks early, opting for 
a highly discretionary expense during a period of cash scarcity. While few would argue 
against the long-term benefits of staying in the good graces of politicians, this observed 
behavior begs the question of whether incremental benefits accrue to these early-birds 
based on the decision to proceed to an IPO ‘connected’.  
On balance, the odds of attaining a good pricing outcome rarely favor the issuer. 
The disparity in bargaining power with the lead underwriter and the liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) result in the systematic dwarfing of the IPO offer price by first 
aftermarket close. The economic implications are colossal: over the period 1980-2014 
alone, a total of 8,060 U.S. issuers realized an average first-day return of 18.6%. In 
dollar terms, the amassing of $805.8 billion in equity capital entailed an opportunity 
cost of $149.8 billion12. 
A politically connected issuer may be at an advantage compared to other IPO 
issuers for several reasons. First, the firm is in less need of an underwriter’s reputation 
for the purpose of certification (Carter et al., 1998). Shares of an issuer known for its 
political ties should be easier to sell, obviating much of the marketing burden. Indeed, 
the increased publicity accompanying elite clientele adds to an underwriter’s own 
reputational capital, so that the prestige spillovers cease to be unidirectional. Second, 
politically involved firms have been shown to enjoy preferential access to debt 
                                                          
11 According to data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a non-profit U.S. research group, 
during 2014 Google spent $ 16,830,000 and $ 1,036,926 for lobbying and PAC contributions, 
respectively. Over the same period, Goldman Sachs was associated with a lobbying expenditure of $ 
3,460,000 and PAC of $ 1,017,100. 
12 We rely for these estimates on data from Jay Ritter’s website. 
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financing (Faccio, 2006; Boubakri et al., 2008; Houston et al., 2014), so these issuers 
encounter neither time nor liquidity constraints but instead they can afford to withhold 
listing until a satisfactory valuation arises. Third, connections mitigate the ex ante 
uncertainty surrounding a firm’s intrinsic value by indicating a capability to extract 
economic rents or, at a minimum, protection against tail risk. This implicit assurance 
may replace a low offer price as a means of disseminating confidence in future 
prospects (c.f. signaling studies such as Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Welch, 1989; 
Chemmanur, 1993).  
Intangible assets such as a firm’s political network are difficult to identify and 
cumbersome to model, with incremental information hidden in the possible 
nonlinearities We investigate a prospective issuer’s potential to retain a larger portion of 
the surplus value created at an IPO, using lobbying and political action committee 
(PAC) campaigns as proxies for corporate political connections, but the challenge lies in 
defining a setting that caters appropriately to the different types of connectedness that 
they lead to. Therefore, rather than setting up a regression-based framework, we opt for 
a method that allows relationships to manifest themselves in a data-driven manner. We 
approach IPO pricing as an efficiency-analysis problem to be treated in a fully 
nonparametric procedure. Central to this framing is the issuers’ abilities to minimize 
underpricing across a variety of settings.  
Gondat-Larralde and James (2008) note the dearth of theory in explaining either 
IPO underpricing in equilibrium conditions or the average differences of IPO returns on 
the observed scales. As a consequence, some researchers (inter alia Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990) analyze IPO underpricing without taking 
into consideration the variation of the observed phenomenon while others presume its 
existence (Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2005). In a departure 
from these studies, we introduce a method for establishing comparability without 
determining a priori a direction (underpricing or other). This is a nonparametric frontier 
approach, known as data envelopment analysis (DEA), which features widely in 
Operations Research (Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984; Sherman, 1984; 
Mahajan, 1991; Duzakin and Duzakin, 2007; Sueyoshi and Goto, 2009; Demerjian et 
al., 2012). Extending this technique to IPOs, we utilize the ratio of offer price to first 
aftermarket close in order to construct non-parametric piece-wise surfaces (i.e. frontiers) 
over the sample. Subsequently, we develop efficiency measures in relation to these 
surfaces by the application of linear programming. On this relative basis, we quantify an 
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issuer’s ability to reduce IPO underpricing across industries, eliminating the 
methodological challenges raised by Gondat-Larralde and James (2008).   
Most relative nonparametric efficiency studies (also called two-stage DEA 
studies) in Operations Research derive efficiency levels in the first stage and, 
subsequently, employ a regression-type framework (i.e. Tobit, OLS models, etc.) in 
order to explain observed variations (dependent variable) based on the exogenous terms 
(control variables)13. However, this route imposes unrealistic assumptions on the data-
generating process leading to biased results (Simar and Wilson, 2011). In order to avoid 
such misspecifications, we apply the probabilistic method of efficiency estimation 
(Daraio and Simar, 2005; 2007) alongside the latest developments (Bădin et al., 2012) 
on the impact measurement of environmental factors. Consequently, we carry forward 
our second stage analysis in a completely nonparametric framework without relying on 
modeling assumptions which may not be supported by the data. This approach enables 
us to capture all potential nonlinearities in the relation between IPO returns and 
lobbying and PAC intensity. Apart from this benefit, the shift of focus from outcome 
prediction to efficiency evaluation renders our estimates immune to endogeneity14: a 
common source of bias in the IPO-return equation which can also arise from firms’ self-
selection into political contributions.   
Nonlinearities in the association between IPO return and lobbying as well as 
PAC contributions are plausible because of the very nature of these strategies. As a 
means for establishing and nurturing connections, the political favoritism that donor 
firms aim at can hardly support a linear association with the hypothesized outcome (i.e. 
containment of IPO underpricing). Human relationships are dynamic and can manifest 
themselves in all conceivable directions. For example, donating PAC money at the legal 
ceiling of $ 5 thousand, or at any level below, is unlikely to have a material effect to a 
candidate’s financing needs; the Center for Responsive Politics estimates the average 
political campaign cost for a seat in the U.S. Senate (House of Representatives) at $ 
10,476,451 ($ 1,689,580). However, as a gesture of support, a PAC contribution can 
result in favouritism that far exceeds the value of donation in nominal terms. From a 
                                                          
13 Refer to Simar and Wilson (2007, 2011) for an excellent analysis of the relevant studies. 
14Also, as in Black and Smith (2004) and Frölich (2008), nonparametric estimators overcome the 
problems associated with endogenous control variables and remain consistent in lieu of instrumental 
variables. 
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complementary angle, one may ask how many candidates an issuer needs to support in 
order to transmit a signal of connectedness at IPO. Conceivably, after having created a 
sufficiently large network of political contacts (via PAC or lobbying money), 
channelling additional funds may result in a negligible marginal benefit for the donor 
firm. Then, the question comes down to pinpointing inflection points where the effect of 
the exogenous variables on IPO efficiency alters. In addressing this objective, therefore, 
a parametric, data-driven approach has a decisive advantage. 
In order to conduct this work, we require a new and comprehensive database. 
We manually investigate U.S. IPO deals recorded in the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) database over the period from 1998 to 2014 for evidence of political 
contributions within the 12-month period prior to the issue day. This search involves 
scrutiny of two distinct sources. The data on PAC contributions come from the files of 
the Federal Election Commission, whereas for lobbying contributions we search the 
electronic archives of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). After merging the 
contributions databases with Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data on 
aftermarket prices, we identify 379 unique IPOs which have exhibited either type of 
activity. These firms cover 12 out of the 14 Thomson Reuters proprietary macro-level 
industry classifications. 
Our results do, indeed, reveal nonlinearities in the relationship of efficiency with 
the two contribution avenues (in itself justifying the fully nonparametric treatment) and, 
moreover, the relationship differs across business sectors. By and large, PAC 
contributions conform to their hypothesized role in reducing the amounts of money left 
on the table by prospective issuers. Market participants factor in direct, interpersonal 
relationships with policy makers. Evidence from lobbying contributions corroborates 
this conclusion. The majority of IPOs exhibiting efficiency take advantage of both 
lobbying and PAC contributions. Results for the complete dataset show lobbying versus 
IPO efficiency exhibiting an inverted “U”-shape which, however, changes to a “U”-
shape when data are restricted to IPOs with positive returns that lie on the empirical 
frontier and are, therefore, efficient. The change in shape prompts a closer examination, 
combined with the thought that firms across the various economic sectors are likely to 
pursue heterogeneous political objectives. We compare Energy and Power, Financial, 
and Industrial sectors and find different (plausibly “strategically tailored”) spending. 
Lobbying contributions in Energy and Power account for a positive nonlinear effect on 
IPOs’ efficiency levels, whereas PAC money appears to erode value. This may be 
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explained by a heavy regulatory framework demanding quality communication between 
those setting policy and those affected by it. The reverse is observed in the Industrial 
sector, from which we surmise that PAC campaigns, as a superior means for 
networking, cajole decision makers into government purchases and favorable 
appropriations from the Federal budget for the industry. The Financial sector, in 
contrast, barely shows an economically meaningful association of either lobbying or 
PAC with IPO efficiency levels, perhaps because it already exerts a political role by 
virtue of its centrality to the economy. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review 
of the relevant literature and develops our main conjecture. Section 4.3 describes the 
database assembly. We delve into the mechanics of the proposed methodology in 
Section 4.4. The empirical analysis is in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 offers a discussion and 
possible interpretations of key findings. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Background and hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Proximity to politics as a value-adding element 
Political connections may be formed via sourcing managers and key executives 
who are well-connected themselves or through the corporate treasury for political 
contributions. International evidence traces connections from interpersonal networks 
into firm value. Fisman (2001), for example, documents the share price of connected 
firms in Indonesia swinging in line with news of President Suharto’s health. Faccio 
(2006), exploring the interplay of business and politics in 47 countries, lists a number of 
benefits for organizations employing officials with an alleged political footprint. 
Specifically, connected firms are capable of maintaining larger market shares as well as 
bearing more leverage compared to their non-connected peers. An additional privilege 
comes in the form of systematic tax discounts. Notably, the greater the observed extent 
of connectedness, the more these features emerge. Faccio and Parsley (2009) follow the 
market reaction of firms headquartered in politicians’ hometowns in 36 countries 
subsequent to their unexpected death announcements and find an economically sizeable 
1.7% decline in value (across a wide spectrum of political and economic conditions, 
including the U.S.). 
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The bourgeoning Chinese IPO market, in conjunction with the high degree of 
interconnectedness between local businesses and the central government, has stimulated 
research on implications for newly listed equities. The limited underpricing of 
politically connected firms features in this literature. For instance, Fan et al. (2007) note 
the role of CEOs’ links with government as both an asset during the IPO day (exactly 
because of the constraining effect on return) and a liability for significantly impairing 
firms’ growth and earnings prospects over the long-run. In a similar spirit, Francis et al. 
(2009) using multiple proxies of political connections (directors’ network, type of state 
ownership, and underwriter’s ability to attract revenue from state-owned companies) 
corroborate the relationship with underpricing. Additionally, they associate connected 
issuers with larger P/E ratios and higher IPO offer prices so that proximity to politics 
emerges as a pivotal factor in raising greater amounts of capital. Of course, using the 
Chinese capital markets as laboratories for assessing the effect of political connections 
on IPO underpricing invites controversy. On the one hand, the peculiar economic model 
of China cripples the transferability of findings to a mature Western market setting. On 
the other, one may argue that if the effect is capable of manifesting itself in spite of the 
constant demand for Chinese equities, then a stringent robustness test has already been 
fulfilled. 
U.S. evidence tracing connections that stem from political contributions also 
reports significant implications for firm value. Cooper et al. (2010) study the correlation 
of PAC contributions with the cross-section of future abnormal returns and document a 
positive association. Chen et al. (2015), substituting PAC data for lobbying, corroborate 
this relationship. In parallel, the authors complement market measures of performance 
with accounting elements such as net income and operating cash flow, thereby showing 
the effect to permeate into firm fundamentals. The value-enhancing element of 
contributions can equally manifest itself via the advancement of more dubious purposes. 
Thus, Yu and Yu (2011) attribute to firms remaining active in lobbying an interesting 
immunity from fraud detection. In particular, scrutiny by the relevant authorities lags by 
an average of 117 days while violators are 38% less likely to be held accountable for 
fraudulent actions in the first place. Similarly, Correia (2014) highlights the role of both 
lobbying and PAC contributions as powerful deterrents against SEC enforcement 
actions.  
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4.2.2 Political connections in the process of going public 
 
Following the research of Stoll and Curley (1970) and Logue (1973) registering 
positive skewness of the IPO returns distribution, underpricing is frequently framed as a 
balance among conflicting incentives of the principal IPO participants. With 
underpricing arising from informational asymmetries, firms may forego some of the 
wealth created at the IPO by setting a lower price in an attempt to mitigate ex ante 
uncertainty. This behavior conforms to a signaling model and differentiates quality 
firms from other issuers (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Welch, 1989; and Chemmanur, 
1993). In parallel with transmitting assurances matching their standing, issuers 
themselves require market feedback and predictions of demand. Sophisticated investors, 
mainly in the form of institutional investors, can be central in this respect. Therefore, a 
number of studies establish underpricing as a means of deferred compensation for 
information revelation (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; 
Spatt and Srivastava, 1991; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001 and 2003). Ritter and Welch 
(2002) speculate that IPO subscription may be used as a tool for exerting influence on 
politicians without, however, providing further evidence.  
A politically involved issuer is equipped to reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
an IPO. The connections formed via political donations can structure a network which 
facilitates information flow such as the exchange of issuer-specific information for 
forecasts of demand and market sentiment. To the extent that proximity to politics 
evidences a firm’s capability to extract economic rents, there is less disagreement on the 
value of connected firms, thereby eliminating the need to signal quality via a low offer 
price. 
In parallel, political connections reinforce an issuer’s bargaining position in 
pricing negotiations with the lead underwriter. Rather than the issuer gaining benefits in 
prestige from the underwriter for legitimacy, this may be reversed; a feature especially 
desirable if the underwriters’ market structure conforms to a model of oligopolistic 
competition as in Liu and Ritter (2010). The immediate prestige spillovers do not 
preclude long-run expectations of a recurring stream of revenue in the form of new 
issuance activity, business with the brokerage division and potential M&As. 
Conversely, connected firms have been associated with advantageous access to 
alternative means of financing such as bank loans (Houston et al., 2014). Attaching less 
urgency to the IPO funds, therefore, the issuer is able to negotiate a higher valuation. As 
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a result, the underwriter is incentivized to exert greater effort to retain a connected client 
at a time when the latter is able to be selective.  
 
4.2.3 Lobbying and PAC: two distinct means for establishing 
connections 
 
Lobbying and PAC contributions constitute a firm’s primary vehicles for 
gaining access to the U.S. political system. To put this endeavor in perspective, 2014 
saw a reported aggregate lobbying expenditure of $ 3.21 billion, whereas PAC 
contributions over the election cycle fell slightly short of $ 0.5 billion. The disparity in 
magnitudes is indicative of their different natures. 
Lobbying aims to sway politicians to interventions that advance corporate 
interests. This may equally translate into refraining from action in cases where the 
optimal outcome lies with the status quo (defensive lobbying). The process is more 
elaborate than an exchange of money for political favors and constitutes an important 
input in the making of politics. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) defines as 
a lobbying contact any oral or written interaction (inclusive of electronic 
communications) to an executive branch official or a legislative branch official made on 
behalf of a client with regard to the formulation, modification, or adoption of federal 
laws, executive orders, or government contracts, etc. As a communications endeavor, 
therefore, lobbying represents a valuable source of information for legislators, even 
more so for issues of an especially technical character. In-house or external specialists, 
commonly former Congress members themselves, spearhead the lobbying effort and 
attempt to pinpoint elements in proposed legislations which confer utility on more 
stakeholders (inclusive of the affected political constituencies) than the client firm. With 
the relevant research (see Leech et al., 2005 and Baumgartner et al., 2011) showing that 
salient issues demand frequent and targeted campaigns, corporate lobbying has more 
than doubled since 1998, the first year for which lobbying data are available in 
databases following the LDA. In the absence of a legal cap, firms’ expenditures far 
exceed what is required for staff compensation and related overhead in order to cater to 
an increasing variety of incumbent politicians’ private expenses (e.g. travel expenses, 
meals and events organization). The cash flows are disclosed, at an aggregate level only, 
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on standardized lobbying reports and identified by their subject matter, also designated 
as ‘lobby issue’. 
PAC are commonly formed by corporations and special interest groups in order 
to support or sabotage the election of a specific candidate. Revolving around legislators 
rather than the legislative process, PAC contributions offer a firm first-order 
connections with people in power. This element of directness differs from lobbying, 
where a firm derives connectedness through lobbyists’ proprietary networks and 
relinquishes it by termination of the campaign. Additionally, PAC impose substantial 
limitations on contribution size and donors’ identity. In particular, even though 
corporate cash is eligible to cover a PAC’s operating costs, contributions beyond the 
break-even point should be sourced from third-party donors. To this end, firms routinely 
solicit financing from principal constituents such as directors, employees and their 
families and, given that no individual may exceed the legal ceiling of $ 5 thousand, 
mass participation becomes a matter of vital importance to a campaign’s success. 
Firms select between the two contribution types based on their competitive 
environment and organizational idiosyncrasy. Large establishments which often attract 
public scrutiny (and increased litigation costs) are strongly incentivized to craft 
legislation on a bill-to-bill basis. In this respect, lobbying is essential. As an added 
benefit, campaign costs are a smaller consideration since they can be spread over an 
extended asset base. Market concentration has also been shown to relate positively to 
lobbying (e.g., Zardkoohi, 1985); conceivably, the fewer the participants in an industry, 
the larger the portion of the anticipated benefits that accrue to the donor firm as opposed 
to free-riders. To the extent that firms emphasize proprietary rights protection and 
securing concessions on the development of novel technologies, R&D intensity is 
another plausible factor for lobbying. Similarly, a heavy regulatory framework induces 
a firm to communicate its perspective to legislators. Conversely, PAC campaigns 
facilitate firms with a large percentage of unionized employees or a heavy reliance on 
government contracts as a superior means for networking and claiming favoritism on an 
interpersonal basis. Of course, this does not preclude the intrusion of non-economic 
factors into the PAC decision such as fads, internal politics, social norms and peer 
demand. 
Lobbying may be framed as a conduit of information and PAC as an open 
reference for the entity transmitting this information, the two complementing one 
another (Langbein, 1986; Wright, 1990; Humphries, 1991; Austen-Smith, 1995; Milyo 
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et al., 2000; Ansolabehere et al., 2002). Langbein (1986) conducts surveys of legislators 
and their cabinets and finds that the former appropriate time to lobbyists according to 
the PAC intensity of their client firms. Milyo et al. (2000) go a step further by refuting 
altogether the influence potential of PAC. Instead, the authors reduce these campaigns 
to simple entry tickets for access and dialogue on an ad hoc basis. Formally, the 
symbiotic relationship is designated as the ‘access-influence’ hypothesis. Adhering to 
this framing, in developing the main conjecture in our study, we group both contribution 
types under the umbrella of political connections. 
 
 
4.3 Data and methodology 
 
Next, we describe the assembly of our database and how we construct a model 
in order to extract effects on IPOs without imposing a regression-based framework, 
allowing relationships (linear or otherwise) to arise from the data. 
 
4.3.1 Data 
 
Following the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, databases are available 
covering lobbying activity from 1998. We retrieve the population of U.S. IPOs for the 
period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2014 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
database. In line with the majority of IPO studies, we exclude deals with an offer price 
smaller than $5 per share (penny stocks), reverse LBOs, limited partnerships, American 
depositary receipts (ADRs) and foreign-based firms whose shares may already trade in 
their home markets. We eliminate real estate investment trusts (REITs), closed-end 
funds, royalty trusts and other special purpose investment vehicles. For this purpose, we 
exclude all SIC codes within the interval 6723-6999, inclusively. Special caution is 
exercised to identify and eliminate IPOs which, while bypassing Thomson Reuters’ 
closed-end fund filter, still function in this manner. The last restriction involves 
corporate spin-offs; these IPOs have only recently acquired organizational autonomy 
from a mature and sizeable organization so that the reputation of the mother firm largely 
certifies the offering, alleviating a significant portion of the ex-ante uncertainty. These 
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interventions leave us with a sample of 379 unique IPOs.  
The pricing data come from two distinct sources. While SDC is an excellent 
source for IPO offer prices, its coverage significantly deteriorates when it comes to 
aftermarket prices. For first trading day closes, we rely on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) and match the two databases. The sources for political 
contributions similarly diverge. We manually search each IPO company in the 
electronic platform of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) for evidence of 
lobbying activity. CRP sources data straight from the semi-annual lobbying reports 
submitted to the secretary of the Senate’s Office of Republic Records (SORP). The 
PAC contributions are retrieved from the archives of the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) where we reiterate the investigation for all IPOs in the sample. Notably, in cases 
of multiple lobbying or PAC activity, we consider the contributions exhibiting the 
closest time proximity to the issue date for plausibly dominating in value relevance over 
older cash flows. Thus, we assemble a new and comprehensive database of U.S. firms’ 
political standpoint at the time of their transition into the public domain. 
 
4.3.2 Sample description 
 
Our dataset consists of 379 U.S. IPOs, 317 of which are underpriced and 62 are 
overpriced (refer to Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics and IPO identification by sector). 
In order to reinforce the robustness of our results, we seek in all of the analyses separate 
evidence from both the full and underpriced samples. 
Figure 4.1 presents an overview of the percentages of total lobbying and PAC 
activity on a sectoral basis. In particular, subfigure 4.1a reveals that companies from the 
Energy and Power, Telecommunications, Industrials and Financials sectors account for 
the highest percentages of lobbying. Similarly, subfigure 4.1b indicates that the largest 
PAC donations come from companies operating within the sectors of Energy and 
Power, Industrials, Financials and Media and Entertainment. Conclusively, the Energy 
and Power, Industrials and Financials sectors allow almost equally for lobbying and 
PAC. However, preferences towards either spending manner can exist. For example, the 
Media and Entertainment sector donates primarily PAC money, whereas the 
Telecommunications sector is more heavily involved into lobbying. 
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4.4 Methodology 
 
4.4.1 The model 
 
Suppose that the issuer’s ability to evaluate an IPO can be characterised by the 
pairs of the first aftermarket closing price pe  and the IPO offer price
qb  . Then, 
as per Farrell (1957), the process of the issuer’s evaluation of the IPO can be 
characterised by the activity setwhich is the support of the density of  ,E B defined 
as: 
    , , 0 ,p q EBe b f e b           (1) 
where EBf  is the joint density of  ,E B with the probability function EBH
defined as: 
   , , .EBH e b P E e B b            (2)  
From (1) and (2) we may then write: 
    , , 0 ,p q EBe b H e b           (3) 
and therefore from (3) we assume free disposability of  . Then for any e such that 
  0P E e  ,  
     , ,EB EB EH e b H b e F e        (4) 
where    B EH b e P B b E e    and    EF e P E e  .Then  can be defined as: 
    , 0 .p q B Ee b H b e           (5) 
Given that the objective of an issuer is to reduce underpricing, we can determine 
the issuer’s performance of evaluating an IPO at price levels  0 0,e b  as follows: 
    0 0 0 0, sup 0 0 .B Ee b H b e             (6) 
Finally, the empirical version of 
B E
H can be stated as: 
 
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In the spirit of other studies (Daraio and Simar, 2005 and 2007; Jeong et al., 2010; 
Bădin et al., 2012), let lobbying and PAC money be denoted by rM  which are the 
environmental/exogenous factors influencing the issuer’s evaluation process. Given that 
0M m , then the conditional process of an issuer’s evaluation of an IPO 0m is 
characterised as: 
    
0 0,
, , 0 ,p qm E B Me b f e b m

           (8) 
where  , ,E B Mf e b m is the conditional density of  ,E B given M m . Then, 
   , , , ,B E MH b e m P B b E e M m            (9) 
And so 
0m
 can be represented as: 
    
0 0,
, , 0 .p qm B E Me b H b e m

                     (10) 
Then the issuer’s conditional efficiency score of IPO evaluation  0 0 0, ,e b m  is defined 
as: 
       
00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,
, sup 0 , sup 0 , 0 .m B E Me b m b e H b e m                (11) 
 
4.4.2 The empirical estimation 
 4.4.2.1 Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
 
Grounded in the ideas of Farrell (1957), data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a 
linear programming formulation that describes a correspondence between multiple 
inputs and outputs. Unlike a production function which is defined by an equation, the 
DEA’s envelope is data-driven. That is, DEA (and not the researcher) determines which 
input-output combinations are efficient and thereby shape the efficient frontier.  
The DEA model compared to alternative methods claims a series of advantages. 
First, DEA assigns efficiency scores to decision making units in the sample while 
regression analysis relies on average values. This causes efficient firms to become 
easily identifiable as they fall along the efficient frontier (even though there is no way 
for further differentiation in case that numerous units lay on the frontier). Second, DEA 
is capable of processing simultaneously (multiple) input and output variables. A 
regression framework is less accommodating as it requires for a specification of a 
production function for the input and a cost function for the output variables. The 
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enhanced efficiency of the DEA estimation offers unbiased results even in cases where 
the variables under study are correlated or jointly determined by omitted variables Black 
and Smith (2004) and Frölich (2008). Third, the basic philosophy of DEA permits firms 
to obtain efficiency both through differentiation and superior performance on many 
dimensions. Fourth, DEA, in contrast with COLS (Corrected Ordinary Least Squares) 
and SFA (Stochastic Frontier Analysis), bears the added benefit that it obviates the need 
for imposing a functional form. Consequently, the method provides protection from 
misspecifying the frontier. Gong et al. (1992) employing simulation exercises have 
established the suitability of DEA over SFA in the case that functional form problems 
or collinear regressions are present. In contrast, the researchers argue that SFA may be 
preferable if the functional form approaches the actual data-generating process but this 
would be particularly challenging to prove. Outliers comprise yet another puzzle: under 
SFA they may mask inefficiency whereas under DEA they may result in attributing 
large inefficiencies to the units in the sample, even though this may not always be true. 
Contemplating treatments for this problem, the DEA method appears to have an easier 
fix in the sense that outliers can be discarded from the final sample. 
Following the work of Charnes et al. (1978), DEA has been applied in 
operations management (see Banker et al., 1984; Sherman, 1984 and Mahajan, 1991) 
but is largely absent from the finance literature. Some traces can be found in Varian 
(1990) who argues for a nonparametric approach when measuring the optimal 
performance of customers, investors and other economic agents. Assigning a lesser 
priority to statistical significance, Varian holds that the economic significance of a 
deviation from the optimal behavior entails more relevance. Employing a set of 
variables (quantities demanded, price and output), he develops metrics relying on 
residuals which capture the difference of outputs over inputs. Seiford and Thrall (1990) 
rely on these measures in order to draw a direct link with efficiency scores derived from 
DEA.  
In IPO research, DEA estimation remains in its infancy, which comes as a 
surprise given the perennial quest in this literature to overcome endogeneity concerns 
within the underpricing equation. The sole extant study is from Kooli (2006); however, 
with a theoretical framing that focuses on investors’ ability to maximize realized returns 
on IPO shares, Kooli overlooks the big picture which rests upon the excessive amounts 
of capital foregone at listing - the decision making units are indicative, with the offer 
109 
 
 
price, number of shares and IPO proceeds comprising the inputs, whereas the first 
aftermarket price and quarterly return are outputs.  
 Our approach, in contrast, investigates IPO performance from the issuer’s 
perspective. Given that IPOs are underpriced (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995 
and Jain and Kini, 1994), the performance of an issuer can be evaluated on the basis that 
the phenomenon of underpricing is reduced. We can therefore apply the nonparametric 
methodology of DEA in order to measure the efficiency of the issuer’s ability to 
evaluate better an IPO by leaving less money on the table. Figure 4.2 presents 
schematically two theoretical frontiers under the constant returns to scale (CRS) and 
variable returns to scale (VRS) assumptions.15 The horizontal axis indicates the stock 
price at close of offer and the vertical one relates to the offer price. Consider four IPOs 
at points C, B, L and H. The frontier under the assumption of CRS (VRS) is represented 
by the straight solid (dashed) line. As it can be easily observed, under the assumption of 
CRS only the IPO at point B is efficient in maximizing the offer price under the stock 
price at close of offer (i.e. minimizing the underpricing effect). However, when the 
assumption alters to VRS, the IPOs at points C, B, and L are regarded as efficient. In 
both regimes, the IPO at point H remains inefficient; under the CRS assumption its 
efficiency relates to the distance from the observed data point to the CRS frontier and is 
equal to the ratio of GF/GH. Alternatively, as per the VRS assumption, its efficiency is 
given by GL/GH. Therefore, in our analysis we need to estimate these distances under 
the two different technologies.   
In order to estimate the radial distances presented in Figure 4.2, we follow the 
estimators introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) by implying the CRS assumption  CRS
and, subsequently, the estimators introduced by Banker et al. (1984) implying the VRS 
 VRS
 . Both estimators enable us to calculate the model presented in (6) and can be 
expressed as:   
                                                          
15The CRS assumption is the most common economic assumption and has greater discriminative power 
compared to the VRS assumption (Zelenyuk and Zelenyuk, 2014). In our case, CRS suggests that a 
proportionate increase in e results in the same proportionate increase in b . However, under the more 
flexible assumption of VRS, a frontier may also exhibit increasing and decreasing returns to scale in 
different regions. Since our sample contains U.S. IPOs from companies operating in different sectors and 
in different time periods, scale effects can be present and may mask the estimated efficiency levels. 
Therefore, this study measures IPO efficiency under both the CRS and VRS assumptions. 
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       (13) 
The DEA estimators described by equations 12 and 13 measure IPO efficiency relative 
to an estimate of an unobserved true frontier. Consequently, remaining conditional on 
our sample from an underlying data-generating process (DGP), these estimators are 
biased by construction. Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a,b) have proposed bootstrap 
methods for inference and bias correction of the original DEA estimates in order to 
improve accuracy. In our setting, the magnitude of the bias can be calculated as: 
        0 0 0 0 0 0ˆ ˆ, , , ,CRS CRS CRSBIAS e b E e b e b        (14) 
       0 0 0 0 0 0ˆ ˆ, , , .VRS VRS VRSBIAS e b E e b e b         (15) 
Then the bootstrap bias estimate of the original estimators under the CRS and VRS 
assumptions is the empirical analog of equations (14) and (15): 
      
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As it has been demonstrated by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a,b), the bias-corrected 
estimators under the CRS and VRS assumptions can be computed as: 
      
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Then, the sample variance of the bootstrap values  * , 0 0ˆ ,CRS b e b ,  
*
, 0 0
ˆ ,VRS b e b provides 
us with an estimate 2ˆ of the variance of  0 0ˆ ,CRS e b  and  0 0ˆ ,VRS e b : 
   
2
2000 2000
2 1 * 1 *
, 0 0 , 0 0
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ , , ,
B B
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b b
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      (20) 
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Finally, we can construct the confidence intervals of the two estimators by using the 
empirical bootstrap distribution of the pseudo estimates * *
, ,
ˆ ˆ, , 1,...,2000CRS b VRS b b    in 
order to find the interval values of ˆˆ  and b  . Then the  1  percent confidence 
interval can be expressed as: 
        0 0 0 0 0 0 ˆˆ ˆˆ, , , ,CRS CRS CRSe b e b e b b                          (22) 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 ˆˆ ˆˆ, , , .VRS VRS VRSe b e b e b b                          (23) 
 
4.4.2.2  Second stage analysis  
 
 Subsequently, in order to incorporate the effect of political donations into our 
measurement (equation 11), we need to adopt smoothing techniques. Therefore, let 
 0 ,I m h be the indices defined as    0 0, / 2iI m h i M m h   . The empirical version 
of  , ,B E MH    can be estimated as: 
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     (24)  
where h is bandwidth applied using the procedure described by Bădin et al. (2010) and 
based on the least squares cross-validation data driven method (Hall et al., 2004). The 
IPO performance from the issuers’ point of view taking into consideration the influence 
of lobby and PAC money can then be written as: 
  
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Clearly, the LPs presented in equations 12, 13, 25 and 26 suggest that the IPO 
efficiency scores are measured on the basis that we try to maximize the IPO offer price 
given the stock price at close of offer. The above estimators are also called output-
oriented DEA models. The choice of orientation is crucial and relies on the pre-
investigation of those parameters/variables that the decision maker has greater control 
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over (Coelli et al., 2005). Since we study IPO performance from the issuer’s 
perspective, the decision maker (that is the issuer) can determine to a larger extent the 
IPO offer price rather than the stock price at close of offer. Accordingly, the above LPs 
minimize underpricing by indicating the efficient IPOs with efficiency scores equal to 1 
 ˆi.e. 1  . Respectively, the inefficient IPOs assume scores of ˆ0 1  .   
As a further step, we apply the latest developments by Bădin et al. (2012). In 
this regard, we need to create ratios of conditional to unconditional efficiency scores as:  
 
 
0 0 0
0 0
ˆ ,
ˆ
ˆ ,
e b m
Q
e b


                                            (27) 
Then, by using a nonparametric regression we are able to analyze the behavior 
of Qˆ  as a function of lobby and PAC money. Let the nonparametric regression 
smoothing be presented as: 
  , 1,..., ,i i iQ g M i n                                           (28) 
where i is the error term with   0i iE M  , and g is the mean regression function, 
since    i i iE Q M g M .  In order to estimate the regression function, we follow 
Jeong et al. (2010) and apply a local linear estimator which is less sensitive to edge 
effects. Then, the presentation of three-dimensional pictures will reveal the combined 
effect of lobby and PAC money on IPOs’ efficiency levels. An increasing 
nonparametric regression will indicate a positive effect, whereas a decreasing a negative 
effect. Overall, the adoption of the fully nonparametric approach offers two main 
advantages. First, it does not impose any prior assumptions on the functional forms of 
the examined relationships and, secondly, it enables us to reveal any nonlinear 
relationships. 
4.5 Empirical results 
 
Figure 4.3 presents the empirical frontiers for the offer price versus closing price 
based on the two samples under the CRS and VRS assumptions. In particular, subfigure 
4.3a indicates the empirical frontiers for the full sample (i.e. including overpriced IPOs, 
N=379); the straight solid (dashed) line represents the empirical frontier under the CRS 
(VRS) assumption. As expected, overpriced firms have higher efficiency scores and lie 
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on the two frontiers16. Since the assumption of CRS has higher discriminative power 
than VRS, fewer IPOs are on the CRS frontier. Conversely, under the VRS assumption, 
we account for scale and heterogeneity effects. As a consequence, more IPOs are 
deemed efficient and lie on the frontier17. Subfigure 4.3b illustrates the empirical 
frontiers when overpriced IPOs are eliminated from the sample (N=317). The slope of 
the CRS frontier becomes considerably smaller compared to the previous CRS frontier 
(subfigure 4.3a, which includes overpriced IPOs).18 Moreover, in this case, we observe 
that more IPOs lie on both the CRS and VRS frontiers. This, again, is attributed to the 
exclusion of the overpriced IPOs. Since in our analysis the minimization of 
underpricing suggests efficiency, the overpriced IPOs envelope the performance of the 
other IPOs and are always deemed efficient.       
Assessing unconditional efficiency estimates19 from the full sample, we find that 
233 out of the 379 IPOs have efficiency scores above the sample mean (0.706) in the 
CRS regime. However, under VRS, 222 out of the 379 IPOs exceed the average 
efficiency score (0.770). Table 4.2 presents the top and lowest 30 performers under the 
two regimes. The mean efficiency score of the top group under CRS is 0.8426, whereas 
under VRS it becomes 0.9556. Furthermore, under CRS, only 1 company is deemed to 
be efficient; under VRS 6 IPOs have an efficiency score equal to 1. The top 30 
performers represent 9 different sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Consumer 
Staples, Energy and Power, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, 
Materials, Telecommunications). Among these companies, 11 have donated both lobby 
and PAC money. Looking at the lowest 30 performers, the mean efficiency score under 
CRS (VRS) is 0.3804 (0.459). Notably, the majority of these issuers operate in the 
“High Technology” sector. In this respect, our findings complement evidence by Lowry 
and Schwert (2002) suggesting that high-technology firms tend to experience higher 
first-day returns. From our efficiency point of view, because such issuers increase the 
                                                          
16An IPO which is efficient under the CRS assumption is also efficient under the VRS assumption. 
However, an IPO efficient under the VRS assumption may not be efficient under the CRS assumption. 
17The CRS frontier is more robust compared to the VRS frontier and, therefore, fewer IPOs under the 
CRS assumption are deemed efficient. 
18Since in our analysis efficiency is represented by the minimization of IPO underpricing, overpriced 
IPOs will always be efficient and shape the efficient frontier under both the CRS and VRS assumptions. 
19As has been pointed by Bădin et al. (2012) and Mastromarco and Simar (2014), it is not meaningful to 
examine the classification of decision making units (DMUs) using conditional efficiency estimates since 
they are obtained accounting directly for the effect of the exogenous variables. Consequently, we present 
the original efficiency scores. However, all the results obtained are available on request.  
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underpricing effect, they significantly impair their efficiency levels. Finally, we note 
that these 30 IPOs have mostly donated lobby and not PAC money. 
Similarly, Table 4.3 presents the top and lowest 30 IPOs from the reduced 
sample (excluding overpriced IPOs, N=317). Under the VRS assumption, all IPOs lie 
on the VRS frontier and exhibit an efficiency score of 1. Under CRS, only 3 IPOs are 
deemed inefficient with the majority of the top performers lying on the CRS frontier. 
This group comprises 9 sectors (Consumer Staples, Energy and Power, Financials, 
Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, Materials, Media and Entertainment and 
Telecommunications) which appear almost identical to those featured in the full sample. 
Under the CRS (VRS) assumption, the lowest 30 IPOs have a mean efficiency score of 
0.4653 (0.4877). The majority of these issuers come from the ‘High Technology’ sector, 
corroborating our previous findings20. Again, we observe that among the top performers 
10 out of 30 companies have donated PAC money. The respective proportion for the 
lowest group is only 4 out of 30. This provides further evidence that IPOs with limited 
underpricing tend to rely on PAC campaigns. However, it should be emphasized that the 
top performers in the reduced sample include fewer companies which combine lobbying 
and PAC compared to the full sample. This, in turn, suggests that it is mainly the 
overpriced IPOs that employ both contribution types. 
We subject our findings to an extended sensitivity analysis. Specifically, we 
apply bootstrap-based inference algorithms, as per Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000b), in 
order to compute the bias-corrected efficiency estimates alongside with the 95% 
bootstrap confidence intervals. This approach allows us to capture any variations in the 
baseline results once the sample bias has been eliminated (Simar and Wilson 2000a). 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report the new estimates under CRS and VRS, respectively, for the 
top and lowest 30 IPOs in the full sample (N=379), whereas Tables 4.6 and 4.7 extend 
this analysis to the reduced sample (excluding overpriced IPOs, N= 317)21. In an 
important divergence from the figures presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, efficiency may 
not take the value of 1. Rather, the IPO performance is determined based on the bias-
corrected efficiency score; the higher the estimate, the greater the performance.  
                                                          
20 The majority of high performers within the reduced sample come from companies operating in the 
“High Technology” sector. This contradicts our previous findings. However, we identify the cause in the 
exclusion of overpriced IPOs. 
21 For our analysis we have applied 2,000 replications as sugessted by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000b). 
Due to the large volume, these results are not tabulated. However, they remain available upon request. 
Finally, for our bootstrap calculations, we acknowledge the use of the ‘FEAR’ – package which is 
integrated in the R-programming language (Wilson, 2008).  
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More closely, within the full sample and under the CRS assumption (Table 4.4), 
the highest performers comprise IPOs from 8 different sectors (Consumer Products and 
Services, Energy and Power, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, 
Materials and Telecommunications). The lowest performing group also involves 8 
sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, 
Industrials, Media and Entertainment, Retail and Telecommunications) with 'High 
Technology' accounting for the majority of the IPOs. On average, the top (lowest) 30 
performers have a bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.8758 (0.3682). In a similar spirit 
with our previous analysis, 6 out of the 30 top performing companies have donated PAC 
money; the respective proportion for the lowest performers is only 2 out of 30.  
Under the VRS assumption (Table 4.5), the highest performing group includes 
IPOs from 10 sectors (Financials, Energy and Power, Consumer Staples, Consumer 
Products and Services, Telecommunications, Real Estate, Materials, Industrials, High 
Technology and Healthcare). Appearing less diverse, the lowest performing group 
comprises 7 sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Telecommunications, Retail, 
Industrials, High Technology, Healthcare and Financials). The top (lowest) 30 
performers have a mean value of bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.9216 (0.4389). 
Importantly, 11 of the top IPOs have been active in both lobbying and PAC. This comes 
in striking contrast to the bottom group whereby 1 company employs both contribution 
types out of a total of 3 PAC donors. Finally, the VRS regime confirms that the lowest 
efficiency levels come from companies in the High Technology sector.  
Table 4.6 presents the bias-corrected results under the CRS assumption for the 
top and lowest 30 IPOs of the reduced sample (excluding overpriced IPOs, N=317). 
With a slightly broader scope than the respective full sample group, the highest 
performers now include IPOs from 9 sectors (Consumer Staples, Energy and Power, 
Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, Materials, Media and 
Entertainment and Telecommunications), whereas the group of the lowest performers 
comprises 8 sectors (Consumer Products and Services, Financials, Healthcare, High 
Technology, Industrials, Media and Entertainment, Retail and Telecommunications). In 
addition, the top 30 performers have a mean bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.9993; 
the respective statistic for the lowest 30 is 0.4647. Again, PAC donors and companies 
that complement lobbying with PAC campaigns appear more likely to be listed within 
the top 30 rather than in the bottom group.  
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Under the VRS assumption (Table 4.7), the group of the highest performers 
includes IPOs from 10 sectors (Consumer Staples, Energy and Power, Financials, 
Healthcare, High Technology, Industrials, Materials, Media and Entertainment, Retail 
and Telecommunications), whereas the bottom group is associated with 7 sectors 
(Consumer Products and Services, Financials, Healthcare, High Technology, 
Industrials, Retail, and Telecommunications). On average, the top 30 performers exhibit 
a bias-corrected efficiency score of 0.9969; the lowest 30 a score of 0.4809. Invariably, 
the top group outnumbers the bottom one in firms donating PAC money with 12 and 4 
IPOs, respectively. It becomes also evident that the lowest efficiency levels 
systematically relate to High Technology. Overall, the bias-corrected results for both 
samples and returns to scale assumptions lend strong support to our baseline findings. 
Conceivably, setting off to analyze the differential effect of lobbying and PAC 
on IPO performance is a meaningful endeavour only to the extent that the above 
efficiency scores would differ in the absence of either type of expenditure. To elucidate 
the association with the issuer’s ability to minimize underpricing, we conduct the 
bootstrap-based nonparametric test proposed by Li et al. (2009) and report the results in 
Table 4.822. The upper part of the table engages the full sample for the CRS and VRS 
assumptions. With 
 f 
 and 
 g 
denoting the density functions of unconditional and 
conditional efficiency estimates, respectively, contributions are shown to produce an 
effect that fulfils all conventional levels of significance. The lower part extends this 
analysis to the reduced sample and corroborates further the relationship. Evidently, 
lobby and PAC money alter issuers’ ability to evaluate IPOs and this reflects upon the 
estimated efficiency levels. Given the strength of the association, we can now turn to 
disentangling the effect by donation type and investigate the optimal appropriation of an 
issuer’s political budget. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates graphically the effect of lobby and PAC contributions on 
IPO efficiency levels as surfaces in a three-dimensional space (c.f. Bădin et al., 2012). 
Drawing evidence from the full sample (N=379 IPOs), subfigures “a”, “c”, “e” and “g” 
present the results from the nonparametric regression analysis under the CRS 
assumption; subfigures “b”, “d”, “f” and “h” portray the respective findings under 
                                                          
22 Following Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), we trim the estimates that are equal to unity (Algorithm I) and 
perform the bootstrap Li et al. (2009) test. Hence, our results are unaffected by sampling variation or 
noise from the DEA estimation. 
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VRS23. Subfigure “a” reveals a nonlinear relationship between lobbying and IPO 
performance, resembling an inverted “U”-shape. For lower levels of lobbying money, 
the effect on efficiency is positive up to a certain threshold value. Beyond that point a 
negative association arises, indicated by a downwards slopping nonparametric 
regression line. An inverted “U”-shape relationship24 is also evident in VRS (subfigure 
“b”). In the case of PAC, we observe an increasing nonlinear nonparametric regression 
line (subfigure “a”), showing a positive influence on IPO efficiency levels. Under VRS, 
the effect is more pronounced, indicated by a steeper increasing nonparametric 
regression line. Modifying further our sampling to account for an issuer’s particular 
economic sector, new interesting patterns emerge. 
Indeed, focusing on IPOs from the “Energy and Power” sector, we observe that 
the effects are not uniform. Under both CRS (subfigure “c”) and VRS (subfigure “d”), 
PAC donations have a nonlinear negative effect on efficiency levels. However, lobby 
money appears to exert a highly positive influence. In both cases, the nonlinearities 
suggest that companies operating in this sector are better off with lobbying rather than 
PAC expenditure. In the Financial sector, under the CRS assumption (subfigure “e”) 
lobbying has a “U”-shape association with efficiency level, whereas PAC accounts for a 
positive effect, indicated by a nonlinear increasing nonparametric regression line. 
However, when we assume VRS (subfigure “f”), the effect of lobbying turns to neutral, 
while the effect of PAC exhibits a light form of an inverted “U”-shape relationship. 
Therefore, the influence of the exogenous factors is also attributable to scale effects25. 
Accordingly, lobby and PAC contributions may have different implications for larger 
companies in the sector compared to smaller ones. Finally, the Industrial sector, under 
both CRS (subfigure “g”) and VRS (subfigure “h”) reveals a positive effect for PAC 
contributions.26 However, lobbying gives rise to heterogeneous patterns. Specifically, 
the CRS assumption yields a negative effect, whereas under VRS there is a “U”-shape 
relationship, suggesting that when we account for offer price levels the effect can vary.         
 In a similar approach, Figure 4.5 describes the effect of lobby and PAC on IPO 
efficiency based on the reduced sample (N=317). Subfigures “a” and “b” present the 
                                                          
23 Subfigures “a” and “b” present the effect of lobby and PAC money for all IPOs of the full sample. The 
rest subfigures illustrate the effect based on sub-sampling analysis for three sectors (Financials, Energy 
and Power and Industrials). The choice is based on the fact that the highest levels of donations for lobby 
and PAC money come from companies operating in these sectors (see also Figure 1).  
24 Since the CRS measurement has a higher discriminative power than VRS, the examined effects in some 
cases may be more emphatic under the CRS assumption.  
25 In our case, the different size is attributed to differences in IPO offer price. 
26 This positive effect is more pronounced under CRS. 
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overall results. Under CRS, lobbying produces a “U”-shape relationship, whereas under 
VRS the association becomes negative. This suggests that scale effects can drastically 
alter the impact on issuers’ efficiency. Conversely, the overall PAC effect remains 
positive under both assumptions, indicated by an increasing nonlinear regression line. 
This is consistent with the full sample results which are proven robust to the 
inclusion/exclusion of overpriced IPOs.  
Drawing separate evidence from the Energy and Power sector, we observe that 
political expenditure exerts a similar influence under both CRS (subfigure “c”) and 
VRS (subfigure “d”). In particular, lobby money has a nonlinear positive effect on IPO 
efficiency levels, whereas PAC has a nonlinear negative effect. The Financial sector 
(subfigure “f”) demonstrates that under VRS the effects of both lobby and PAC money 
are almost identical with those previously examined for the full sample. However, under 
CRS (subfigure “e”) lobbying gives rise to an inverted “U”-shape, whereas previously it 
formed a “U”-shape. In this case, the lobbying influence remains conditional on 
sampling and implies that the CRS assumption in some industries may be unrealistic. 
Finally, subfigure “g” engages firms operating in the Industrial sector. In overall terms, 
the results are robust since they agree with our earlier evidence, suggesting a negative 
association with lobbying and a positive one with PAC money. In addition, under the 
assumption of VRS (subfigure “h”) the effect of PAC money is positive as it has also 
been for the full sample; however, lobbying leads to a “U”-shape relationship, 
suggesting a negative effect for lower levels of lobbying contributions and a positive 
effect for higher levels. This contradicts our previous findings which portrayed a 
monotonically negative effect for lobbying. Once again, the assumption of VRS does 
not produce robust results.  
Conclusively, the evidence from both samples converges on the positive 
influence of PAC; the dollar intensity of these campaigns tends to constrain 
underpricing. Given that IPO firms channel significantly larger amounts towards 
lobbying than PAC, our findings suggest that the effects of such donations are not 
deterministic to IPO performance and depend heavily on the particular sectors that the 
companies operate in. Likewise, scale effects can determine the effect of lobby and 
PAC money on IPO efficiency levels. Invariably, the relationships are highly nonlinear, 
justifying our fully nonparametric treatment.   
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 4.6 Discussion 
 
Overall, our results show that IPOs with reduced underpricing tend to come 
from companies which have employed PAC campaigns and that companies with 
overpriced IPOs are mainly those that donate both lobby and PAC money. There is a 
nonlinear relationship between lobby money and IPO performance (the inverted “U”-
shape).  
PAC contributions produce a robustly positive effect across both full and 
reduced samples; the inclusion/exclusion of overpriced IPOs does not alter the effect of 
PAC money. This is apparent in the IPOs of Industrial firms (where, in contrast, the 
influence of lobbying assumes a variety of patterns). Non-coincidentally, this sector 
includes industries known for their high political expenditure such as transport 
equipment and defense system manufacturers, for which historically the U.S. 
government is the single most influential buyer.27 
Lobbying, as a message-oriented activity, lends itself to circumstances where the 
elements of communication and timely interactions with legislators are crucial. The 
Energy and Power sector, which is extensively regulated, illustrates this notion by a 
decisive advantage for lobbying IPOs. Commonly under public scrutiny for safety and 
environmental concerns, these firms must produce compelling arguments about the way 
that their operations affect other stakeholders - especially if, as noted by Milyo (2001), 
an incumbent’s objective function revolves around the issues of re-election, career 
progression within Congress and ideology promotion. Where discontent is caused 
among a candidate's constituents, a firm not only depletes its political capital but may 
also trigger enactment of constraining legislation. 
For the Financial sector, however, the analysis reveals patterns which lack 
robustness as well as a definite direction. This is intriguing, given the large amounts that 
many of these firms spend28, the complex institutional framework and the massive 
assistance which the federal government has provided during periods of turbulence. The 
idiosyncrasy of financial organizations may account for the blurred effect. 
Notwithstanding the high degree of regulation and frequent government intervention, 
                                                          
27  IBISWorld reports that in 2013, the top contributing defence and aerospace firms had 56.1% of 
turnover coming from federal contracts, while in some cases the figure is around 90%. 
28 Approximately 16.5% of total political expenditure over the last five years, though because this sector 
mainly comprises large businesses, political expenditure is not a large proportion of each company’s 
expenditure. 
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operators in this sector are not as dependent on political favoritism for the success of 
their businesses as is the case, for example, with regulated industries from the Industrial 
sector. Financial institutions are essential to economic activity and exert de facto 
political influence, obviating the need for contributions. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Political connections formed via monetary contributions constitute a potentially 
powerful mechanism for reducing IPO underpricing. To evaluate this proposition, we 
require that the methodological tools in the pertinent literature be upgraded. Our 
contribution, in this respect, is twofold. First, we show how traditional shortcomings of 
IPO performance assessment can be overcome through the application of a relative 
efficiency measure in a probabilistic framework. Having resolved the problem of 
comparability among IPO returns, we subsequently analyze the influence of lobbying 
and PAC contributions in a fully nonparametric manner.  
We find a robustly positive effect of PAC money on IPO efficiency levels 
whereas the effect of lobbying is more nuanced. Our sector analysis pinpoints 
circumstances under which contributions intensity can not only squander corporate cash 
but also impair efficiency levels. The implications for prospective issuers are clear: 
political donations do not constitute a one-size-fits-all solution but can be effective 
when the distinct type of connectedness reinforces the firm’s position within its 
competitive environment, as with the lobbying contributions of Energy and Power 
firms. 
Overall, there are unique patterns for each economic sector but a common theme 
emerges in the important nonlinearities in the relationship of political contributions with 
IPO efficiency. On this basis, the nonparametric frontier analysis offers a decisive 
advantage by allowing the effects to unfold in an unbiased manner. Finally, although 
our interest here is in IPOs, the approach is more generally applicable in finance where 
relationships of influence are suspected. 
 
 
121 
 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics and IPO sample description 
Our sample consists of 379 U.S. IPOs for the period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2014 extracted 
from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. IPOs with an offer price smaller than $ 5 per share 
(penny stocks), reverse leveraged buyouts, limited partnerships, American depositary receipts (ADRs), 
foreign-based firms, real estate investment trusts (REITs), closed-end funds, royalty trusts and other 
special purpose investment vehicles are excluded from the sample. The issuing firms have been manually 
investigated in the electronic platform of the Center for Responsive Politics and the archives of the 
Federal Election Commission for evidence of lobbying and PAC contributions, respectively. All figures 
are in 12/2014 U.S. dollars. We rely on the SDC database for IPO offer prices, whereas aftermarket prices 
are sourced from CRSP. The lower part of the table distributes the IPOs across the 12 (out of 14) 
Thomson Reuters’ proprietary macro-level industry classifications which we have been able to associate 
with political expenditure. 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
      
Offer price 17.29 16.00 8.81 5.00 97.00 
1st aftermarket close 21.56 18.11 18.55 5.00 280.00 
Lobby money  279,268 80,000 788,021 0.00 9,570,000 
PAC money 26,292 0.00 84,326 0.00 780,000 
N Percentage 
(%) 
   
High Technology 78 21 
Healthcare 72 19 
Financials 49 13 
Energy and Power 27 7 
Materials 27 7 
Industrials 33 9 
Consumer Products & Services 27 7 
Media and Entertainment 17 4 
Retail 14 4 
Real Estate 3 1 
Telecommunications 21 6 
Consumer Staples 11 3 
Total 37
9 
100 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of lobby and PAC money per sector 
Subfigure 1a presents the per sector percentages of lobbying contributions made by 379 U.S. IPO 
firms over the period January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2014. Subfigure 1b presents the respective 
percentages for PAC money.  
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Figure 4.2: Graphical representation of the theoretical frontiers  
The solid line presents the IPOs’ theoretical frontier under CRS. The dashed line presents the IPOs’ 
theoretical frontier under VRS. The black dots indicated by the letters C, B, L and H refer to the 
theoretical positions of hypothetical IPOs. The letters F and G represent distance points.  
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Figure 4.3: Graphical representation of the empirical frontiers 
Subfigure 3a presents the estimated empirical frontier for all 379 IPOs in our sample. Subfigure 3b 
presents the empirical frontier for the 317 IPOs (i.e. we have excluded the overpriced IPOs). The 
solid line indicates the empirical frontier under the CRS assumption, whereas the dashed line 
indicates the empirical frontier under the VRS assumption.  
 
a
 
b  
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Table 4.2: Efficiency analysis- 379 IPOs: top and worst performers  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs for the full sample (N=379) in terms of their ability to 
minimize underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their efficiency performance under the VRS 
assumption in order to account for differences between sectors. When an IPO is efficient (i.e. 
efficiency score equal to 1.000) under the CRS assumption, it is also efficient under the VRS 
assumption. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with the lobby and PAC 
donation amounts. The main descriptive statistics for the efficiency estimates, lobby and PAC 
amounts are tabulated below each IPO group.   
Listing Date Company Ticker CRS VRS Lobby Money PAC Money Sector 
07/29/2014 ContraFect Corp CFRXU 0.9249 1.0000 20000 0 Healthcare 
04/12/2012 Oaktree Capital Group  OAK 0.8147 1.0000 260000 0 Financials 
08/03/2010 Trius Therapeutics  TSRX 0.8031 1.0000 60000 0 Healthcare 
11/08/2007 ICx Technologies  ICXT 1.0000 1.0000 1420000 85000 High Technology 
08/19/2004 Google  GOOG 0.6803 1.0000 180000 0 High Technology 
07/20/1999 Genentech  DNA 0.6134 1.0000 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
05/10/2013 BioAmber  BIOA 0.9561 0.9828 80000 0 Materials 
07/24/2014 Pfenex  PFNX 0.9092 0.9807 180000 0 Healthcare 
10/28/2009 Addus HomeCare  ADUS 0.9460 0.9715 40000 0 Healthcare 
05/18/2012 Facebook  FB 0.7983 0.9694 1350000 270000 High Technology 
02/03/2004 TRW Automotive Holdings  TRW 0.8298 0.9647 0 675000 Industrials 
04/10/2014 Ally Financial  ALLY 0.8373 0.9552 2110000 0 Financials 
05/05/2005 Lazard  LAZ 0.8366 0.9545 290000 0 Financials 
05/24/2006 Vonage Holdings  VG 0.9194 0.9536 805000 150000 Telecommunications 
07/30/1999 Biopure  BPUR 0.9402 0.9526 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods  KFT 0.8031 0.9512 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
06/19/2001 The Princeton Review  REVU 0.9299 0.9470 60000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
10/08/2009 Omeros  OMER 0.9200 0.9427 60000 0 Healthcare 
04/10/2014 Adamas Pharmaceuticals  ADMS 0.9172 0.9379 10000 0 Healthcare 
05/09/2013 Quintiles Transnational Q 0.7629 0.9358 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
02/10/2012 Homestreet  HMST 0.7362 0.9349 5000 2350 Financials 
03/08/2007 Clearwire  CLWR 0.8155 0.9343 80000 0 High Technology 
04/23/2008 American Water Works  AWK 0.8382 0.9314 300000 100000 Energy and Power 
03/22/2013 West Corp WSTC 0.8517 0.9305 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
11/18/2010 General Motors  GM 0.7752 0.9294 9570000 284500 Industrials 
11/17/2011 Delphi Automotive  DLPH 0.8284 0.9263 396429 40500 Industrials 
05/03/1999 CONSOL Energy  CNX 0.9018 0.9259 550000 226250 Materials 
03/09/2011 HCA Holdings  HCA 0.7767 0.9200 200000 268250 Healthcare 
02/11/2011 Kinder Morgan  KMI 0.7760 0.9193 190000 0 Energy and Power 
12/13/2013 Cheniere Energy Partners  CQH 0.8357 0.9165 2630000 201800 Energy and Power 
 mean  0.8426 0.9556 732,880.9667 78,938.3333  
 std  0.0860 0.0284 1,793,480.2481 147,547.0496  
 min  0.6134 0.9165 0.0000 0.0000  
 max  1.0000 1.0000 9,570,000.0000 675,000.0000  
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics  SAGE 0.4803 0.5666 70000 0 Healthcare 
06/22/1999 Ramp Networks  RAMP 0.5274 0.5622 20000 0 High Technology 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange  ISE 0.4755 0.5618 0 6000 Financials 
06/17/1998 software.net  SWNT 0.5455 0.5499 20000 0 High Technology 
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07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals  AGIO 0.4622 0.5480 40000 0 Healthcare 
12/13/2012 SolarCity  SCTY 0.5450 0.5475 230000 2000 Industrials 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems  OESX 0.4877 0.5457 100000 0 Industrials 
07/20/2011 Zillow  Z 0.4490 0.5413 40000 0 High Technology 
05/29/2014 Resonant  RESN 0.5295 0.5409 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye  FEYE 0.4462 0.5382 120000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group  ISSX 0.4376 0.5345 80000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign  VRSN 0.4409 0.5079 60000 0 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets  FMKT 0.1377 0.4948 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine  FMI 0.4089 0.4923 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth  ATHN 0.4072 0.4904 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis  CORV 0.3413 0.4886 40000 0 Telecommunications 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding  ISIL 0.3718 0.4862 80000 0 High Technology 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM  MPPP 0.3552 0.4814 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications  WJCI 0.3984 0.4743 0 1500 High Technology 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences  KIN 0.4704 0.4723 1940000 0 Healthcare 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink  DTHK 0.3877 0.4551 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod  EYES 0.3619 0.3999 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com  DSCM 0.2877 0.3696 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Engage Technologies  ENGA 0.2938 0.3595 20000 0 High Technology 
12/03/1998 Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.2793 0.3411 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections  RTHM 0.2440 0.3366 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com  BCST 0.2304 0.3117 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com  MCAF 0.2190 0.2717 20000 0 High Technology 
03/29/1999 priceline.com  PCLN 0.1862 0.2569 80000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon  HLTH 0.2047 0.2429 30000 0 Healthcare 
 mean  0.3804 0.4590 117,866.6667 316.6667  
 std  0.1152 0.1005 347,410.0959 1,163.2545  
 min  0.1377 0.2429 0.0000 0.0000  
 max  0.5455 0.5666 1,940,000.0000 6,000.0000  
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Table 4.3: Efficiency analysis- 317 IPOs: top and worst performers 
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs for the reduced sample (317 underpriced IPOs) in terms of 
their ability to minimize underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their efficiency performance 
under the VRS assumption in order to account for differences between sectors. When an IPO is 
efficient (i.e. efficiency score equal to 1.000) under the CRS assumption, it is also efficient under the 
VRS assumption. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with the lobby and PAC 
donation amounts. The main descriptive statistics of the efficiency estimates, lobby and PAC 
amounts are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing Date Company Ticker CRS VRS 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC 
Money 
Sector 
07/31/2014 
Marinus 
Pharmaceuticals  MRNS 1.0000 1.0000 40000 0 Healthcare 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences  KIN 1.0000 1.0000 1940000 0 Healthcare 
03/20/2013 
Tetraphase 
Pharmaceuticals  TTPH 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 Healthcare 
05/18/2012 Facebook  FB 0.9940 1.0000 1350000 270000 High Technology 
06/24/2011 KiOR  KIOR 1.0000 1.0000 120000 0 Energy and Power 
12/17/2010 Fortegra Financial  FRF 1.0000 1.0000 150000 0 Financials 
11/19/2010 Aeroflex Holding  ARX 1.0000 1.0000 8700 0 High Technology 
08/03/2010 Trius Therapeutics  TSRX 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 Healthcare 
04/22/2010 Codexis  CDXS 1.0000 1.0000 190000 0 Materials 
11/16/2007 Internet Brands  INET 1.0000 1.0000 80000 0 High Technology 
02/09/2007 VeriChip  CHIP 1.0000 1.0000 120000 0 Telecommunications 
12/14/2006 NewStar Financial  NEWS 1.0000 1.0000 0 15000 Financials 
11/02/2005 
Cbeyond 
Communications  CBEY 1.0000 1.0000 100000 0 Telecommunications 
08/17/2005 Rockwood Holdings  ROC 1.0000 1.0000 140000 0 Materials 
06/14/2005 
Premium Standard 
Farms  PORK 1.0000 1.0000 40000 18075 Consumer Staples 
02/10/2005 
Nasdaq Stock 
Market  NDAQ 1.0000 1.0000 0 51400 Financials 
01/21/2005 ViaCell  VIAC 1.0000 1.0000 20000 0 Healthcare 
08/19/2004 Google  GOOG 0.8471 1.0000 180000 0 High Technology 
08/05/2004 
RightNow 
Technologies  RNOW 1.0000 1.0000 110000 0 High Technology 
07/30/2004 EnerSys  ENS 1.0000 1.0000 0 150000 High Technology 
05/24/2004 Genworth Financial  GNW 1.0000 1.0000 180000 0 Financials 
08/02/2001 Bunge  BG 1.0000 1.0000 120000 0 Consumer Staples 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods  KFT 1.0000 1.0000 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
03/15/2001 
SureBeam 
Corp(Titan Corp) SURE 1.0000 1.0000 220000 500 Industrials 
07/29/1999 
Lennox 
International  LII 1.0000 1.0000 0 8000 Industrials 
07/28/1999 
American Nat. Can 
Group CAN 1.0000 1.0000 0 7300 Materials 
07/20/1999 
Engage 
Technologies  ENGA 0.7638 1.0000 20000 0 High Technology 
07/22/1998 USEC  USU 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 Materials 
05/27/1998 
Capstar 
Broadcasting  CRB 1.0000 1.0000 60000 0 
Media and 
Entertainment 
05/11/1998 
MGC 
Communications  MGCX 1.0000 1.0000 0 5500 Telecommunications 
  mean   0.9868 1.0000 178,956.6667 
19,509.166
7   
 std  0.0505 0.0000 411,343.9300 
55,975.203
3  
 min  0.7638 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   
1.0000 1.0000 
1,940,000.00
00 
270,000.00
00   
02/08/2007 Accuray  ARAY 0.6322 0.6322 200000 0 Healthcare 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com  PLRX 0.6154 0.6154 30000 0 Retail 
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12/19/2007 
Orion Energy 
Systems  OESX 0.6072 0.6072 100000 0 Industrials 
11/07/2013 Twitter  TWTR 0.5791 0.6040 90000 0 High Technology 
05/17/1999 Nextcard  NXCD 0.5970 0.5984 20000 0 Financials 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics  SAGE 0.5980 0.5980 70000 0 Healthcare 
03/09/2005 
International Sec 
Exchange  ISE 0.5921 0.5921 0 6000 Financials 
12/12/2013 ARAMARK Holdings  ARMK 0.5858 0.5858 200000 2000 Retail 
07/24/2013 
Agios 
Pharmaceuticals  AGIO 0.5754 0.5756 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow  Z 0.5591 0.5615 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye  FEYE 0.5556 0.5580 120000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group  ISSX 0.5448 0.5552 80000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign  VRSN 0.5490 0.5490 60000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 
Foundation 
Medicine  FMI 0.5092 0.5112 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth  ATHN 0.5070 0.5091 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding  ISIL 0.4630 0.5007 80000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications  WJCI 0.4961 0.4967 0 1500 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets  FMKT 0.1714 0.4948 80000 0 
Consumer Products 
and Services 
07/27/2000 Corvis  CORV 0.4249 0.4919 40000 0 Telecommunications 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM  MPPP 0.4423 0.4914 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink  DTHK 0.4828 0.4828 40000 0 
Consumer Products 
and Services 
11/19/2014 
Second Sight Med 
Prod  EYES 0.4507 0.4507 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com  DSCM 0.3582 0.3822 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Genentech  DNA 0.3659 0.3741 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
12/03/1998 
Ticketmaster 
Online TMCS 0.3478 0.3542 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 
Rhythms 
NetConnections  RTHM 0.3038 0.3421 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com  BCST 0.2869 0.3183 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com  MCAF 0.2727 0.2832 20000 0 High Technology 
03/29/1999 priceline.com  PCLN 0.2319 0.2611 80000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon  HLTH 0.2549 0.2550 30000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.4653 0.4877 94,866.6667 483.3333   
 std  0.1331 0.1142 185,565.8138 1,441.2838  
 min  0.1714 0.2550 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.6322 0.6322 
1,040,000.00
00 6,000.0000   
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Table 4.4: Bootstrap efficiency analysis 
- 379 IPOs: top and worst performers  
(CRS assumption) 
 
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs for the full sample (N=379) in terms of their ability to 
minimize underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the 
CRS assumption. High bootstrap efficiency levels indicate high IPO performance. Additionally, we 
identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also we present 
the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its 
standard deviation. Finally, the main descriptive statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing Date Company Ticker Bias 
Correcte
d CRS 
Estimate
d Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimate
d Bias 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby Money PAC Money Sector 
11/08/2007 ICx Technologies ICXT 0.9861 0.0139 0.0002 0.9583 0.9997 1420000 85000 High Technology 
05/10/2013 BioAmber BIOA 0.9428 0.0133 0.0001 0.9162 0.9558 80000 0 Materials 
10/28/2009 Addus HomeCare ADUS 0.9327 0.0132 0.0001 0.9064 0.9455 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/30/1999 Biopure BPUR 0.9271 0.0131 0.0001 0.9009 0.9399 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/19/2001 The Princeton Review REVU 0.9170 0.0129 0.0001 0.8911 0.9296 60000 0 
Consumer Products and 
Services 
07/29/2014 ContraFect CFRXU 0.9121 0.0128 0.0001 0.8863 0.9246 20000 0 Healthcare 
10/08/2009 Omeros OMER 0.9071 0.0128 0.0001 0.8815 0.9196 60000 0 Healthcare 
05/24/2006 Vonage Holdings VG 0.9067 0.0127 0.0001 0.8810 0.9191 805000 150000 Telecommunications 
04/10/2014 Adamas Pharmaceuticals ADMS 0.9045 0.0127 0.0001 0.8789 0.9169 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/24/2014 Pfenex PFNX 0.8964 0.0127 0.0001 0.8711 0.9087 180000 0 Healthcare 
05/03/1999 CONSOL Energy CNX 0.8891 0.0126 0.0001 0.8640 0.9014 550000 226250 Materials 
05/02/2014 SCYNEXIS SCYX 0.8799 0.0124 0.0001 0.8550 0.8920 40000 0 Healthcare 
09/29/2005 Avalon Pharmaceuticals AVRX 0.8763 0.0123 0.0001 0.8515 0.8883 120000 0 Healthcare 
06/27/2007 AuthenTec AUTH 0.8711 0.0123 0.0001 0.8465 0.8831 36000 0 High Technology 
02/05/2014 Genocea Biosciences GNCA 0.8639 0.0122 0.0001 0.8395 0.8758 110000 0 Healthcare 
10/12/2009 RailAmerica RA 0.8639 0.0122 0.0001 0.8395 0.8758 120000 51635 Industrials 
07/29/2010 Molycorp MCP 0.8629 0.0121 0.0001 0.8385 0.8747 290000 0 Materials 
07/25/2007 Rex Energy REXX 0.8600 0.0121 0.0001 0.8357 0.8718 80000 0 Energy and Power 
06/18/2010 Motricity MOTR 0.8553 0.0120 0.0001 0.8311 0.8670 40000 0 High Technology 
10/03/2012 LifeLock LOCK 0.8526 0.0120 0.0001 0.8285 0.8643 240000 0 High Technology 
11/15/2006 Emergent BioSolutions EBS 0.8461 0.0119 0.0001 0.8222 0.8577 2000000 300000 Healthcare 
10/25/2013 Endurance Intl Grp Hldg EIGI 0.8447 0.0119 0.0001 0.8208 0.8563 120000 0 High Technology 
05/15/2007 Continental Resources CLR 0.8424 0.0119 0.0001 0.8186 0.8539 60000 0 Energy and Power 
02/01/2012 US Silica Holdings SLCA 0.8415 0.0118 0.0001 0.8177 0.8530 20000 0 Materials 
03/22/2013 West Corp WSTC 0.8397 0.0119 0.0001 0.8160 0.8513 40000 0 
Consumer Products and 
Services 
10/04/2012 Berry Plastics Group BERY 0.8335 0.0118 0.0001 0.8099 0.8449 160000 0 Materials 
11/18/2011 Intermolecular IMI 0.8335 0.0118 0.0001 0.8099 0.8449 30000 0 High Technology 
05/15/2007 Pinnacle Gas Resources PINN 0.8297 0.0117 0.0001 0.8062 0.8411 20000 0 Energy and Power 
07/24/2013 Heat Biologics HTBX 0.8276 0.0116 0.0001 0.8042 0.8389 20000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/2011 
Apollo Global 
Management APO 0.8268 0.0116 0.0001 0.8034 0.8381 932984 118100 Financials 
  mean   0.8758 0.0123 0.0001 0.8510 0.8878 257466.1333 31032.8333   
 std  0.0400 0.0006 0.0000 0.0389 0.0406 460060.5601 73961.0203  
 min  0.8268 0.0116 0.0001 0.8034 0.8381 10000.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9861 0.0139 0.0002 0.9583 0.9997 2000000.0000 300000.000
0 
  
12/15/2004 Las Vegas Sands LVS 0.4932 0.0070 0.0000 0.4793 0.5000 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com PLRX 0.4873 0.0069 0.0000 0.4736 0.4940 30000 0 Retail 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.4808 0.0068 0.0000 0.4672 0.4874 100000 0 Industrials 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.4735 0.0067 0.0000 0.4601 0.4800 70000 0 Healthcare 
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05/17/1999 Nextcard NXCD 0.4727 0.0067 0.0000 0.4593 0.4792 20000 0 Financials 
03/09/2005 
International Sec 
Exchange ISE 0.4689 0.0066 0.0000 0.4556 0.4753 0 6000 Financials 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences KIN 0.4638 0.0066 0.0000 0.4507 0.4702 1940000 0 Healthcare 
11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.4585 0.0065 0.0000 0.4455 0.4648 90000 0 High Technology 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.4556 0.0065 0.0000 0.4428 0.4619 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.4427 0.0063 0.0000 0.4302 0.4488 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.4398 0.0063 0.0000 0.4274 0.4459 120000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.4348 0.0061 0.0000 0.4225 0.4407 60000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.4314 0.0061 0.0000 0.4192 0.4373 80000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.4032 0.0057 0.0000 0.3918 0.4087 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.4015 0.0057 0.0000 0.3902 0.4071 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.3928 0.0056 0.0000 0.3817 0.3982 0 1500 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.3823 0.0054 0.0000 0.3715 0.3876 40000 0 
Consumer Products and 
Services 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.3666 0.0052 0.0000 0.3563 0.3717 80000 0 High Technology 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.3568 0.0051 0.0000 0.3468 0.3617 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.3501 0.0050 0.0000 0.3402 0.3549 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.3364 0.0048 0.0000 0.3269 0.3410 40000 0 Telecommunications 
07/20/1999 Engage Technologies ENGA 0.2897 0.0041 0.0000 0.2815 0.2937 20000 0 High Technology 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.2835 0.0041 0.0000 0.2755 0.2874 140000 0 Retail 
12/03/1998 
Ticketmaster Online-
CitySearch TMCS 0.2754 0.0039 0.0000 0.2676 0.2792 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.2404 0.0035 0.0000 0.2337 0.2438 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.2270 0.0033 0.0000 0.2206 0.2301 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2159 0.0031 0.0000 0.2098 0.2189 20000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2018 0.0029 0.0000 0.1961 0.2046 30000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.1836 0.0026 0.0000 0.1784 0.1861 80000 0 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.1356 0.0020 0.0000 0.1318 0.1375 80000 0 
Consumer Products and 
Services 
  mean   0.3682 0.0052 0.0000 0.3578 0.3733 114200.0000 250.0000   
 std  0.1051 0.0015 0.0000 0.1022 0.1066 346576.6970 1119.9600  
 min  0.1356 0.0020 0.0000 0.1318 0.1375 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.4932 0.0070 0.0000 0.4793 0.5000 1940000.0000 6000.0000   
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Table 4.5: Bootstrap efficiency analysis 
- 379 IPOs: top and worst performers 
 (VRS assumption)  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs of the full sample (379 IPOs) in terms of their ability to 
minimize underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the 
VRS assumption in order to account for differences between sectors. High bootstrap efficiency 
levels indicate high IPO performance. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with 
the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also we present the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals 
of the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its standard deviation. Finally, the main 
descriptive statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker Bias 
Corrected 
VRS 
Estimated 
Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimated 
Bias 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC Money Sector 
11/08/2007 ICx Technologies ICXT 0.9684 0.0316 0.0002 0.9440 0.9956 1420000 85000 High Technology 
05/10/2013 BioAmber BIOA 0.9553 0.0274 0.0003 0.9224 0.9792 80000 0 Materials 
02/03/2004 TRW Automotive Holdings TRW 0.9518 0.0128 0.0001 0.9301 0.9636 0 675000 Industrials 
04/10/2014 Ally Financial ALLY 0.9458 0.0093 0.0000 0.9295 0.9541 2110000 0 Financials 
04/12/2012 Oaktree Capital Group OAK 0.9455 0.0545 0.0008 0.9080 0.9902 260000 0 Financials 
10/28/2009 Addus HomeCare ADUS 0.9454 0.0261 0.0003 0.9131 0.9681 40000 0 Healthcare 
05/05/2005 Lazard LAZ 0.9453 0.0092 0.0000 0.9289 0.9536 290000 0 Financials 
05/24/2006 Vonage Holdings VG 0.9399 0.0136 0.0001 0.9202 0.9525 805000 150000 Telecommunications 
07/30/1999 Biopure BPUR 0.9324 0.0202 0.0002 0.9068 0.9497 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods KFT 0.9321 0.0191 0.0002 0.9060 0.9499 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
05/18/2012 Facebook FB 0.9309 0.0385 0.0005 0.8973 0.9662 1350000 270000 High Technology 
06/19/2001 The Princeton Review REVU 0.9263 0.0207 0.0002 0.9001 0.9441 60000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
03/08/2007 Clearwire CLWR 0.9248 0.0095 0.0001 0.9077 0.9335 80000 0 High Technology 
04/23/2008 American Water Works AWK 0.9240 0.0073 0.0000 0.9115 0.9305 300000 100000 Energy and Power 
03/22/2013 West Corp WSTC 0.9233 0.0072 0.0000 0.9110 0.9298 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
04/10/2014 Adamas Pharmaceuticals ADMS 0.9201 0.0177 0.0001 0.8981 0.9365 10000 0 Healthcare 
10/08/2009 Omeros OMER 0.9192 0.0235 0.0002 0.8887 0.9399 60000 0 Healthcare 
11/17/2011 Delphi Automotive DLPH 0.9188 0.0074 0.0000 0.9060 0.9253 396429 40500 Industrials 
05/03/1999 CONSOL Energy CNX 0.9099 0.0160 0.0001 0.8888 0.9247 550000 226250 Materials 
12/13/2013 Cheniere Energy Partners CQH 0.9093 0.0071 0.0000 0.8972 0.9156 2630000 201800 Energy and Power 
12/09/2004 Foundation Coal Holdings FCL 0.9041 0.0074 0.0000 0.8913 0.9106 0 74000 Materials 
11/18/2010 General Motors GM 0.9032 0.0262 0.0003 0.8748 0.9274 9570000 284500 Industrials 
03/29/2011 Apollo Global Management APO 0.9022 0.0073 0.0000 0.8896 0.9088 932984 118100 Financials 
03/09/2011 HCA Holdings HCA 0.9015 0.0185 0.0002 0.8762 0.9187 200000 268250 Healthcare 
11/15/2007 EnergySolutions ES 0.9014 0.0081 0.0000 0.8874 0.9086 1020000 780000 Energy and Power 
02/11/2011 Kinder Morgan KMI 0.9006 0.0186 0.0002 0.8753 0.9179 190000 0 Energy and Power 
06/10/2004 CB Richard Ellis Group CBG 0.8963 0.0072 0.0000 0.8839 0.9027 10000 0 Real Estate 
05/02/2014 SCYNEXIS SCYX 0.8908 0.0215 0.0002 0.8628 0.9096 40000 0 Healthcare 
02/01/2012 US Silica Holdings SLCA 0.8908 0.0096 0.0000 0.8751 0.8996 20000 0 Materials 
03/15/2012 Allison Transmission Hldg ALSN 0.8887 0.0082 0.0000 0.8745 0.8960 240000 0 Industrials 
  mean   0.9216 0.0170 0.0001 0.9002 0.9368 757480.4333 111096.6667   
 std  0.0215 0.0110 0.0002 0.0199 0.0267 1790773.6903 192603.8139  
 min  0.8887 0.0071 0.0000 0.8628 0.8960 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9684 0.0545 0.0008 0.9440 0.9956 9570000.0000 780000.0000   
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.5562 0.0104 0.0001 0.5413 0.5658 70000 0 Healthcare 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange ISE 0.5510 0.0107 0.0001 0.5360 0.5609 0 6000 Financials 
11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.5487 0.0314 0.0003 0.5256 0.5756 90000 0 High Technology 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.5412 0.0044 0.0000 0.5336 0.5451 100000 0 Industrials 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.5366 0.0114 0.0001 0.5213 0.5472 40000 0 Healthcare 
06/17/1998 software.net SWNT 0.5354 0.0145 0.0001 0.5218 0.5482 20000 0 High Technology 
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12/13/2012 SolarCity SCTY 0.5338 0.0136 0.0001 0.5196 0.5459 230000 2000 Industrials 
05/29/2014 Resonant RESN 0.5284 0.0125 0.0001 0.5120 0.5393 40000 0 High Technology 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.5236 0.0176 0.0001 0.5062 0.5397 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.5204 0.0178 0.0001 0.5030 0.5367 120000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.5095 0.0249 0.0002 0.4895 0.5316 80000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.5022 0.0057 0.0000 0.4922 0.5074 60000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.4768 0.0154 0.0001 0.4612 0.4911 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.4748 0.0156 0.0001 0.4592 0.4892 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.4633 0.0110 0.0001 0.4495 0.4734 0 1500 High Technology 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences KIN 0.4601 0.0121 0.0000 0.4479 0.4708 1940000 0 Healthcare 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.4554 0.0308 0.0003 0.4349 0.4810 80000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.4477 0.0074 0.0000 0.4365 0.4546 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.4448 0.0366 0.0004 0.4238 0.4777 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.4212 0.0674 0.0010 0.4037 0.4811 40000 0 Telecommunications 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.3988 0.0960 0.0026 0.3821 0.4880 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.3967 0.0031 0.0000 0.3913 0.3995 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.3479 0.0217 0.0001 0.3324 0.3660 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Engage Technologies ENGA 0.3418 0.0176 0.0001 0.3284 0.3571 20000 0 High Technology 
12/03/1998 Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.3252 0.0158 0.0001 0.3124 0.3392 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.3072 0.0294 0.0003 0.2923 0.3340 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.2881 0.0235 0.0002 0.2747 0.3093 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2568 0.0148 0.0001 0.2462 0.2693 20000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2376 0.0052 0.0000 0.2308 0.2423 30000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.2344 0.0224 0.0002 0.2231 0.2548 80000 0 High Technology 
  mean   0.4389 0.0207 0.0002 0.4244 0.4574 120200.0000 316.6667   
 std  0.1020 0.0189 0.0005 0.1005 0.1012 346964.9093 1163.2545  
 min  0.2344 0.0031 0.0000 0.2231 0.2423 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.5562 0.0960 0.0026 0.5413 0.5756 1940000.0000 6000.0000   
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Table 4.6: Bootstrap efficiency analysis 
- 317 IPOs: top and worst performers  
(CRS assumption)  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs of the reduced sample (317 IPOs) in terms of their ability to 
minimize underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the 
CRS assumption. High bootstrap efficiency levels indicate high IPO performance. Additionally, we 
identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also we present 
the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its 
standard deviation. Finally, the main descriptive statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.   
 
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker Bias 
Corrected 
CRS 
Estimated 
Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimated 
Bias 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC Money Sector 
07/31/2014 Marinus Pharmaceuticals MRNS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 40000 0 Healthcare 
12/12/2013 Kindred Biosciences KIN 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 1940000 0 Healthcare 
03/20/2013 Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals TTPH 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Healthcare 
08/03/2010 Trius Therapeutics TSRX 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Healthcare 
11/16/2007 Internet Brands INET 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 80000 0 High Technology 
02/09/2007 VeriChip CHIP 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 120000 0 Telecommunications 
08/05/2004 RightNow Technologies RNOW 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 110000 0 High Technology 
06/24/2011 KiOR KIOR 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 120000 0 Energy and Power 
12/17/2010 Fortegra Financial FRF 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 150000 0 Financials 
11/19/2010 Aeroflex Holding ARX 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 8700 0 High Technology 
04/22/2010 Codexis CDXS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 190000 0 Materials 
12/14/2006 NewStar Financial NEWS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 15000 Financials 
11/02/2005 Cbeyond Communications CBEY 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 100000 0 Telecommunications 
08/17/2005 Rockwood Holdings ROC 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 140000 0 Materials 
06/14/2005 Premium Standard Farms PORK 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 40000 18075 Consumer Staples 
02/10/2005 Nasdaq Stock Market NDAQ 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 51400 Financials 
01/21/2005 ViaCell VIAC 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 20000 0 Healthcare 
07/30/2004 EnerSys ENS 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 150000 High Technology 
05/24/2004 Genworth Financial GNW 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 180000 0 Financials 
08/02/2001 Bunge BG 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 120000 0 Consumer Staples 
03/15/2001 SureBeam Corp(Titan Corp) SURE 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 220000 500 Industrials 
07/29/1999 Lennox International LII 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 8000 Industrials 
07/28/1999 American National Can Group CAN 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 7300 Materials 
07/22/1998 USEC USU 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Materials 
05/27/1998 Capstar Broadcasting CRB 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
05/11/1998 MGC Communications MGCX 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 5500 Telecommunications 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods KFT 0.9994 0.0006 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
11/15/2007 EnergySolutions ES 0.9988 0.0007 0.0000 0.9971 0.9995 1020000 780000 Energy and Power 
10/01/2014 Vivint Solar VSLR 0.9986 0.0007 0.0000 0.9969 0.9993 40000 0 Energy and Power 
05/28/2004 Alnylam Pharmaceuticals ALNY 0.9977 0.0006 0.0000 0.9960 0.9983 40000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.9993 0.0006 0.0000 0.9976 1.0000 163956.6667 36509.1667   
 std  0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 382799.2196 143574.3383  
 min  0.9977 0.0006 0.0000 0.9960 0.9983 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9994 0.0007 0.0000 0.9977 1.0001 1940000.0000 780000.0000   
12/15/2004 Las Vegas Sands LVS 0.6224 0.0004 0.0000 0.6213 0.6228 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com PLRX 0.6149 0.0004 0.0000 0.6138 0.6153 30000 0 Retail 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.6066 0.0005 0.0000 0.6056 0.6070 100000 0 Industrials 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.5976 0.0004 0.0000 0.5966 0.5980 70000 0 Healthcare 
05/17/1999 Nextcard NXCD 0.5966 0.0004 0.0000 0.5956 0.5970 20000 0 Financials 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange ISE 0.5917 0.0004 0.0000 0.5907 0.5921 0 6000 Financials 
134 
 
 
12/12/2013 ARAMARK Holdings ARMK 0.5853 0.0004 0.0000 0.5843 0.5857 200000 2000 Retail 
11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.5786 0.0004 0.0000 0.5776 0.5790 90000 0 High Technology 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.5750 0.0004 0.0000 0.5740 0.5754 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.5587 0.0004 0.0000 0.5578 0.5591 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.5551 0.0004 0.0000 0.5542 0.5555 120000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.5487 0.0003 0.0000 0.5477 0.5490 60000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.5445 0.0003 0.0000 0.5435 0.5448 80000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.5087 0.0004 0.0000 0.5078 0.5090 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.5067 0.0003 0.0000 0.5058 0.5070 40000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.4958 0.0003 0.0000 0.4949 0.4961 0 1500 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.4824 0.0003 0.0000 0.4815 0.4827 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.4626 0.0003 0.0000 0.4618 0.4629 80000 0 High Technology 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.4503 0.0003 0.0000 0.4495 0.4506 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.4419 0.0003 0.0000 0.4411 0.4422 40000 0 High Technology 
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.4246 0.0003 0.0000 0.4239 0.4249 40000 0 Telecommunications 
07/20/1999 Genentech DNA 0.3655 0.0003 0.0000 0.3649 0.3658 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.3580 0.0002 0.0000 0.3574 0.3582 140000 0 Retail 
12/03/1998 Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.3476 0.0002 0.0000 0.3470 0.3478 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.3034 0.0003 0.0000 0.3029 0.3036 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.2866 0.0002 0.0000 0.2861 0.2868 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2725 0.0002 0.0000 0.2720 0.2727 20000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2547 0.0002 0.0000 0.2543 0.2549 30000 0 Healthcare 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.2316 0.0002 0.0000 0.2312 0.2317 80000 0 High Technology 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.1713 0.0001 0.0000 0.1710 0.1714 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
  mean   0.4647 0.0003 0.0000 0.4639 0.4650 90200.0000 483.3333   
 std  0.1327 0.0001 0.0000 0.1324 0.1327 184588.5266 1441.2838  
 min  0.1713 0.0001 0.0000 0.1710 0.1714 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.6224 0.0005 0.0000 0.6213 0.6228 1040000.0000 6000.0000   
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Table 4.7: Bootstrap efficiency analysis 
- 317 IPOs: top and worst performers  
(VRS assumption)  
We present the top and worst 30 IPOs of the reduced sample (317 IPOs) in terms of their ability to 
minimize underpricing. We sort the IPOs based on their bootstrap efficiency performance under the 
VRS assumption in order to account for differences between sectors. High bootstrap efficiency 
levels indicate high IPO performance. Additionally, we identify the IPO firm’s sector alongside with 
the lobby and PAC donation amounts. Also, we present the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of 
the estimations alongside with the estimated bias and its standard deviation. Finally, the main 
descriptive statistics are tabulated below each IPO group.  
  
Listing 
Date 
Company Ticker Bias 
Corrected 
VRS 
Estimated 
Bias 
STD of 
the 
estimated 
Bias 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lobby 
Money 
PAC Money Sector 
07/28/1999 American National Can Group CAN 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9964 0.9999 0 7300 Materials 
05/11/1998 MGC Communications MGCX 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9964 0.9999 0 5500 Telecommunications 
07/29/1999 Lennox International LII 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9962 0.9999 0 8000 Industrials 
05/27/1998 Capstar Broadcasting CRB 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9962 0.9999 60000 0 Media and Entertainment 
02/10/2005 Nasdaq Stock Market NDAQ 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9963 0.9999 0 51400 Financials 
01/21/2005 ViaCell VIAC 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9963 0.9999 20000 0 Healthcare 
08/02/2001 Bunge BG 0.9988 0.0012 0.0000 0.9963 0.9999 120000 0 Consumer Staples 
08/17/2005 Rockwood Holdings ROC 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 140000 0 Materials 
05/24/2004 Genworth Financial GNW 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 180000 0 Financials 
06/24/2011 KiOR KIOR 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 120000 0 Energy and Power 
04/22/2010 Codexis CDXS 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.9960 0.9999 190000 0 Materials 
07/22/1998 USEC USU 0.9985 0.0015 0.0000 0.9954 0.9999 60000 0 Materials 
11/19/2010 Aeroflex Holding ARX 0.9983 0.0017 0.0000 0.9949 0.9999 8700 0 High Technology 
10/01/2014 Vivint Solar VSLR 0.9980 0.0013 0.0000 0.9955 0.9991 40000 0 Energy and Power 
06/14/2005 Premium Standard Farms PORK 0.9980 0.0020 0.0000 0.9938 0.9998 40000 18075 Consumer Staples 
07/30/2004 EnerSys ENS 0.9980 0.0020 0.0000 0.9938 0.9998 0 150000 High Technology 
11/02/2005 Cbeyond Communications CBEY 0.9977 0.0023 0.0000 0.9930 0.9998 100000 0 Telecommunications 
11/15/2007 EnergySolutions ES 0.9977 0.0018 0.0000 0.9941 0.9994 1020000 780000 Energy and Power 
12/17/2010 Fortegra Financial FRF 0.9970 0.0030 0.0000 0.9906 0.9998 150000 0 Financials 
05/22/2002 Liquidmetal Technologies LQMT 0.9967 0.0013 0.0000 0.9940 0.9979 120000 0 Materials 
12/14/2006 NewStar Financial NEWS 0.9960 0.0040 0.0000 0.9872 0.9997 0 15000 Financials 
03/15/2001 SureBeam Corp(Titan Corp) SURE 0.9960 0.0040 0.0000 0.9872 0.9997 220000 500 Industrials 
06/22/2011 Vanguard Health Systems VHS 0.9960 0.0012 0.0000 0.9935 0.9971 120000 123000 Healthcare 
12/11/2009 KAR Auction Services KAR 0.9952 0.0023 0.0000 0.9906 0.9973 53000 0 Retail 
05/23/2002 Eon Labs ELAB 0.9952 0.0014 0.0000 0.9925 0.9964 20000 0 Healthcare 
06/29/1999 Seminis SMNS 0.9947 0.0013 0.0000 0.9920 0.9959 20000 0 Consumer Staples 
06/12/2001 Kraft Foods KFT 0.9930 0.0070 0.0000 0.9828 0.9991 0 59500 Consumer Staples 
02/05/1998 Vysis (BP Amoco) VYSI 0.9927 0.0023 0.0000 0.9882 0.9948 3520000 172000 Healthcare 
02/02/2007 Molecular Insight Pharm MIPI 0.9921 0.0015 0.0000 0.9891 0.9935 105000 0 Healthcare 
07/31/2014 Marinus Pharmaceuticals MRNS 0.9906 0.0094 0.0001 0.9710 0.9996 40000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.9969 0.0022 0.0000 0.9926 0.9989 215556.6667 46342.5000   
 std  0.0023 0.0018 0.0000 0.0054 0.0017 651009.0151 145988.4131  
 min  0.9906 0.0012 0.0000 0.9710 0.9935 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.9988 0.0094 0.0001 0.9964 0.9999 3520000.0000 780000.0000   
02/08/2007 Accuray ARAY 0.6295 0.0027 0.0000 0.6250 0.6320 200000 0 Healthcare 
10/06/1999 PlanetRx.com PLRX 0.6135 0.0018 0.0000 0.6103 0.6151 30000 0 Retail 
12/19/2007 Orion Energy Systems OESX 0.6061 0.0010 0.0000 0.6043 0.6070 100000 0 Industrials 
11/07/2013 Twitter TWTR 0.5968 0.0071 0.0000 0.5861 0.6032 90000 0 High Technology 
07/18/2014 SAGE Therapeutics SAGE 0.5945 0.0035 0.0000 0.5891 0.5977 70000 0 Healthcare 
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05/17/1999 Nextcard NXCD 0.5928 0.0056 0.0000 0.5854 0.5977 20000 0 Financials 
03/09/2005 International Sec Exchange ISE 0.5884 0.0037 0.0000 0.5829 0.5917 0 6000 Financials 
12/12/2013 ARAMARK Holdings Corp ARMK 0.5843 0.0014 0.0000 0.5815 0.5855 200000 2000 Retail 
07/24/2013 Agios Pharmaceuticals AGIO 0.5715 0.0041 0.0000 0.5655 0.5750 40000 0 Healthcare 
07/20/2011 Zillow Z 0.5544 0.0071 0.0000 0.5457 0.5607 40000 0 High Technology 
09/20/2013 FireEye FEYE 0.5506 0.0074 0.0000 0.5420 0.5571 120000 0 High Technology 
01/30/1998 VeriSign VRSN 0.5476 0.0014 0.0000 0.5450 0.5489 60000 0 High Technology 
03/23/1998 ISS Group ISSX 0.5474 0.0077 0.0000 0.5374 0.5544 80000 0 High Technology 
09/25/2013 Foundation Medicine FMI 0.5049 0.0062 0.0000 0.4973 0.5105 80000 0 Healthcare 
09/20/2007 athenahealth ATHN 0.5027 0.0063 0.0000 0.4950 0.5083 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 Intersil Holding ISIL 0.4932 0.0074 0.0000 0.4809 0.4997 80000 0 High Technology 
08/18/2000 WJ Communications WJCI 0.4927 0.0040 0.0000 0.4873 0.4961 0 1500 High Technology 
07/22/1999 MP3.COM MPPP 0.4819 0.0095 0.0001 0.4650 0.4906 40000 0 High Technology 
02/25/2000 DigitalThink DTHK 0.4804 0.0023 0.0000 0.4766 0.4825 40000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
07/27/2000 Corvis CORV 0.4646 0.0273 0.0004 0.4304 0.4905 40000 0 Telecommunications 
12/10/1999 Freemarkets FMKT 0.4505 0.0443 0.0017 0.4015 0.4936 80000 0 Consumer Products and Services 
11/19/2014 Second Sight Med Prod EYES 0.4499 0.0007 0.0000 0.4487 0.4505 10000 0 Healthcare 
07/28/1999 drugstore.com DSCM 0.3773 0.0049 0.0000 0.3692 0.3816 140000 0 Retail 
07/20/1999 Genentech DNA 0.3692 0.0049 0.0000 0.3624 0.3737 1040000 5000 Healthcare 
12/03/1998 Ticketmaster Online-CitySearch TMCS 0.3491 0.0050 0.0000 0.3427 0.3536 36000 0 High Technology 
04/07/1999 Rhythms NetConnections RTHM 0.3337 0.0084 0.0000 0.3203 0.3416 20000 0 Telecommunications 
07/17/1998 Broadcast.Com BCST 0.3121 0.0061 0.0000 0.3013 0.3177 20000 0 High Technology 
12/01/1999 McAfee.com MCAF 0.2798 0.0034 0.0000 0.2748 0.2829 20000 0 High Technology 
03/29/1999 priceline.com PCLN 0.2546 0.0064 0.0000 0.2444 0.2606 80000 0 High Technology 
02/10/1999 Healtheon HLTH 0.2531 0.0019 0.0000 0.2504 0.2547 30000 0 Healthcare 
  mean   0.4809 0.0068 0.0001 0.4716 0.4872 94866.6667 483.3333   
 std  0.1147 0.0085 0.0003 0.1164 0.1142 185565.8138 1441.2838  
 min  0.2531 0.0007 0.0000 0.2444 0.2547 0.0000 0.0000  
  max   0.6295 0.0443 0.0017 0.6250 0.6320 1040000.0000 6000.0000   
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Table 4.8: Kernel consistent density equality tests 
We implement a consistent integrated squared differences test for the equality of densities of 
conditional and unconditional efficiencies under the CRS and VRS assumptions in the full and 
reduced IPO samples. Following Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), we trim the DEA-estimates from 
values equal to unity and conduct the Li et al. (2009) test applying the least-squares cross 
validation criterion and bootstrap methods for the null distribution of the statistic (1,000 
replications have been applied).  
 
Full sample (including overpriced IPOs)  
  Test Statistic  p-value 
   
   
0
1
:
:
H f CRS g CRS M
H f CRS g CRS M


 
286.2809 0.0000 
   
   
0
1
:
:
H f VRS g VRS M
H f VRS g VRS M


 
175.7127 0.0000 
Reduced sample (excluding overpriced IPOs)  
  Test Statistic  p-value 
   
   
0
1
:
:
H f CRS g CRS M
H f CRS g CRS M


 
226.1246    0.0000 
   
   
0
1
:
:
H f VRS g VRS M
H f VRS g VRS M


 
131.1409    0.0000 
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Figure 4.4: The effect of lobby and PAC money on IPO performance  
(full sample -379 IPOs): Nonparametric regression 
The three-dimensional graphs represent the results of local constant estimators indicating the 
effect of PAC and lobby money on IPO performance (efficiency). These regressions apply for 
bandwidth selection the least-squares cross validation criterion. The vertical axes indicate the ratio 
of conditional to unconditional measures, whereas the horizontal axes represent the amounts of 
lobby and PAC money donated by IPO firms. Subfigures 4a, 4c, 4e and 4g illustrate the effect of 
lobby and PAC money under the CRS assumption, and subfigures 4b, 4d, 4f and 4h show the effect 
under the VRS assumption.   
a  b  
c  d  
e  f  
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Figure 4.5 
The effect of lobby and PAC money on IPO performance  
(reduced sample-317 IPOs): Nonparametric regression 
The three-dimensional graphs represent the results of local constant estimators indicating the 
effect of PAC and lobby money on IPO performance (efficiency). These regressions apply for 
bandwidth selection the least-squares cross validation criterion. The vertical axes indicate the ratio 
of conditional to unconditional measures, whereas the horizontal axes represent the amounts of 
lobby and PAC money donated by IPO firms. Subfigures 4a, 4c, 4e and 4g illustrate the effect of 
lobby and PAC money under the CRS assumption, and subfigures 4b, 4d, 4f and 4h show the effect 
under the VRS assumption.   
 
a  b  
c  d  
e  f  
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Chapter 5 - The influence of political connections on 
new ventures: From inception to peril 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
When an entrepreneur launches a new venture inevitably endows the emerging 
organization with her political network among all other forms of relationship capital.  
Consequently, as individuals may or may not be actively involved in politics, immense 
heterogeneity is observed in the extent of firms’ interference with the political process. 
In this regard, the aim of our study is to investigate the value-relevance of this special 
endowment and its continuity throughout the later stages in corporate life cycle.  
A popular notion holds that a firm with ties to politicians is capable of realizing 
a multitude of benefits which would otherwise remain unattainable. Supporting 
empirical evidence can be found in the studies of Hart (2001), Faccio (2006), Boubakri 
et al. (2008), Cooper et al. (2010), Chaney et al. (2011), and Houston et al. (2014). 
Though, this notion might as well backfire on connected organizations. For example, it 
can constitute a source of animosity for a number of stakeholders and result in increased 
litigation risk or scrutiny which obstructs the day-to-day operations.  In this respect, 
Masters and Keim (1985) warn that a firm which can temporarily extract economic 
benefits is incentivized to abstain from any political action as this may jeopardize its 
competitive position, even more so when the business model resembles to a 
monopolistic market structure.  
Whether proximity to politics ultimately represents an asset or a liability, the 
extant literature on corporate political connections invariably draws evidence from 
adequately established and long-tenured organizations. In such cases the business 
reputation of the entity precedes and generally supersedes the effect of corporate 
political activities. In contrast, commencing the empirical investigation from company 
inception, our study provides a more complete view on a spectrum of events. 
Sequentially assessing the interplay of connections with milestone organizational 
outcomes, we shed light on the various functions that political contributions can serve 
over the course of a venture’s life. Ultimately, we ask: To what extent an entrepreneur’s 
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political orientation may be passed on to a new firm and if so, can political connections 
act as a red carpet towards the venture’s growth and survival prospects? 
Political connections appear as a valuable endowment to a start-up company for 
a number of reasons. First, connected firms have been documented to sustain larger 
market shares without, nevertheless, the increased turnover to result in a commensurate 
increase in profitability (Boubakri et al., 2008). Because at inception the viability of the 
organization is primarily dependent on issues of recognition and market penetration the 
certification implications of political ties are critical as a means of reference to the 
marketplace. At the same time, concerns on other dimensions of operating performance 
such as the accounting bottom line assume a lesser priority (also as in Trueman et al., 
2000). Second, the mounting capital expenditure and working capital needs of the 
embryonic phase require access to a steady source of external financing. In this respect, 
Houston et al. (2014) attest to the advantageous provisions of bank loans towards 
politically connected firms in terms of both lower rates and lax covenants. Third, the 
new firm is capable of better coping with a lack of structure and formal operational 
processes; it also appears less likely to be penalized for such deficiencies. For example, 
Chaney et al. (2011) document that politically involved firms tend to systematically 
underperform in accounting quality, though this entails no economically significant 
consequences. Abusively, this immunity could extend to situations of malpractices, 
improper business conduct and fraudulent activity (Yu and Yu 2011; Correia, 2014). 
Overall, early political ties pose as a compelling and holistic treatment of the market 
newness liability (Stinchcombe, 1965). In fact, the earlier stage a company appears to be 
at, the more beneficial the effect is expected to emerge. 
The foremost challenge residing in the research of original endowments pertains 
to the fact that a significant number of non-surviving firms abandon the sample before 
being able to produce a significant corporate footprint (for example, refer to Shane and 
Stuart, 2002). The present study, though not completely immune to this persistent 
problem, traces firms at strategically early stages in the corporate life cycle when 
founders’ legacy is still a dominant determinant of corporate behavior. For a holistic 
picture, we broaden our scope to encompass the effect of political connections deeply in 
the public domain. Consequently, the investigation extends to firms that obtain their 
connections at any point in time along with those that inherit them from founders, 
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therefore allowing for the possibility of a differential effect between various means of 
connectedness and across different life cycle stages.  
The empirical analysis engages a large and comprehensive dataset. The database 
assembly comprises a number of steps. First, we read the directors’ biographical 
information in IPO prospectuses (S-1) documents to isolate founders from later 
additions to the management team. Second, we trace the political activity of these 
individuals within the electronic archive of the Federal Election Committee (FEC). 
Third, we search for contributions taking place at the corporate level in the form of 
lobbying and PAC (Political Action Committee) campaigns. As a final step, we merge 
this data with IPO-specific information provided by the SDC portal, and aftermarket 
information from CRSP, for total a sample of 1,769 U.S firms that undertook an IPO 
during the period 1998 to 2014.  
Overall, the findings reveal that political connections may exert a multifaceted 
influence on a new venture’s life. A common theme emerges in their value-added 
element. Some benefits are immediately apparent such as the longevity of politically 
connected firms and the increased turnover activity. Others are more subtle but equally 
salient. Specifically, we provide robust results showing political connections to 
significantly delay an IPO. As this relationship may invite conflicting interpretations, 
we draw auxiliary evidence from a related financing event, the access to angel or 
venture capital. By and large, politically active firms appear reluctant to share 
ownership with this type of investors. Taken together, these findings converge on the 
financial autonomy of connected firms which can withstand the cash scarcity of the pre-
IPO regime for a longer time. Furthermore, we show that the effect of political 
contributions, as a proxy for political connections, varies considerably with 
contributors’ identity. While founders’ activity remains vital to the sequence of events 
until listing, it claims minimal explanatory power in the public domain. At that mature 
time of the corporate life cycle, whereby a clear organizational identity has evolved, 
means of involvement which rely on mass participation and central planning (i.e. 
lobbying and PAC) result in a superior political outreach compared to individual 
contributions from prominent insiders.  
Our study has close theoretical links to the work of Miner et al.(1990), Shane 
and Stuart (2002), Fischer and Pollock (2004), Fan et al. (2007), Faccio and Parsley 
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(2009), Francis et al. (2009), Cooper et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2015). Miner et al. 
(1990) examine the correlation between the political connections of a sample of Finish 
publishing groups and their ability to cope with organizational change. We update their 
research by providing evidence from the world’s largest equity market and across a 
spectrum of industries. Shane and Stuart (2002) and Fischer and Pollock (2004) 
converge on the conclusion that founders’ social capital enhances the likelihood of 
survival. We corroborate this association centering on a niche of social capital that is of 
mounting public interest. As an additional contribution, we shed light on the interplay of 
politics with other important milestones in a new venture’s life (i.e. time to VC 
financing and time to IPO) which have largely been neglected by the relevant literature. 
Thus, while the area of corporate political connections is a well-researched one (Cooper 
et al., 2010; Yu and Yu, 2011; Correia, 2014; and Chen et al., 2015) and with the 
economies in transition of Southeast Asia to spearhead this endeavor (for example, Fan 
et al., 2007 ; and Francis et al., 2009), our study is to the best of our knowledge the first 
to consider the transferability and endowment effects of founders’ political connections. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 presents key studies on 
political connections. We develop our main research hypotheses in Section 5.3. Section 
5.4 describes the database assembly and sample selection criteria. The empirical 
analysis is in Section 5.5. We test the robustness of our findings in Section 5.6. Finally, 
Section 5.7 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Related literature 
 
The symbiotic relationship between business and politics features extensively in 
the corporate finance literature. To shed light on their between interdependencies, 
Faccio (2006) conducts a twofold exercise: the author records the stock price reaction to 
the announcement of: (1) a firm’s offering a directorship to a politician and (2) a 
corporate insider commencing a political career. The result marks an average increase in 
market value of 2%. Chen et al. (2010) and Cooper et al. (2010) tracing lobbying and 
PAC contributions, respectively, document a strong association with the variation in 
both abnormal market returns and accounting measures of performance. Controlling for 
a likely differential outcome across partisan sidelines, Shon (2010) frames the 37-day 
Florida recount term of the 2004 election as a natural experiment. Indeed, throughout 
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this period the researcher reveals an economically significant positive (negative) effect 
on the share price of firms which had supported the Bush (Gore) presidential race.  
The correlation between business activity and politics has also given impetus to 
interdisciplinary research on firms’ economic rationale for diverting capital from 
productive uses to candidates’ coffers. The seminal study of Masters and Keim (1985) 
is the first to show firms spending for quid pro quos. In line with the intuitive notion 
that organizations frequently interacting with the federal government, either as a 
consequence of their business model (i.e. the state is the buyer) or the institutional 
framework (i.e. the state is the regulator), possess a greater incentive to cajole 
politicians, the authors document a positive association with campaign contributions. 
Firm-specific characteristics are similarly related: size, cash-generating ability, R&D 
investment, and diversification in product as well as geographic base all claim some 
explanatory power. Grier and Munger (1993) employing a similar set of covariates, also 
correcting for selectivity, update the work of Masters and Keim. In doing so, the 
researchers observe that collective action obstacles can nullify in practice the benefits 
bestowed on corporate donors. Zardkoohi (1985) and Hart (2001) add to the side-effects 
the rise of free-riders which, while remaining absent in the effort to increase federal 
budget appropriations, they inevitably profit from the enlargement of the pie for the 
industry as a whole. 
Notably, politics is a force potent enough to claim an effect even upon those 
organizations that opt to abstain from active involvement. Roberts (1990) and Faccio 
and Parsley (2009) illustrate the notion of how firms can be inertly affected by political 
change and converge on the futility of the quest for a perfect hedge against institutional 
risk. Accordingly, the share price reaction in the aftermath of an exogenous shock, i.e. a 
local politician’s death, is marked by a sharp decline leading to an instant impairment of 
shareholders’ wealth. A (limited) number of studies refuting altogether the covariance 
between corporate interference in state affairs and firm value (e.g. Ansolabehere et al., 
2002; Goldman et al., 2009) are barely popular as the majority of researchers recognize 
at least some causal relationship between the two dimensions. 
That is even more apparent in an IPO, whereby proximity to politics serves an 
important certification function, especially for international investors. In this respect, 
the evidence from the bourgeoning market for Chinese equities is compelling (also refer 
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to Fan et al., 2007 and Francis et al., 2009). From a different angle, international 
privatization studies (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988; Perroti and Guney, 1993; and 
Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997) debate as to whether ex ante uncertainty is lower for 
previously state-owned enterprises. Notably, while disagreeing on the direction, this 
research unanimously supports the strong association. A further common theme in the 
extant works (inclusive of the Southeastern studies) emerges in that they revolve around 
the valuation experience of issuers, thereby conforming in essence to the broader 
literature of IPO underpricing. Justifiably, the question of the extent of funds that is left 
on the table during the day of listing is core to both the company’s sellers and buyers. 
Though, it is unlikely to warrant an important determinant of the company’s foundation 
decision. 
The reason lies in the intuition that an IPO appears as a remote event for an 
entrepreneur that is just embarking on a new venture. Other matters such as sourcing 
capital and sustaining a growth course claim a higher priority. When the venture 
matures to the point that an IPO appears as a possibility, time to listing becomes critical 
both for the entrepreneur’s personal objective function and the firm’s ability to connect 
with a superior source of capital compared to what is available in the pre-IPO regime, 
i.e. angel and venture capital financing. Finally, with the median U.S. issuer to possess 
no more than 7 years of operational experience (as Jay Ritter estimates on his website), 
viability is an ongoing concern in the post-IPO regime. Conclusively, while the present 
study does not relegate the pricing dimension of an IPO, it emphasizes the role of 
political connections on the road towards an IPO and beyond. This framework is in line 
with Liu and Ritter (2010) showing issuers to strategically undertake the cost of a 
discounted offer price when the non-pricing dimensions of an IPO deal appear 
attractive. 
5.3 Hypotheses development 
 
 While literature is characterized by an abundance of corporate aspects co-
varying with actions alluding to politics (the evidence in the previous section is by no 
means exhaustive), the challenge resides in attaching causality to the observed 
phenomenon. Cooper et al. (2010) recommend vigilance for confounding factors that 
may ultimately account for the effect. Even though the problems of self-selection and 
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omitted variables are pervasive, we believe that our methodological choice to trace 
observations over the full time period for which they remain in the sample alleviates 
related concerns. In this respect, we describe three distinct organizational outcomes 
upon which a political record can exert influence. 
 Angel or 1st round of venture capital (VC) financing can frequently be vital to a 
new venture’s transition from the seed to an expansionary stage. Beyond the obvious 
capital providing function, a VC firm may add value in non-financial ways (Hsu, 2004). 
In particular, the business acumen acquired through industry expertise, and evidenced 
by a prior record of successful IPOs, can assist an entrepreneur to evolve into an 
efficient manager. Alternatively, reinforcing structure and competitive strategy is 
possible through the appointment of VC-affiliated directors in the management team. 
This addition also disseminates a signal of managerial sophistication and organizational 
competence to IPO investors (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). After all, a reputable VC 
firm or one that is in the process of establishing a reputation would abstain from 
aligning forces with an issuer of low potential, also as per the grandstanding theory of 
VCs (Gompers, 1996). 
 However, do these benefits pose equally appealing to entrepreneurs who are in 
position to exert political influence? Prior research associates politically connected 
firms with greater ease to attracting external funds (e.g Faccio, 2006; Boubakri et al., 
2008). The main reason is that expectations of political favoritism or protection from 
tail risk are factored into a lower discount rate. Houston et al. (2014) narrowing this 
privilege down to the level of bank loans offer compelling empirical support: S&P 500 
firms with politically related boards, over the 2003-2008 period, not only do they incur 
lower rates on their debt but also considerably flexible covenants. The banks, in this 
case, appear to attach increased creditworthiness to their connected customers compared 
to otherwise similar firms. Because debt capital, as in the form of bank loans, is a less 
complicated and more expedient means of financing, entrepreneurs have a plausible 
incentive to substitute venture capital. Non-financial objectives such as the certification 
function can likewise subside. Arguably, proximity to political elites is a notion that 
appeals to both informed and uninformed investors underscoring a capability to extract 
economic rents.  
149 
 
 
H.1. A firm’s likelihood to resort to angel or VC financing is inversely related to 
founders’ political contributions 
The time to IPO also conforms to this line of argument. In less need of the IPO 
proceeds, the connected firm can withhold listing until the economic and business 
conditions appear most opportune. This extends to the interactions with the involved 
agents (for example, auditors, legal intermediaries and underwriters’ syndicate). 
Averting a premature IPO is likely to confer a multitude of advantages.  First, it is 
conducive to maximizing the proceeds raised for the equity foregone. Lending support 
to this view, the evidence from China attests to the limited underpricing of politically 
connected firms (Fan et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2009). Second, it results in less 
litigation risk (Lowry and Shu, 2002). Third, it implies that the firm does not assume the 
burden of a public company’s statutory and reporting obligations until it has at least 
developed the internal processes to carry out the transition with less friction. Taken 
together, a politically connected firm encounters no apparent economic reason to fast-
forward to an IPO. 
H.2. A firm’s time to IPO increases with the intensity of political contributions 
Profitability for the majority of start-ups appears to be more of a long-term objective. 
Because fueling growth frequently marks the only path to survival, the mounting capital 
expenditure combined with the burden of the market newness liability rarely allow for a 
positive accounting bottom line. Political connections have been shown to draw 
increased turnover and reinforce a firm’s competitive position (Faccio, 2006). Yet, they 
have also been associated with the connected entity’s failure to reap the benefits by 
successfully converting a hefty market share to a commensurately large profit (Boubakri 
et al. 2008). Apparently, the steady stream of revenues invites a certain degree of 
managerial entrenchment. This agency conflict induces self-serving behaviors which 
reflect on profit margins and systematically erodes shareholders’ wealth. On balance, as 
the capitalization of the significant upward potential of politically connected firms 
depends on internal governance mechanisms and incentives’ alignment, we leave the 
direction of the relationship up to empirical investigation. 
H.3. A firm’s likelihood to report positive earnings per share relates to political 
contributions 
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IPO survival requires that a firm exhausts all conceivable means in order to preserve the 
resources that it has been both endowed and subsequently developed or acquired (Shane 
and Stuart, 2002). Under circumstances of distress (or near distress) the flexibility to 
maneuver on the verge of the legal and institutional framework may largely determine 
the sustainability of future operations. In this respect, powerful acquaintances in politics 
have been shown to insulate firms from the associated compliance burden. For example, 
Chaney et al. (2011) document no negative implications for the fact that connected 
firms ignore or partially satisfy numerous requirements of statutory reporting. Notably, 
these firms remain relatively intact even in incidents of material omissions or fraudulent 
behavior as in Correia (2014) and Yu and Yu (2011), respectively. Though these 
ethically questionable practices can have a profound effect on the likelihood of survival, 
they come second to the possibility that an organization extracts economic rents simply 
by staying in the good graces of politicians. In turn, institutional and market 
imperfections underscore our last testable hypothesis.  
H.4. A firm’s survival likelihood is an increasing function of its political contributions 
5.4 Data and sample 
 
The time horizon of this study is conditional on the data availability of our 
proxies for political connections; i.e. lobbying, PAC and individual contributions. While 
the archive of the Federal Election Committee allows the tracing of campaign financing 
over several decades, a reliable database for lobbying contributions emerged in 1998 as 
a belated response to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. Accordingly, we use the 
website of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) as a portal to corporate lobbying 
activity and set the time period of the study from 1998 to 201429. Because our interest 
spans numerous corporate events, we scrutinize both founders and organizations in the 
above sources for evidence of political donations. Adhering to an arbitrarily imposed 
cut-off, founders’ and TMT contributions dating older than 5 years from the company 
                                                          
29 Chapter 3 draws evidence from firms going public during the period 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2013. 
Chapter 4 and 5 use a slightly broader period (i.e. 1 January, 1998 to 31 December 2014). The starting 
point, common for all studies, is the date when lobbying data become available in databases subsequent to 
the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. The end point is 6 months later in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 for not any other reason apart from the fact that the chapter order reflects the actual order they 
were written. As a result, Chapter 3 engages a total of 1,578 IPOs while extending to the end of 2014 
results in 1,769 IPOs. In both cases, the sample size is sufficiently large for satisfying the central limit 
theorem assumptions and thereby making valid statistical inferences.   
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inception and corporate contributions older than 5 years from post-IPO failure are 
discarded. 
We rely on the SDC database, accessed via Thompsonone, for our IPO 
companies. Initially, we retrieve the population of U.S. IPOs for the period whereby 
coverage by the political contributions’ databases is possible. Subsequently, we 
introduce the conventional sample restrictions prevailing in the IPO literature (Welch, 
1989; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Chemmanur, 1993; Hsu, 2004; Loughran and Ritter, 
2002, 2004; Derrien, 2005). To this end, we exclude penny stocks (i.e. IPOs with an 
offer price less than $5), foreign issuers, corporate spin-offs and reverse leveraged 
buyouts (LBO). Our filter also prohibits American depositary receipts (ADR), real 
estate investment trusts (REIT), special purpose investment vehicles, unit offerings, 
royalty trusts, limited partnerships, and financial firms within the SIC codes of 6723 to 
6999 which all barely resemble a typical corporate issuer. Some closed-end funds 
bypass the Thomson Reuters’ flag. In such cases, we resort directly to the IPO 
prospectus (S-1 form) for calling a decision on the actual corporate character. Other 
databases used include U.S. COMPUSTAT for accounting elements and the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for all aftermarket prices.  
After merging the contributions and IPO databases, our special sample of 
interest comes down to 1,769 unique IPO deals.  
5.5 Empirical analysis 
 
5.5.1 Variables identification 
 
A number of well-established covariates in the IPO literature are employed into 
the baseline specifications. IPO proceeds are a common proxy for size (Beatty, 1989; 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). A firm’s 
resource availability can claim significant explanatory power over the various 
organizational outcomes. For example, larger establishments may be slower in 
transitioning from a private to public domain, realizing a positive accounting bottom 
line and experiencing failure (as in non-survivor IPOs). An investigation of the 
liabilities’ side of the balance sheet is also in order. Overly aggressive leverage may 
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trigger a sequence of value eroding events: a premature equity sell-off to a venture 
capitalist of dubious quality or an excessively underpriced IPO while undermining 
viability over the long-run. To control for this dimension, we broadly use the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets in the last reporting period prior to going public. Earnings 
per share often is not as much of a priority to a growth firm as, for instance, is market 
share expansion and competitive positioning (Trueman et al., 2000). However, we 
include this covariate (in the form of an indicator variable) as we expect positive 
profitability in the pre-IPO period to give an impetus for superior performance and 
financial standing in the post-IPO period. Firm age evidences cumulative organizational 
and industry experience (Ritter, 1991; Schultz, 1993; and Carter et al., 1998). Plausibly, 
a firm that has survived for a longer time in the pre-IPO period can similarly claim 
increased chances of survival after the IPO event, unless the opacity of the private 
regime has been among the very causes of the longevity. Venture capital (VC) is often 
reported as a make-or-break factor in the course of a new venture with the outcome 
being conditional on the investment objectives of the VC firm. If, as per the 
grandstanding theory, VCs center on a mass IPO production in order to build a 
reputation, the portfolio firms should struggle with a multitude of shortcomings 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2004). On the other hand, a VC which joins as a long-term 
business partner, and does not fixate on IPO as an exit strategy, has to offer a lot in 
terms of financial and non- financial functionally equivalent support (Hsu, 2004). In our 
setting, we may not rule out the possibility that this non-financial value can also be 
derived by the firm’s political network, therefore mitigating the need to invite a VC in 
the capital structure. The top management team (TMT) can have a profound effect on 
the decision to go public and, similar to VCs, may pressure for an early IPO in order to 
promote self-serving objectives (Lowry and Murphy, 2007). We account for this factor, 
expecting this concern to subside with a greater number of executives, whereby at least 
some of them are likely to remain committed to their principals and resist to 
compromise firm value. Finally, a technology firm indicator variable enters all of the 
models in order to capture the incremental risk of the pertinent industries (Aggarwal, 
2002). 
Table 5.1 reports key descriptive statistics on the above covariates. As 
evidenced, the average issuer: (i) raises $ 123.1 million in IPO proceeds; (ii) possesses 
about 16 years of operating experience; (iii) reports a negative accounting bottom line; 
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(iv) exhibits a leverage ratio in excess of 1; (v) is more likely than not to advance to an 
IPO without making use of venture capital; (vi) comprises a top management team of 
about 10 members; and (vii) accounts for a 34% likelihood of belonging to the broader 
technology sector. Columns 1-6 report the pairwise correlations of variables which 
barely warrant any multicollinearity concerns. Furthermore, cases of an observed high 
magnitude are in line with economic intuition. For example, venture capital is positively 
associated with technology firms but negatively related to firm age and EPS which 
attests to the short-term investment horizon of this type of financiers. In passing, larger 
and longer-lived firms as proxied by proceeds and age, respectively, engage a more 
populous top management team. 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics on three distinct types of corporate 
political contributions (founders, top management team and corporate) at three 
benchmark years in corporate life cycle (inception, IPO and 5th quoted year). The upper 
part of the table analyzes founders’ contributions, exclusively, for being the only 
feasible political footprint at this embryonic stage. The break-down reveals that the 
majority of firms derive direct political connectedness through the network of top 
management team. This is largely intuitive in the sense that this group of insiders 
outnumbers founders. However, it is also interesting that these politically involved 
individuals fail to stimulate commensurately large corporate political activity as in the 
form of lobbying and PAC campaigns. The fact that the median amounts of the latter 
contributions are multiples of individual contributions may partially explain the 
observed discrepancy. Lastly, all of the expenditure types increase in dollar intensity 
across the three benchmarks but this is barely surprising as the cash levels also ascend 
in the same direction. 
 
5.5.2 The road towards an IPO: Venture capital and time 
 
To assess the interplay of founders’ political connections with the presence of 
VC financing in a firm’s capital structure, we employ a Cox proportional hazard 
regression analysis whereby the time to angel or first-round of VC financing is the 
dependent variable. We obtain these dates from the SDC database and manually 
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estimate the distance from the firm’s foundation as given on the Jay Ritter’s website. 
Then, a set of covariates determines the hazard rates as follows: 
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝜆𝜊(𝑡). 𝑒
(𝛽𝑜+𝛽1 𝑋1+𝛽2 𝑋2+𝛽3 𝑋3+⋯+𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑘) 
We apply the Cox proportional hazard (CPH) model to estimate the effect of 
plausible determinants on a firm’s i) time to external financing (i.e. venture capital or 
angel financing) and ii) time to profitability. Because both variables measure time to an 
event (duration), they may not satisfy the normal distribution assumption which is a 
requirement for an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Instead, CPH can provide 
statistical inferences without making any particular distribution assumptions (Cox, 
1972). Once we have abandoned the OLS framework, the second important decision 
pertains to the selection between a CPH and an accelerated failure time (AFT) setting. 
The CPH model considers the effect of covariates constant whereas under the AFT that 
may either accelerate or decelerate the event. Although we cannot rule out the 
possibility that some regressors may indeed have a disproportional effect to time-to-
failure, we prefer CPH as it does not make the assumption of a parametric distribution 
for the time-to-event. In this case, our methodological choice is also in line with prior 
literature; Jain et al. (2008) employ a CPH model to assess post-listing profitability and 
so do Hellman and Puri (2002) for investigating the likelihood of share option 
compensation in the presence of venture capital.   
A common limitation that studies on firms’ inception encounter is the dearth of 
firm-specific data (Shane and Stuart, 2002). In turn, they use information on founders’ 
characteristics which, at this early stage, appear to exert a compelling influence on the 
evolving organization. Accordingly, we complement our study variable, founders’ 
contributions, with the following covariates: i) number of founders and ii) a technology 
dummy which is used to account for the special relationship of VCs with companies in 
this sector (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). Because of our argument in favor of recent 
contributions (and data availability constraints), we trace founders’ activity since the 
year of 1988. This modification reduces the sample size by approximately 9% for a total 
of 1,615 IPOs. 
The resulting coefficients vis-à-vis the corresponding hazard ratios are reported 
in Table 5.3. The variable in interest, founders’ contributions, confirms Hypothesis 1 by 
means of a negative coefficient (and a hazard ratio less than unit). Therefore, the 
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existing resources are shown to suffice for politically connected founders who appear 
unwilling to relinquish any ownership until a considerably later time. A similar effect is 
documented for the number of founders. Plausibly, with more entrepreneurs on board, 
resource and expertise pooling results in greater self-sufficiency. Finally, the positive 
and sizable coefficient on the technology dummy highlights the fact that venture capital 
commonly comprises the lifeblood of companies standing at the high-end of 
technological innovation. Invariably, all coefficients are statistically significant, at the 
1% level, and so is the likelihood ratio. 
 Table 5.4 traces the time to IPO for politically connected firms. However, as 
every firm in our sample experiences the event, no failures or censored observations are 
identified. Therefore, we apply a 4-step multiple hierarchical regression framework. The 
first step (Model 1) regresses the time to IPO solely upon the control variables. 
Subsequently, we add to this block the three variables in interest (one at a time) so that 
Models 2, 3 and 4 account for the effect of founders’, TMT, and corporate political 
contributions, respectively.  
 The findings from Model 1 are largely intuitive. Firms exhibiting a higher 
capital adequacy or organic profitability attach less urgency to the IPO funds, thereby 
withholding listing until an advanced stage in corporate life cycle. This conclusion may 
be drawn from the positive and highly significant association with IPO proceeds and 
earnings per share. The presence of a venture capital in ownership structure also yields 
an unambiguously negative correlation at all levels of significance. This lends support 
to the grandstanding theory of VCs, as previously discussed, and is indicative of short-
termism; the VC is looking forward to taking the firm public as an exit strategy and it 
requires that the IPO takes place at a sooner than later time. In contrast, TMT size is 
shown to significantly delay the event; possibly, because of a divergence of opinions as 
to the appropriate timing. Technology firms are known for shifting into the public 
domain soon after foundation as a consequence of their rapid growth, R&D 
requirements and VC-backing. This finding features in our analysis by means of a 
strong negative sign. In passing, the coefficient on leverage comes up negative and 
statistically insignificant. 
 Models 2-4 convey the gist of our analysis without altering the effects of 
covariates. Specifically, Model 2 attests to the incremental explanatory power of 
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founders’ contributions accompanied with a steep increase in adjusted R2 by about 35%. 
In particular, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
contrast, the inclusion of TMT and corporate contributions in Models 3 and 4, 
respectively, produces insignificant results. Furthermore, the overall model 
improvement is only marginal. Overall, the sharp distinction among the three 
contribution venues with reference to the effect on the time elapsing to IPO shows that 
founders’ endowments determine organizational outcomes for at least as long as the 
firm remains in the private domain. In this respect, founders’ endowments may not be 
easily replicated or externally acquired. Thus, the present study is in line with the 
evidence from Shane and Stuart (2002) attesting to the pervasive nature of founders’ 
endowment effects. 
 
5.5.3 Post-IPO operating performance 
 
 Because operating performance in the pre-IPO period frequently comes second 
to fuelling growth and market share increase (Trueman et al., 2000), we investigate its 
cross-sectional variation with political contributions subsequent to listing. To this end, 
we employ two sets of tests.  
 The first test uses data from the end financial statements of the IPO year. In this 
brief time window, we seek for any immediate effects on firm’s ability to increase 
revenues, realize profits and generate cash. Table 5.5 reports the results of the 
multivariate regression analysis. Model 1 and 2 regress the natural logarithm of a firm’s 
revenues and cash flow from operations, respectively, upon the contributions and the set 
of control variables. The main difference with the pre-IPO regime is discernible in the 
fact that founders’ contributions cease to be an important determinant, failing all 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Instead, in Model 1 both TMT and 
corporate contributions, in the form of lobbying and PAC, appear important 
determinants in reinforcing turnover. Replacing revenues with the cash flow from 
operations as the dependent variable, in Model 2, results in the loss of significance for 
TMT contributions while leaving the influence of corporate contributions unaffected 
(the coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level). Taken together, the evidence 
shows that founders’ endowments and individual features such as proprietary political 
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networks evaporate in the public domain or fully assimilate into the broader corporate 
identity. Finally, we extend the analysis to net income which comprises the common 
numerator in the return on sales (Model 3) and return on assets (Model 4) ratios. 
Invariably, the variables in interest obtain statistically insignificant coefficients. 
Therefore, the positive association with turnover and the cash-generating ability fails to 
support accounting profits. Thus, we have drawn evidence from the IPO setting that is 
in congruence with Boubakri et al. (2008) attesting to the inability of politically 
connected firms to convert their increased market shares to abnormally positive 
profitability. 
 The second test traces each observation in the sample until profitability is 
attained. We resort for this purpose to time to event analysis. We specify a Cox 
proportional hazard regression model similar to time to VC but different in that the full 
set of control variables is employed. The dependent variable relates to the duration of 
losses or a net income of zero. In turn, this duration is regarded as completed upon the 
realization of positive profitability or the end of this study’s time period for permanently 
loss-incurring firms. 
 Table 5.6 reports findings that tie in with the evidence from the time window of 
the IPO year. Specifically, founders’ contributions once more fail to produce a 
statistically significant effect. In addition, the negative sign on the TMT contributions 
and, especially, corporate contributions variables at the 10% and 1% levels, 
respectively, show both behaviors to act in a manner which defers profitability for a 
later time. Evidently, absent other considerations such as market penetration and 
strategic positioning, managers predominantly relying on profitability-related measures 
to assess performance are incentivized to suppress a firm’s political footprint at both the 
corporate and executive levels. In passing, the control variables confirm that larger 
firms, as evidenced by IPO proceeds, attain profitability within a shorter time. The 
earnings per share also obtain a strong (at the 1% level) positive coefficient, therefore 
decreasing the time to event in the post-IPO period. The opposite association holds for 
leverage as interest payments erode profit margins and restrictive debt covenants may 
prohibit firm from assuming risky projects (Houston et al., 2014). Venture capital 
similarly increases time to profitability. This marks a further testament to the fact that 
VCs lead firms to premature IPOs (as in Loughran and Ritter, 2004); the firm is likely 
to suffer multiple periods of losses before it develops the capability to sustain operations 
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organically. Finally, profitability tends to be a long-run objective for technology firms. 
Understandably, the product complexity requires a substantial time as well as monetary 
investment in R&D. If successful, this endeavor will confer a competitive advantage so 
that the firm claims market share and profitability within a more medium to long-term 
horizon. In this respect, our evidence complements that of Trueman et al. (2000) for 
Internet stocks. 
 
5.5.4 IPO firm survival 
 
 The final organizational aspect examined in this study relates to a firm’s ability 
to absorb the shock of a domain shift and defend its longevity in spite of the public 
entity’s rigors (legal compliance, statutory reporting complexity, increased scrutiny 
etc.). With the mean (standard deviation) survival rate of the companies in our sample at 
0.63 (0.49), it is clear that an important portion of IPOs are ultimately proven 
detrimental to the issuing firms. Our inquiry into the causes involves both univariate 
and multivariate regression analysis. 
 The distinction on a ‘survivor versus non survivor’ basis in Table 5.7 provides 
an initial overview. In particular, survivors are associated with almost double the size of 
non-survivors (i.e. $ 202.6 and 120.1 million, respectively). They also appear 5 years 
older in age with a mean of about 20 years. Unsurprisingly, firms advancing to an IPO 
with positive profitability have an approximately 36% greater representation within the 
survivors. The leverage ratio, while remaining above unit for both groups, is 45% 
bigger in magnitude for non-survivors. As previously discussed, venture capital 
financing is considerably less common among long-lived IPOs. Evidently, the short-
termism of these investors exerts an adverse influence on numerous aspects in a new 
venture’s life, triggering a chain of negative outcomes: a premature IPO, persistence of 
losses and, eventually, failure. In contrast, TMT size with a mean of 7.18 (7.56) 
members in successful (failed) IPOs barely warrants a disparity between the two 
samples, as also evidenced by an insignificant p value (p > 0.1). Lastly, a striking 
difference pertains to technology stocks which pose about 4 times more likely to 
experience failure underscoring the excessive riskiness prevailing in the sector.  
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 The statistics on the 3 variables under study jointly give rise to a discernible 
pattern. That is, survivor IPOs surpass non-survivor ones across all contributions’ 
avenues. At the individual level, founders’ contributions from survivors exceed those 
made by non-survivors in terms of average values (i.e. $ 549.85 and 441.27, 
respectively). With respect to TMT contributions, the survivors’ dominance accounts 
for more than a 2:1 relationship. This phenomenon reaches a peak at the corporate 
contributions level (i.e. lobbying and PAC), whereby the mean amounts for survivors 
and non-survivors are $ 100,688.6 and 37,958.1, respectively. Therefore, politically 
connected individuals appear to induce their corporations as a whole to centrally-
planned political campaigns and this claims a direct effect on their likelihood of 
survival. 
 Given the above findings, a multivariate analysis is in order to capture the effect 
of contributions net of the confounding factors. In a methodological divergence from 
the previous analysis, IPO firm survival is explored via a logistic regression. This 
framework is preferable to the time to event analysis previously employed as the 
research interest now resides within the occurrence per se rather than the time to failure. 
Consistent with Fischer and Pollock (2004), we define as survivors those companies 
that remain listed 5 years after their IPO. However, unlike the aforementioned study, we 
assign M&As to the non-survivors’ group. The reason lies in the poor corporate and 
market performance typically preceding an M&A which we regard as an alternative 
form of weakness.  
 Table 5.8 reports the results on a firm’s survival likelihood for a sample of 1,184 
IPOs. Focusing on the study variables, a differential effect on the odds for survival 
based on contributions’ type becomes apparent. In particular, founders’ and TMT 
contributions claim negligible explanatory power over the dependent variable. In 
contrast, corporate contributions obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
at the 5% level. Therefore, the implications are clear in that contributions can be 
conducive to survival only if pooled and channeled towards the collective corporate 
means (i.e. lobbying and PAC). Fragmented action through individual contributions 
creates no positive externalities at this stage in corporate life cycle. Similarly, founders’ 
interpersonal networks appear devoid of value-relevance.  
160 
 
 
As for the control variables, findings are largely in accord with those from the 
univariate analysis. Specifically, the survival likelihood is an increasing function of IPO 
proceeds, age and prior profitability as they all yield strong (at the 5% or better) 
associations. Inversely, technology firms and the presence of venture capital pose as 
threats to long-term viability; a finding that fulfils all conventional levels of 
significance. An interesting exception appears in leverage which produces a statistically 
insignificant effect. This can plausibly manifest some degree of resilience in firms’ 
debt-bearing capacity. Finally, as it was evidenced in the univariate analysis, TMT size 
fails to warrant an important survival determinant. The overall specification results in a 
pseudo-R2 of 12.56%. 
5.6 Robustness  
 
After excluding outlier observations, our baseline models in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 
5.8 produce qualitatively similar results. In addition, we create new specifications that 
engage only the explanatory variables that have attained some of the conventional levels 
of statistical significance (i.e. 10% or higher). Again, the effect of the remaining 
covariates remains unaffected. 
 The Cox regression models of Tables 5.3 and 5.6 require special methodological 
treatment. This is because a proportional hazard framework renders the common 
residuals-based diagnostic tests inappropriate. To this end, we follow an alternative 
course in order to identify observations excessively biasing the estimated parameters. 
Investigating the full sample estimate, β̂, comparatively with the new parameter 
estimate, β̂(i), which results from the deletion of observation (i), we can assess the 
overall influence of (i). Specifically, the deviation  β̂ −  β̂(i) is referred to as the ‘dfbeta’ 
and comprises a vector with a dimension that is equal to the number of independent 
variables in the regression equation. In this regard, we standardize and summarize the 
absolute values of ‘dfbetas’ to construct an influence index with one-dimension. Based 
on their score value on this particular index, influential observations are singled out and 
excluded from the models. Accordingly, the proportional hazard model in Tables 5.3 
and 5.6 are now run with sample sizes of 1,602 and 1,009 respectively. For the venture 
capital equation, the four explanatory variables remain significant at the highest level. In 
contrast, for the profitability equation, the age variable attains significance at the 1% 
161 
 
 
level, therefore slightly improving the model’s overall explanatory power. Furthermore, 
the robustly positive coefficient is in accord with our initial conjecture that firms of 
greater operational experience can expect to transition to positive earnings per share 
faster. 
 Finally, we augment baseline specifications with a series of additional 
covariates. Namely, we use underwriter’s reputation, ownership retention upon IPO 
completion, and listing exchange. Although, these factors are well-established 
covariates in the IPO-return equation, in our context, they invariably lead to 
insignificant results. Further, they impair the significance levels of some of the principal 
explanatory variables.  
 Omitted variables constitute a pervasive problem and our model cannot claim 
immunity to this bias. However, we exercise caution to approximate the underlying 
reality to a statistically and economically satisfactory degree. In this respect, we pay 
attention to the model’s R-squared, the t-statistics and the Durbin-Watson value. In 
addition, we check that the coefficient signs are theoretically justified and in line with 
prior literature. The regressors in determining time to IPO (Table 5.4) feature in the 
study of Yang et al. (2011). Likewise, the regressors in the post-IPO profitability 
equation (Table 5.5) are commonly employed (e.g. Jain and Kini 2008, Chahine and 
Goergen 2013). Auxiliary to these variables, we can hypothesize about the effect of 
numerous confounding factors, though we choose to discard and apply the Occam's 
razor. 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we investigate for a likely nurturing effect of political 
connections upon new ventures. Rather than setting up a typical event study, we 
sequentially visit key milestones and study the dynamics of the hypothesized 
associations across the corporate life cycle. Although not a one size-fits all solution, 
political connections of young firms claim significant explanatory power over a series 
of desirable organizational attributes such as financial independence, market share 
expansion and longevity. Taking monetary contributions as a proxy for political 
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connectedness, however, the effect varies considerably with contributors’ identity and 
firm’s ownership structure. 
At inception, founders pass on to start-ups, among other resources, their 
proprietary political networks. This endowment leads to an increased time to VC and 
IPO financing. A finding which we interpret in positive terms as a firm’s powerful 
alliances can underscore its operational and financial autonomy. Notably, founders’ 
political contributions overshadow those made by top management team or at a 
centrally-planned level such as lobbying and PAC. This is observable until the IPO 
event which, along with the ownership change, brings about a peripheral role to 
founders’ characteristics. Evidently, political involvement in order to influence the 
organizational outcomes of a public firm requires corporate-wide strategies and mass 
participation. 
 Consequently, corporate campaigns, much more than individual contributions, 
can pave the way for market penetration as evidenced by a positive relationship with 
turnover. Nevertheless, it is still upon the firm to convert the revenues to profitability. In 
this regard, the study provides mixed evidenced. Finally, it is corporate campaigns, 
exclusively, which can enhance a connected firm’s survival likelihood by deterring 
M&As and any other form of failure. 
Given the evidence on the multifaceted benefits stemming from proximity to 
politics, follow-up research could shed light on likely abuses. For example, it is possible 
that political connections invite management entrenchment. In this case, political 
contributions, rather than adding to the firm’s relationship capital, comprise perquisite 
consumption and erode shareholders’ wealth. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,769 U.S. IPOs announced from 1 January, 1998 
to 31 June, 2014. All IPOs come from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database, while the 
accounting data is from Compustat. The statistics provided include the mean, standard deviation and the 
pairwise correlations for the independent variables used in the subsequent regressions. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A 
 
 Mean Std Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
1.Proceeds 123.1 223.8       
2.Age 16.3 22.9 0.17      
3.EPS 0.43 0.47 0.05 0.22     
4.Leverage 1.40 1.90 -0.09 -0.09 -0.19    
5.Venture 0.42 0.45 -0.11 -0.27 -0.30 0.09   
6.TMT  Size 9.82 3.29 0.21 0.28 0.13 -0.08 -0.02  
7.Tech firm 0.34 0.43 -0.06 -0.21 -0.24 -0.01 0.34 -0.16 
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Table 5.2: Contributions breakdown across firms’ life cycle 
This table reports statistics of the political money contributions made by a sample of 1,769 U.S. IPOs 
announced from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2014. The data for corporate contributions is from the 
OpenSecrets website; the data for founders’ and TMT contributions is from the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) archive. The statistics provided include the mean, standard deviation, median, 
minimum and maximum. These statistics are reported for the three benchmark years investigated in this 
study: i) Inception (founders-only) ii) IPO year and iii) 5th quoted year. N represents the number of firms 
identified with each type of activity at any given year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Inception 
 N Mean Std Dev. Median Min Max 
Contributions 
($ 000s) 
      
   Founders 157 5.7 16.6 2.0 0.2 170.4 
       
 IPO year 
 N Mean Std Dev. Median Min Max 
Contributions 
($ 000s) 
      
   Founders 181 6.4 17.5 2.3 0.7 182.4 
   TMT 718 8.8 2.6 2.5 0.2 339.1 
   Corporate 397 297.9 864.5 72.7 2.5 8,854.2 
 5th quoted year 
 N Mean Std Dev. Median Min Max 
Contributions 
($ 000s) 
      
   Founders 134 7.6 12.3 3.0 0.25 70.9 
   TMT 942 12.6 3.8 4.7 1.1 400.1 
   Corporate 412 305.6 874.6 80.0 6.1 9,985.5 
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Table 5.3: VC capital funding for start-up firms 
This table reports the Cox proportional hazard model estimates for a sample of 1,615 U.S. IPOs over the 
period 1 January 1998- 30 June 2014. The dependent variable is the time to angel or first-round of venture 
capital financing. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry and year fixed effects are included. 
The first column reports the resulting coefficient, the second the T-statistic and the third the 
corresponding hazard ratio. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient T-statistic Hazard ratio 
    
Number of founders -0.096*** -3.44 0.909 
    
Founders’ contributions -0.030*** -2.64  0.970 
    
Tech firm 0.236*** 4.44 1.267 
    
    
Likelihood ratio   77.78*** 
N   1,769 
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Table 5.4: Time to IPO 
This table reports the results of hierarchical multiple regressions for a sample of 1,769 U.S. IPOs over the 
period 1 January 1998- 30 June 2014. The dependent variable is the time to IPO measured since 
company’s foundation. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry and year fixed effects are 
included. The lower part of the table reports model improvement as a result of adding the new 
explanatory variables. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 Model  4 
     
Proceeds 4.4445*** 4.3476*** 4.3964*** 4.3927*** 
 (8.19) (8.00) (8.03) (8.00) 
Earnings per share 5.0524 *** 4.8856*** 4.8927*** 4.9025*** 
 (4.35) (4.20) (4.21) (4.21) 
Leverage -0.1318 -0.1356 -0.1374 -0.1344 
 (-0.77) (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.79) 
VC -7.0584*** -7.0854*** -7.081*** -7.0574*** 
 (-5.93) (-5.96) (-5.95) (-5.93) 
TMT  Size 4.4946*** 4.3442*** 4.3461*** 4.2484*** 
 (7.75) (7.45) (7.45) (7.22) 
Tech firm -4.1159*** -4.0463*** -4.1122*** -4.0544*** 
 (-3.58) (-3.52) (-3.57) (-3.52) 
Founders’ contributions  0.7851** 0.8845** 0.8442** 
  (2.22) (2.35) (2.23) 
TMT contributions   -0.1299 -0.1474 
   (-0.76) (-0.86) 
Corporate contributions    0.1683 
    (1.28) 
     
N 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 
Adjusted  R2 0.151 0.201 0.201 0.200 
Δ  Adjusted  R2  0.050 0.000 0.001 
F 66.03*** 57.44*** 50.32*** 44.93*** 
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Table 5.5: The effect of contributions on post-IPO performance  
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for a sample of 1,769 U.S. IPOs over the period 1 
January 1998- 30 June 2014. The dependent variables in Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 are revenues, cash flow, 
return on sales (ROS) and return on assets (ROA), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Industry and year fixed effects are included. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Revenues 
(1) 
Cash flow 
(2) 
ROS 
(3) 
ROA 
(4) 
     
Proceeds 0.8352*** 0.4743*** 0.2439*** 0.0612*** 
 (14.95) (12.42) (3.61) (5.60) 
Age 0.0169*** 0.0057*** 0.0029 0.0006 
 (7.9) (3.61) (0.98) (1.22) 
Earnings per share 1.4685*** 1.7857*** 1.4859*** 0.5218*** 
 (16.16) (28.17) (10.91) (23.69) 
Leverage -0.0809*** 0.0094*** -0.1139*** -0.0480*** 
 (-2.77) (2.88) (-5.72) (-14.9) 
VC -0.5178*** 0.0108 -0.4291*** -0.0774*** 
 (-5.49) (0.19) (-3.06) (-3.42) 
TMT  Size 0.2294*** 0.0595 0.0843 0.0052 
 (5.65) (1.33) (1.21) (0.46) 
Tech firm 0.1650* -0.0899* 0.3203** 0.0550** 
 (1.87) (-1.7) (2.38) (2.52) 
Founders’ contributions -0.0119 0.0196 0.0029 -0.0031 
 (-0.62) (0.85) (0.07) (-0.43) 
TMT contributions 0.0439*** 0.0073 0.0025 0.0032 
 (3.72) (0.8) (0.13) (1.00) 
Corporate contributions 0.0258*** 0.0216*** -0.0193 0.0006 
 (2.56) (2.96) (-1.26) (0.22) 
     
     
Adjusted  R2 0.5525 0.5652 0.1564 0.4532 
N 1,769 1,769 1,769 1,769 
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Table 5.6: The effect of contributions on time to profitability 
This table reports the Cox proportional hazard model estimates for a sample of 1,184 U.S. IPOs over the 
period 1 January 1998- 30 June 2010. The dependent variable is the time to profitability, evidenced by a 
positive net income. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry and year fixed effects are included. 
The first column reports the resulting coefficient, the second the T-statistic and the third the 
corresponding hazard ratio. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient T-statistic Hazard ratio 
    
Proceeds 0.065** 2.29 1.067 
    
Age 0.037 0.62 1.038 
    
Earnings per share 2.830*** 17.33 1.040 
    
Leverage -0.025** -2.37 0.975 
    
VC -0.003** -2.27 0.997 
    
TMT  Size -0.007 -0.25 0.993 
    
Tech firm -0.135** -2.27 0.874 
    
Founders’ contributions 0.011 0.9 1.011 
    
TMT contributions -0.014* -1.94 0.987 
    
Corporate contributions 
(lobby+PAC) -0.019*** -2.95 0.981 
    
Likelihood ratio   392.37*** 
N   1,184 
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Table 5.7: A comparison between survivor and non-survivor IPOs 
This table reports descriptive statistics on IPO and firm-specific characteristics for a sample of 1,184 U.S. 
IPOs announced from 1 January, 1998 to 30 June, 2010 which is further divided on the basis of survivors 
(non-survivors) 5 years after the IPO. All IPOs come from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. 
The statistics provided include the mean and standard deviation for the main variables in interest and 
control variables used in the regressions. The presentation of each variable concludes with a test for 
difference in the sub-sample means. All variables are defined in Appendix A 
 
 Survivors Non-Survivors P-value   
diff in means  Mean Std Dev Mean Std dev 
      
Proceeds 202.663 388.330 120.016 482.847 0.00 
      
Age 20.237 28.919 15.313 21.212 0.01 
      
EPS 0.649 0.477 0.419 0.493 0.00 
      
Leverage 1.101 2.314 1.603 3.287 0.01 
      
VC 0.225 0.4185 0.539 0.498 0.00 
      
TMT  Size 7.18 2.62 7.56 2.89 0.15 
      
Tech firm 0.163 0.371 0.438 0.496 0.00 
      
Founders 549.85 3,804 441.267 5,228.8 0.00 
      
TMT  2,087.42 6,368.09 978.98 5,785.44 0.00 
      
Corporate  
(lobby+PAC) 
 
100,688.6 489,223.4 37,958.06 33,7328.9 0.00 
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Table 5.8: Probability of surviving in the public domain 
This table reports the probit regression estimates for the probability of survival 5 years after the IPO for a 
sample of 1,184 U.S. IPOs over the period 1 January 1998- 30 June 2010. The dependent variable is the 
probability of an IPO surviving as an autonomously quoted firm 5 years following the offering. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry and year fixed effects are included. The first column 
reports the resulting coefficient, the second the standard error and the third the T-statistic. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
          
           
    
 
 
 
Coefficient Standard error T-statistic 
 
    
Proceeds 0.340*** 0.071 4.79 
    
Age 0.006** 0.003 -2.21 
    
Earnings per share 0.381*** 0.147 2.6 
    
Leverage -0.043 0.040 -1.08 
    
VC -0.935*** 0.161 -5.81 
    
TMT  Size -0.023 0.066 -0.35 
    
Tech firm -1.020*** 0.169 -6.03 
    
Founders’ contributions 0.046** 0.020 2.28 
    
TMT contributions -0.021 0.019 -1.1 
    
Corporate contributions 
(lobby+PAC) 0.003 0.016 0.22 
    
    
Pseudo-R2   12.56 
Model Chi-square   205.66*** 
N   1,184 
171 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and concluding remarks 
 
This thesis shows that political connections may be a valuable asset in a firm’s 
effort to combat the market newness liability by conferring the necessary certification 
and legitimacy. We draw most of the empirical evidence from the process of going 
public. In Chapter 3, this is accomplished via a regression-based approach. In contrast, 
in Chapter 4, we introduce a nonparametric approach which is novel to the IPO setting 
and has general applicability when relationships of influence are suspected. In this 
respect, our analysis extends from outcome prediction to efficiency evaluation. Lastly, 
Chapter 5 broadens its scope to investigate the explanatory power of political outreach 
over additional milestone events besides an IPO. 
Specifically, in Chapter 3 we consider two possible avenues through which 
proximity to politics, signified by lobbying and PAC contributions, is likely to mitigate 
an issuer’s ex ante uncertainty. First, it is conducive to leveling the informational 
playing field among the principal IPO participants. In turn, this may be the outcome of 
the increased disclosure accompanying both of the aforementioned contribution types. 
Equally plausible is a networking argument. In particular, we acknowledge that issuer, 
institutional investors and underwrites may all come closer by virtue of their 
connections.  As a result, a niche network arises which enables the exchange of firm-
specific insight with predictions of demand and overall market sentiment. Second, we 
posit that the perceived capability to influence political elites elevates a connected issuer 
to a higher status which is discernible by the lead underwriter. Aspiring to prestige spill-
over and a recurring business relationship, the latter party is less likely to low-ball the 
IPO offer price conceding a larger portion of the surplus value to the client firm. 
Invariably, all lines of argument converge on the prediction that IPO underpricing 
should abate with corporate political donations. 
Given the multifaceted function that political connections can serve, identifying 
any of the above lines of arguments as a single, dominant culprit is unrealistic. Yet, we 
employ a series of tests. First, we visit the bookbuilding period to trace the magnitude of 
filing price revisions. If the networking channel is valid, the need for subsequent pricing 
interventions should be lower, ceteris paribus. The findings, however, fail to support a 
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superior information flow as the revisions, in absolute terms, barely differ from the rest 
offerings in the sample. Second, underwriters’ own political network is taken into 
account. Presumably, underwriters that are connected themselves are less likely to 
concede a favorable valuation on the basis of the client’s network. Yet, as the effect 
survives this robustness exercise, the bargaining power argument gains ground with an 
interesting note; rather than representing an underwriter’s attempt to cajole the IPO 
firm’s political acquaintances, a better negotiated outcome arises as a result of the 
brighter prospects that connected issuers are typically associated with. At the same time, 
we cannot relegate political connections as a means of instilling confidence in IPO 
investors. The significantly lower volatility the IPO shares realize in the aftermarket 
period is evident of the general market consensus on the liquidity and level that these 
equities will trade. 
Issuers allowing for a political budget, albeit the cash-scarcity of the pre-IPO 
regime, benefit from the opportune setting. A modest 10% increase in political 
expenditure causes a 2.5% reduction in IPO underpricing. The substantial economic 
significance of the relationship is amplified once studied in conjunction with the median 
political contribution of $ 71.5 thousand. Breaking down the effect at the level of 
individual recipients, we develop political strategies for optimal results per dollar spent. 
In this regard, we show that supporting candidacies for the House of Representatives or 
those identifying with the Democratic party produces the maximum appeal. 
Furthermore, the application of the candidate indexes of Cooper et al (2010) divulges an 
incremental effect for incumbent politicians with long tenures and a competitive career 
track within Congress. 
The interplay of political connections with IPO underpricing continues to be the 
main research question in Chapter 4, albeit from a different angle. Building upon the 
Chapter 3 evidence, we describe a framework which allows the relationships to manifest 
themselves in a data-driven manner. Specifically, we apply a frontier approach using a 
determinist-nonparametric methodology aiming to find the smallest convex cone 
enveloping the observed data. Then the efficiency is measured as the (output-based) 
distance from the estimated frontier. The objective is to create an envelope based on the 
“smallest,” or “tightest fitting,” convex cone, where the upper boundary of the “fit” will 
reveal the best practice. To this end, we apply the mathematical programming technique 
known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Using the ratios of offer prices to the first 
173 
 
 
aftermarket prices, we construct non-parametric piece-wise surfaces (i.e. frontiers) over 
the examined IPOs. Then the efficiency measures are calculated relative to these 
surfaces by the application of linear programming models. As a result we are able to 
obtain relative, comparable efficiency measures across the examined IPO sample. 
This technique lends itself well to the vastly different philosophy of lobbying 
and PAC contributions, disentangling the effect of each type on IPO underpricing. In 
doing so, it reveals a robustly positive effect of PAC money on IPO efficiency levels 
whereas the effect of lobbying entails numerous sampling and methodological 
peculiarities. Indicatively, the inverse “U”-shape relationship of lobbying money with 
IPO performance alters into a “U”-shape pattern once we preclude issuers with a first 
aftermarket price below the IPO offer price. Our sector analysis also pinpoints 
circumstances under which contributions intensity can not only squander corporate cash 
but also impair efficiency levels. The implications for prospective issuers are clear in 
the sense that political donations do not constitute a one-size fit all solution. 
Nevertheless, once the distinct type of connectedness offered by each contribution type 
matches and reinforces the firm’s position within its competitive environment, profound 
results can emerge as in the paradigm of the lobbying contributions of Energy and 
Power firms. 
In the final chapter, we assess the role of political connections on a sequence of 
other important corporate events. Again, the value-adding element of proximity to 
politics emerges as the common theme. In particular, we associate connected ventures 
with the following: (1) financial autonomy as evidenced by a longer time to venture 
capital and, subsequently, IPO financing; (2) increased turnover without, however, this 
to result in increased profitability. Notably, setting time to profitability as the dependent 
variable in a Cox proportional hazard model, political contributions significantly defer 
the occurrence of the event; (3) greater survival likelihood in the public domain. 
Recognizing that connectedness may arise through multiple sources, we comparatively 
assess contributions made by 3 distinct avenues: founders, top management team and 
centrally planned campaigns directly financed by the corporate treasury (i.e. lobbying 
and PAC). At inception, founders’ contributions account for a valuable endowment and 
suffice for a new venture to claim benefits at the early (and up to medium) stages in the 
corporate life cycle. Yet, as a distinct corporate identity emerges, founders progressively 
cease to be among the important determinants of organizational outcomes. In this 
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respect, the IPO time appears to be the turning point. Subsequently, means of 
involvement that rely on mass participation and demonstrate that the whole organization 
is on board, rather one or more prominent individuals, are preferable. Therefore, a 
firm’s political strategy is a dynamic process necessitating rebalancing with timely 
interventions, otherwise it becomes obsolete. 
6.2 Managerial implications 
 
Given the multifaceted value that a new venture can claim as a consequence of 
its political capital, monetary contributions channeled towards this purpose obtain many 
of the characteristics of an investment; for example, the initial outlay is dwarfed by the 
value of the expected benefits. As an investment, therefore, political contributions 
barely constitute a one-size-fits-all solution but require strategy in both planning and 
implementation. To this end, the type, target recipients and timing of these cash flows 
can all be of critical importance.  
Lobbying, as a message-oriented activity, lends itself to circumstances where the 
elements of communication and timely interactions with legislators are crucial. The 
Energy and Power sector, which is extensively regulated, illustrates this notion by a 
decisive advantage for lobbying IPOs. In contrast, the focused and personalized nature 
of PAC and individual contributions has an advantage when the quest is broadly for 
favoritism as in the cases of competing for government contracts or balancing labor 
union influence. More often than not, however, some combination is necessary whereby 
lobbying, by being uncapped, allows for dollar intensity and PAC for identification. 
Drawing the profiles of value-adding targets, we offer evidence from the IPO 
paradigm in favor of politicians aligning with the Democratic party and the House of 
Representatives. Home state candidacies also claim special importance. Because a 
career record of accomplishment is associated with incremental explanatory power, 
incumbents have an advantage over new challengers. In all cases, the relationship grows 
stronger with a recurring and uninterrupted stream of campaign financing than a one-off 
lump sum payment. 
The timing of cash flows is also important with regard to firm age. At early 
stages in the corporate life cycle, founders’ proprietary networks appear to offer a 
valuable endowment. Yet, as a corporate identity emerges, centrally planned campaigns 
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that engage a greater number of stakeholders and organizational layers should be 
present in order to constitute a firm ‘connected’. In this sense, a firm’s breadth and 
depth of political involvement increases in proportion to operational experience and 
tangible asset base.  
 Consequently, the institutional and competitive environment together with the 
firm’s idiosyncrasy dictates the successful political strategy. Random political 
expenditure or a pattern that fails to direct the political budget for a maximum effect per 
dollar spent nullifies the investment point of view and may represent managers’ attempt 
to reinforce their personal network and sphere of influence at the shareholders’ expense 
(perquisite consumption).  
6.3 Research limitations 
 
On the whole, our results attribute to corporate political donations a decisive 
advantage. In addition, the barrier to entry is low. Therefore, a question logically arising 
is why not even more firms have been drawn into this practice in order to claim benefits 
initiating as early as the firm’s inception and extending up to the event of corporate 
failure. We propose four reasons that may be accountable for the underrepresentation of 
IPO firms among the donors.  
 First, an issuer may align with the agency cost view. Also consistent with a 
strand of literature (e.g. Ansolabehere et al., 2003) associating political donations to 
managerial consumption of perquisites, the value-relevance of this type of expenditure 
can involve important skepticism. However, as these studies remain silent with regard 
to the special setting of an IPO, the novelty of the present work comes to the forefront. 
Regardless of whether political contacts ultimately deliver the hypothesized benefits or 
not in the post-issuance period, we show how issuers can create value by myopically 
fixating on the IPO event. Arguably, in lieu of prior empirical evidence, such 
conclusion would entail a considerable leap of faith. 
Second, proximity to politics is commonly associated with the side-effect of 
polarization. With IPO success being conditional on investor participation, this source 
of probable discomfort could alienate a fraction of market at a vital time. Therefore, 
preoccupied with attaining maximum appeal, an issuer is likely to suppress its political 
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footprint opting for the safety of an apolitical image. This argument also runs parallel to 
Masters and Keim (1985) conjecture that immensely profitable firms may shy away 
from contributions in fear of jeopardizing their status quo position. 
Third, there is the threat of unwanted disclosure due to both lobbying and PAC 
campaigns. With IPO pricing impounding both the quantity and quality of information 
provided by issuer (refer also to Leone et al., 2007), the latter one is expected to 
exercise selectivity as to the dissemination of informational cues around listing time. 
This type of self-imposed censorship can plausibly extend to political donations; the 
filing of a lobbying report requires the explicit identification of the issue being lobbied 
for and, similarly, a PAC contribution is fully traceable to the recipient level.  Thus, 
both political avenues are susceptible to revealing risk factors that management would 
otherwise prefer to conceal.  
Fourth, cash scarcity is inherent in a typical pre-IPO regime. Given the 
mounting cash outflows in the preparation for going public (e.g. towards auditing, legal 
and marketing services), an issuer may opt out of an additional, highly discretionary, 
financial burden; at least for until the IPO cash enters the corporate coffer. Non-
coincidentally, donor IPOs are more probable to exhibit positive profitability and firm’s 
cash flow level has come up among the significant determinants of a firm’s political 
involvement. 
6.4 Recommendations for further work 
 
This thesis paves the way for follow-up investigation on a number of related 
issues. Though, the pertinent list can practically be inexhaustible, we provide the 
following suggestions on the basis of thematic proximity. 
An interesting investigation can pertain to the ownership changes transpiring at 
IPO. If politically connected insiders systematically retain larger equity stakes than 
other insiders, then the former ones plausibly factor in incremental benefits in the public 
domain. At the same time, this would also be indicative of asymmetric information 
within the sellers’ side as any future economic rents due to connections are unlikely to 
be publicly disclosed or their very essence may be jeopardized. Another informative 
pattern could exist in institutional investors’ preference or aversion to firms. 
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Accordingly, that would either divulge a vote of confidence in the firm’s relationship 
capital or disdain for opaque forms of dependencies. 
If political connections confer immunity in cases of malpractices and even 
fraudulent behavior, this privilege should manifest itself in the IPO setting by means of 
reduced litigation against connected issuers. Either as a reluctance to draw negative 
attention from the firm’s political contacts or because of expectations of superior 
performance in the post-IPO regime, IPO investors are likely to withhold from 
exercising their legal rights. This status of insulation could result in a larger portion of 
proceeds to be channeled towards the intended uses rather than settling IPO-related 
lawsuits. 
Given that the influence of political connections on corporate events grows 
stronger with the time length of the relationship, a certain degree of managerial 
entrenchment is likely to emerge. This study provides substantial evidence towards this 
possibility. In particular, it is observed that connected managers’ contributions and, 
especially, lobbying and PAC campaigns, while relating to increased turnover and 
operating cash flow, significantly defer profitability. Future research could closely trace 
managerial decisions in light of a friendly government and pinpoint culprits for the 
striking discrepancy between the top and bottom line of the firm’s income statement. 
Yet another study could exclusively focus on business ventures established 
directly by politicians. If the latter ones systematically engage in areas related to their 
delegated duties in Congress, as evidenced by participating committees, subsequent 
abnormal performance may reflect more than accumulated knowledge and experience. 
Specifically, ongoing dependencies between former members of Congress and 
incumbent ones or other bureaucrats are likely to create for these businesses an undue 
competitive advantage. In turn, this entails a series of implications for politicians’ 
investment activities and the extent to which the latter ones should be subject to 
regulation. 
On a technical note, this thesis introduces a nonparametric framework to assess 
the impact of political connections. Because it is data-driven, this approach refrains 
from pre-assuming a functional form and is conducive to capturing likely nonlinearities. 
These features cater to the modeling challenges of intangible assets and even more so a 
firm’s relationship capital. Overall, this is a technique of general applicability when 
relationships of influence are suspected and, thus, future literature can rely on this or 
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other nonparametric methods for providing less biased insight.   
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Appendix A – Variables definitions 
Variables                                                            Definition 
Panel A:   IPO pricing 
 
First-day return 
 
The difference between the first secondary market closing price available on CRSP 
and IPO offer price, divided by IPO offer price. This variable is transformed into 
the regression models by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm. 
Revisions 
The difference between IPO offer price and midpoint of initial filing price range, 
divided by IPO offer price. 
Absolute revisions The absolute value of Revisions variable. 
Panel B:   Contributions 
PMC Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs with lobbying or PAC contributions, else 0. 
Political money 
The natural logarithm of all lobbying and PAC contributions made in the election 
cycle most closely preceding the IPO with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years. 
Lobby money 
The natural logarithm of total lobbying dollars in the year most closely preceding 
the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years. 
PAC money 
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards candidates in the 
election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 
years. 
House money 
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards House of 
Representatives candidates   in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, 
with an oldness cutoff set at 5 years. 
Senate money 
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards Senate candidates   in 
the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 
years. 
Democrat money 
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards Democratic candidates   
in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 
years. 
Republican money 
The natural logarithm of total dollar contributions towards Republican candidates   
in the election cycle most closely preceding the IPO, with an oldness cutoff set at 5 
years. 
Both lobby - PAC Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs with both lobby and PAC contributions, else 0. 
Just lobby Dummy variable set to 1for IPOs with lobbying contributions only, else 0. 
Just PAC Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs with PAC contributions only, else 0. 
Founders’  Contributions 
The aggregate dollar contributions made by firm’s founding members. Founding 
members are identified through the biographical information in S-1 documents. 
The contributions data is sourced from the archives of the Federal Election 
Committee (FEC). 
TMT  Contributions 
The aggregate dollar contributions made by firm’s top management team  with 
data coming from FEC. TMT members are identified through the combined use of 
S-1 documents and the Boardex database. 
Corporate Contributions 
The sum of lobbying and PAC contributions with sources being the FEC and the 
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), respectively. 
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Panel C:   IPO characteristics 
Firm age 
The number of years elapsed since firm’s foundation to IPO date, using foundation 
dates from the Field-Ritter database. The variable is transformed into the 
regressions by adding 1 and taking the natural logarithm 
Venture capital Dummy variable set to 1 for venture capital-backed firms, else 0. 
Proceeds Gross proceeds raised by the IPO estimated as shares offered times the offer price. 
Dotcom period Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs within the 1999-2000 period, else 0. 
Internet firm 
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs of Internet firms, else 0. As Internet firms are 
classified those with business description sections in Thomson Financial SDC 
containing any of  the words “Internet”, “Online”, “eBusiness”, “eCommerce”, 
and  “Website”. 
Technology firm 
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPO firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 
3578 (i.e. computer hardware); 3661, 3663, 3669 (i.e. communications 
equipment); 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (i.e. electronics); 3812 (i.e. 
navigation equipment); 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (i.e. measuring and 
controlling devices); 3841, 3845 (i.e. medical instruments); 4812, 4813 (i.e. 
telephone equipment); 4899 (i.e. communications services); and 7371, 7372, 7373, 
7374, 7375, 7378,7379 (i.e. software), else 0. 
Underwriter ranking 
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs engaging underwriters of the highest prestige 
ranking (a value of 9) in the Loughran and Ritter (2004) database, else 0. 
Share overhang 
The ratio of shares retained by the pre-IPO shareholders over shares issued in the 
offering. 
Credit crunch 
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPOs within the financial (‘credit crunch’) crisis of 
2007–2008, else 0. 
NASDAQ Dummy variable set to 1 for NASDAQ-listed IPOs, else 0. 
Market return 
The compounded daily return on the CRSP value-weighted index over the 20 
trading days trailing the IPO. 
Panel D:   Firm fundamentals 
Assets 
Assets 
 
The trailing book-value of annual assets in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Earnings per share 
Dummy variable set to 1 for positive earnings per share in the last fiscal year prior 
to IPO, else 0. 
Leverage 
Defined as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets in the last fiscal year prior 
to IPO. 
TMT Size Number of top management team members based on S-1 documents and Boardex. 
Panel E:   PMC determinants 
Regulated industry 
Dummy variable set to 1 for IPO firms with SIC codes of 4900–4939 (electric and 
gas), 1300 (oil and gas extraction), 4000– 4700 (transportation), 4800 
(telecommunications), 4950–4959 (sanitary services) and all 6000s (financial 
companies), else 0. 
Pre-IPO mgt ownership 
Percentage of total shares held by executive officers & directors prior to IPO, with 
hand-collected data from the IPO prospectuses. 
Bills introduced The number of bills and joint resolutions introduced in each 2-year Congress. 
Electoral College The electoral college votes corresponding to IPO firm’s headquarters state. 
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Cash flow 
The natural logarithm of net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
and amortization minus dividends on common and preferred stock. The data 
comes from the last fiscal year prior to IPO with all amounts in millions of dollars. 
Industry PMC 
 
The number of firms in industry (at the 4-digit level of SIC code) with a traceable 
PMC record. 
R&D Dummy variable set to1 for IPO firms reporting an R&D figure, else 0. 
HHI 
The Herfindahl -Hirschman index (HHI) of industry concentration constructed 
with net revenues from Compustat. 
Business segments The number of firm’s business segments as given by the Compustat segment file. 
Geographic segments The number of firm’s geographic segments as given by the Compustat. 
Media coverage 
Dummy variable: 1 for IPOs within the top 25th percentile of results returned by 
the LexisNexis database n the year prior to PMC, else 0. 
Government purchases 
 
Dummy variable set to1 for the five sectors topping the Economic Census list of 
U.S. public spending i.e. the sectors of defense, heath, energy, transportation and 
education, else 0. 
Unionized employees 
Percentage of industry-wide (at the 4-digit level of SIC code) participation of 
employees in labour unions as reported in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). 
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Appendix B – PAC & lobby 
Political Action Committee (PAC) is a committee that is established with the 
explicit purpose of accumulating funds for supporting a political candidate’s campaign. 
A PAC may also act pre-emptively in order to sabotage and fight against the election of 
disliked candidates. PACs dare back to 1944 and the conception of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) to form one in order to secure financing for the second 
electoral race of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Importantly, the funds were sourced 
from individual members of the union rather than the union’s treasury thereby Smith 
Connally Act of 1943. Ever since, PACs have grown in popularity (the Center for 
Responsive Politics estimates aggregate PAC contributions for the election cycle 2014-
2016 at almost $ 0.5 billion) and are commonly used by corporations, labour unions and 
a plethora of ideological groups to ensure representation by like-minded candidates. 
PACs are eligible to donate: i) $ 5 thousand to a candidate per election cycle, ii) $ 15 
thousand to any political party annually and iii) $ 5 thousand to other PACs. Given the 
diversity of PAC money sources and targets our focus on this study is PAC established 
by corporations to influence the campaign of incumbent or new candidates for a seat in 
the U.S. Senate or Houser of Representatives. Notably, the corporation is eligible to 
provide for the PAC’s operating costs only. Any amount in excess of PAC’s break-even 
point needs to come from different donors. A corporation typically circumvents this 
constraint soliciting financing from various stakeholders such as management team, 
employees, business partners and their families.  
Lobbying (or lobby) refers to the attempt of exerting influence on legislators or 
other policy makers so that they act in ways that are aligned with the purposes of a 
corporation or other interest group. The origin of the term, though is subject to debate, 
is often attributed to the gatherings of the members of the UK parliament at the lobbies 
of the building to meet representatives of the public before or after the planned 
parliamentary proceedings. Nowadays, lobbying constitutes the prevalent way for US 
firms to reach out to the Congress Chambers; in 2014 the aggregate lobbying 
expenditure reached the amount of $ 3.21 billion. Lobbying can be conducted by in-
house lobbyists or outsourced to lobbyist specialists (which may be the only feasible 
option for smaller and more resource-constrained organizations). In either case, the 
lobbyist is in charge with communicating and promoting the perspective of a client 
organization: for example a medical company would exercise pressure for stricter anti-
smoking legislation whereas a tobacco company would strive for more leniency on the 
grounds of the freedom of choice. The amounts a firm can disburse for lobbying are 
uncapped which has resulted in the skyrocketing of contributions in order to provide 
incumbent politicians with a wide variety of accommodations (e.g. trips, social event 
organizations). The opacity that generally characterizes lobbying donations has also 
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been conducive to the rapid development of the lobbying practice: the disclosure 
requirement is limited to the filing of a lobbying report as the Lobbying Disclosure Act 
of 1995 (LDA) reporting the donor, total lobbying contribution and the lobbying issue 
(in very broad terms). In our study, we rely on the dollar amount stated in these 
lobbying reports as a proxy for a firm’s lobbying intensity. 
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Appendix C – PMC search 
Illustration of a PAC search (Facebook Inc - 2012) 
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Appendix D – 1st stage results 
1st stage 
regressions 
IV method Heckman MLE 
IV method 
 (with revision) 
 
Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat. 
Proceeds 0.044*** 3.61 0.197*** 2.86 0.168** 2.51 0.051*** 3.31 
Earnings per 
Share -0.057*** -2.56 -0.305** -2.1 -0.349** -2.41 -0.046* -1.67 
Leverage -0.001 -0.77 -0.026 -0.68 -0.008 -0.29 0.000 -0.19 
Firm age -0.000 -0.04 -0.014 -0.29 -0.024 -0.52 -0.003 -0.28 
Venture Capital -0.020 -0.98 0.026 0.22 -0.003 -0.03 -0.006 -0.25 
Dotcom period -0.092*** -4.72 -0.620*** -4.9 -0.651*** -5.08 -0.080*** -3.4 
Financial crisis 0.090*** 2.57 0.413*** 3.25 0.391*** 3.1 0.079** 2.07 
Internet firm 0.072*** 2.99 0.277* 1.76 0.259* 1.66 0.060** 2.1 
Tech firm -0.016 -0.79 -0.111 -1.05 -0.082 -0.78 -0.015 -0.6 
Underwriter rank 0.024 1.28 0.125 1.1 0.099 0.88 0.032 1.41 
Share Overhang 0.005* 1.74 0.025** 2.08 0.026 2.01 0.003 1.01 
NASDAQ -0.038* -1.75 -0.037 -0.33 -0.045 -0.41 -0.035 -1.34 
Market Return 0.113*** 2.91 0.609*** 2.51 0.627*** 2.62 0.152*** 3.17 
Assets 0.023*** 3.13 0.129*** 3.08 0.154*** 3.77 0.020** 2.34 
Cash flow 0.019** 2.12 0.094** 2.06 0.098** 2.17 0.025** 2.32 
Pre-IPO mgt 
ownership 0.063*** 2.53 0.355*** 2.96 0.346*** 2.97 0.057** 2.16 
Bills introduced 0.182*** 7.56 0.889*** 6.75 0.819*** 6.30 0.200*** 7.02 
Electoral College -0.000 -0.12 -0.001 -0.28 -0.001 -0.54 0.000 0.53 
Industry PMC 0.000 1.14 0.000 1.41 0.000** 2.24 0.000 0.6 
Regulated 
industry 0.093*** 3.49 0.434*** 3.94 0.408*** 3.79 0.118*** 3.59 
R&D 0.175*** 7.79 0.914*** 7.64 0.850*** 7.18 0.180*** 6.87 
HHI -0.136 -0.97 -0.680 -1.05 -0.818 -1.29 -0.295* -1.73 
Business 
segments 0.030*** 2.8 0.090** 1.96 0.091** 2.02 0.025** 2.04 
Geographic 
segments 0.000 -0.04 -0.008 -0.33 -0.007 -0.27 -0.005 -0.98 
 Media coverage 0.053*** 3.08 0.252*** 2.71 0.241*** 2.68 0.054*** 2.63 
Government 
purchases 0.060** 2.06 0.292*** 2.29 0.336 2.68 0.027 0.79 
Unionized 
employees 0.095 0.82 0.127 0.22 0.160 0.28 0.198 1.27 
Revisions 
  
    0.518*** 4.3 
   
      
N 1,578 
 
1,578  1,578  1,173  
Pseudo-R² 0.2361 
 
0.2850  0.2850  0.2347  
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Appendix E –DEA principles and other methodologies 
 
Conventional economic theory presumes that producers are capable of working at 
maximum capacity or attain an optimum. Yet, this premise is regularly falsified in 
practice as only a fraction of them succeed in converting available inputs to outputs 
with frugality; most companies will misallocate resources IPO issuers by giving away a 
portion of their equity at a discount price comprise one more corporate finance setting 
that raises efficiency concerns. As a production problem, the study of best-performing 
practices (i.e. least-underpriced IPOs) for the purpose of emulation appears pivotal to 
leaving less money on the table. 
Comparative efficiency assessment is attainable by means of two distinct 
methodological avenues. The first one relies on econometric techniques, namely 
regression analysis and stochastic frontier analysis (an extension intended to derive the 
frontier for an assortment of functions with varying corresponding efficiency values). 
The second approach involves a non-parametric framework and conducts frontier 
analysis through the use of a mathematical programming technique known as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), which can also be viewed as an addition to the plain-
vanilla method of index numbers. Schematically, efficiency assessment may be 
represented by the following roadmaps: 
         Figure 1: Efficiency assessment  
 
 
Efficiency 
assessment
Parametric
Non-frontier
Simple 
regression 
analysis
Frontier
Stochastic 
frontier 
analysis
Non-
parametric
Non-frontier
Index numbers
Frontier
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Figure 2: Roadmap to mainstream estimation procedures 
 
 
 
Resorting to linear programming, DEA targets at determining weights (set of) that will 
maximize the efficiency of each IPO firm (decision making unit) in the sample with the 
constraint that none of the firms can assume an efficiency score in excess of 1 (100%) at 
the respective weights. DEA not only permits heterogeneity of these weights across 
issuers but is also capable of capturing nonlinear associations between inputs and 
outputs. A unit is deemed inefficient if its efficiency score is dwarfed by another one at 
the same set of weights. The efficient firms collectively comprise the peer group and the 
benchmark from which the inefficient unit derive their efficiency score. Accordingly, at 
the first-stage of the DEA model, we obtain the ratio of offer price to first aftermarket 
close in order to develop non-parametric piece-wise surfaces over the sample. With 
reference to this efficient frontier, the DEA estimation assigns efficiency scores to each 
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firm in the sample. In turn, the estimated efficiencies are used as the second-stage inputs 
in order to examine their variation based on the influence of the exogenous factors 
under study (i.e. lobbying and PAC contributions). The process can be graphically 
represented by the following chart: 
 
Figure 3: DEA estimation 
 
 
DEA estimation, though is discarded by IPO research mainly in favor of parametric 
non-frontier analysis, can offer numerous advantages in the study of IPO underpricing. 
First, overcoming the need of assigning a functional form, DEA estimation exhibits the 
least bias with regard to the alternative frontier methods (even though the data-driven 
approach implies an inability to define a goodness of fit that would allow for 
comparability across different specifications and models). To the best of our knowledge, 
IPO underpricing literature (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995 and Jain and Kini, 
1994) pre-assumes a linear association with the postulated determinants (for example, 
underwriter reputation, industry, firm size, venture capital, share overhang, exchange of 
listing). Second, such variables raise important endogenous concerns stemming from 
either the possibility that they are simultaneously determined with IPO returns (Carter et 
al., 1998, Loughran and Ritter, 2002, 2004) or are affected by omitted terms. For 
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example Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003 speculate that external financing, as in the form 
of venture capital, was a greater necessity during the overheated period of 1999-2000 
compared to earlier years. Moreover, the same study shows a high correlation between 
high-technology firms, NASDAQ (as the preferred exchange), a small size and the 
presence of venture capital.IPO underpricing and underwriter reputation as shown in or 
Third, DEA compared to regression analysis and, to a degree, over SFA considers only 
the efficient decision making units in deriving the frontier. This is an advantage as the 
best practices are revealed and the rest units derive a efficiency score that is indicative 
of their distance from the optimal performance. To illustrate the use of DEA in offering 
appropriate benchmarks for issuers, let us consider two IPOs: IPO A with an offer price 
of $2 and a first aftermarket close of $4; IPO B with an offer price of $10 and an 
aftermarket close of $20. Because both cases yield an initial return of 100%, the focus 
on underpricing conceals the disparity in absolute price appreciation (i.e. $2 and $10 for 
IPOs A and B, respectively) providing no information on whether the issue is ‘cheap’ or 
‘expensive’. Consequently, in terms of relative performance assessment, each IPO 
misleadingly appears to be an appropriate benchmark for the other. Fourth, DEA is 
mathematically less demanding than SFA (especially true for baseline DEA forms) 
and, because of its simplicity, the method is more frequently observed, especially 
in operations research.  
Looking to the future, natural computing (NC) and the use of algorithms, though 
still at an infant stage, can facilitate common financial modeling and optimization 
problems (refer to figure 4 for a schematical overview of the algorithmic process). 
Drawing motivation from the natural phenomena, such methods seek to establish the 
parallels to processes featuring in asset allocation, portfolio selection, risk management, 
derivatives valuations and more (refer to Bradazon et al., 2012 for an overview of 
seminal studies). Quintana et al., 2005 and Chou et al., 2010 extend the use of NC to the 
IPO setting letting the IPO returns to be predicted by common covariates from the 
underpricing literature (e.g. share overhang, listing exchange, amount of proceeds) 
according to pre-assigned algorithmic patterns. In both cases, the findings demonstrate 
that the performance of the algorithmic constructs greatly depends on the fitness 
function and the maximum of computational reiterations permitted. Additionally, the 
studies converge on the vitality of the calibration procedure; it is shown that the optimal 
parameters depend on the problem specification, the fitness function and the algorithmic 
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variants. The implication is that slight alterations of the algorithmic forms can give 
remarkably different results. Given these shortcomings, DEA estimation remains for the 
time-being least as a more robust and significantly less-computationally intensive 
approach. 
Figure 4: Key Step on Estimation based on Evolutionary algorithms 
 
 
 
 
 
Genesis
• Define a random or hand-picked sample of N likely 
solutions.
Evaluation
• Evaluate units in the sample through the application of a 
fitness function. 
Survival of 
the Fittest
• Create a special subset of units for those attaining a top 
fitness score. 
Evolution
• Give rise to new offspring through random combinations of the initial
(parent) solutions. The evolution becomes possible via a unique or
multiple evolutionary operators. The most typical processes are
mutations and cross-over. Mutation creates clones with a slight
variation (e.g. reversing a single digit in a sequence of digits). Cross-
over involves the break-down of parents to further pieces that it
subsequently reshuffles and assigns into a new combination.
Iteration
• Reiterate stages 2 to 4 until a satisfactory outcome results 
or a natural barrier (e.g. computing power) restricts the 
process.
